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History and the Conquest
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PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THESE Lectures, first published twenty years ago, have been for some time out of print. They are now reprinted with very slight changes. I have not attempted to improve the language, though I find many uses of words, phrases, names, which a maturer taste would have led me to alter. I have merely made about a dozen verbal changes where I thought that the expressions used were either lacking in clearness or likely to mislead.

In reading what I wrote twenty years ago, I cannot but be struck with the way in which the lessons which I attempted to enforce then are still needed word for word now. The subject prescribed for me did not take in the history of the Ottoman Turks, and, in a course of historical lectures given while the madness of the Crimean war was still raging, it was not my business to treat directly of the immediate politics of the time. But the general history of Mahometanism, its character and its workings, did form part of my subject. And from them I drew some

lessons which are as true and important now as they were then. I enforced then some obvious truths which the public mind is now far more disposed to accept than it was then, but which seem to have made much less progress with the slower understandings of men whom official routine hinders from looking facts in the face. That nothing is to be hoped for from so-called Turkish reforms is a truth which is made clear at a glance alike by the history of the past and by those facts of the present in which the history of the past is continued. The experience of the past taught me twenty years back that nothing was to be looked for from the promised reforms of Abd-ul-Medjid. The experience of twenty more years has shown that I was right; nothing has come, except to make matters still worse, of the boasted reforms alike of Abd-ul-Medjid and of Abd-ul-Aziz. For this I claim no prophetic power, no special sagacity of any kind. What I said twenty years ago was the simple utterance of common sense, the utterance of truths which were obvious then to every man who did not allow himself to be carried away by the cry of the moment. What was then the cry of the moment has now passed away; the number of Englishmen who venture to use their common sense on the matter is much larger now than it was then. It is only among the official repeaters of formulæ that, instead of the experience of past and present, we get only the parrot-like utterance of phrases, some of which perhaps once had a meaning, but

om all of which all traces of meaning have long passed away.

At this moment the people of south-eastern Europe are striving for freedom. They are striving to throw off the yoke of ages, the yoke of the foulest tyranny on earth. Their independent neighbours of their own race have come to their help, as the men of one half of England would go to the help of the other, if the other half were held down under Turkish bondage. Every generous heart in Europe is longing for their success in their noble and righteous struggle. Every generous heart in Europe is burning with indignation at the foul deeds with which the oppressor has striven to put down the revolt of victims whose patience was at last exhausted. Yet the Prime Minister of England stands up in the Parliament of England to make the evil deeds of the oppressors a subject of brutal merriment. He strives by every paltry shift to keep the plain truth from the knowledge of those who hear him, till the truth which he attempts to hide is made known by evidence which even he cannot withstand. When the history of Bulgaria in the nineteenth century is written, it will be written, not according to the version of Mr. Disraeli, but according to the version of the *Daily News*. So again, in the same spirit of sneering at all that is good and noble, the same speaker, later still, ventured to say that all Servia wanted was "provinces." Doubtless Servia does wish for "provinces." The Prince

and people of Servia doubtless do wish for the territorial increase of the Servian principality. But the territorial increase of the Servian principality means the increase of the area of freedom, the decrease of the area of bondage; it means that another portion of the earth's surface should be set free from a foreign yoke; it means that another portion of mankind shall be restored to those rights of common humanity which Mr. Disraeli seems to grudge them. No case can be plainer. Here is a great struggle of right and wrong, in which the facts of history join with every generous impulse of our nature to lead every man who can see and feel to the side of right. But traditional formulæ would seem to cut off all power of seeing and feeling; they seem to condemn our statesmen to the duty of defending the wrong and sneering at the right.

The evidence of past and of present facts, as they are recorded in this little book, and as they stand out unmistakeably before our eyes, teaches us two lessons. Even under the very best Mahometan government, it is impossible that men of other religions than the Mahometan should have real political equality with Mahometans. It is impossible, because it is contrary to the first principles of the Mahometan religion. The unreformed, intolerant, Turk has the better of the argument with the Turk who professes reform and toleration, because the unreformed Turk is consistent according to his own principles, while the reforming Turk is not. Even under the best Mahometan

government, the non-Mahometan is doomed to political inferiority, and under a bad Mahometan government, political inferiority is sure to grow into actual personal oppression. What it has grown to be under that system of organized brigandage which in the courtesy of official language is called the Ottoman government, we see with our own eyes. All experience, past and present, proves that in such a case reform is hopeless. The evil thing cannot be changed; it must be got rid of. These are the simple dictates of common sense, the unanswerable inferences drawn from all experience past and present. But from the answer made by the Earl of Derby to a deputation which set forth these obvious truths, it would seem that within the official range of understanding, common sense is allowed no play, that within that range it is forbidden to give any heed to the experience either of past or present. To the simple truths set before him, the Foreign Secretary of England answered by a series of fallacies which are indeed worth preserving in any collection of curious sophisms, but which could hardly have misled any mind unfettered by official trammels. Lord Derby was simple enough to believe that the fact that Christians, Mussulmans, and Hindoos can live together on terms of perfect equality under the English government of India, proved that Christians and Mussulmans could live together on terms of perfect equality under the Turkish "government" of Romania. I need hardly explain to any one who reads this little book the nature

of a fallacy which on a less serious subject would be amusing. But to any who may like to be saved the trouble of thinking, I may point out that, when the proposition is that Mahometans and non-Mahometans cannot live together under a Mahometan government, it is no answer to say that they can live together under a government which is not Mahometan. This last proposition is true enough: Lord Derby might have added that it is proved by the experience of Russian as well as of English dominion. But Lord Derby must have sadly forgotten his logic before he thought that the truth which he set forth was any answer to the truth which was set forth to him. With the same simplicity, Lord Derby thought that he had found another answer in the fact that in past times both Jews and Christian heretics have been worse treated in Western Europe than Christians are now in South-Eastern Europe. He forgot the simple fact that in Western Europe the condition of the Jew and the heretic has been getting better and better, till in many countries all religious disabilities have vanished altogether. Meanwhile the condition of the Christians under the Turkish yoke has been getting worse and worse. That is to say, a Christian government, however bad, is capable of reform. The government of the Turk is incapable of reform; because in truth it is no government at all, but simply organized brigandage.

This last truth is one that should be clearly understood. The rule of the Turk is not government; it

is not even misgovernment. It is the mere domination of a gang of robbers. If a burglar breaks into a house, we do not call it misgovernment; and the so-called "government" of the Turk is simply an act of burglary prolonged for centuries. The dominion of other conquerors became lawful as soon as their dominion became "government," as soon as the conqueror and the conquered became one nation with a common interest. As soon as the sovereign gave protection, the subject owed allegiance. But in the case of the Turk, the conqueror and the conquered remain as distinct as ever; the so-called "sovereign" gives no protection; therefore the so-called "subject" owes no allegiance. To the people of Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and the other enslaved lands the Turk is not a ruler; he is not a countryman; he is as much an alien enemy as when he first crossed the Bosporos. Add to this that, since the great Sultans gave way to the small ones, the rule of that alien enemy has gradually reached a degree of corruption and oppression in detail, such as was quite unheard of even among the earlier Ottomans, much more under the nobler Saracens. The so-called Ottoman government is, as I just now said, simply a rule of a gang of robbers; and it is the rule of a gang of robbers without a captain. The rod of Bazajet the Thunderbolt, of Mahomet the Conqueror, and of Solomon the Law-giver, drops daily from the feeble hands of the wretched beings who successively profane their titles, beings so abject that they barely

excite a listless curiosity as to whether they are sane or insane, drunk or sober, dead or alive.

Such a state of things as this cannot be reformed; it must be swept away. The position of political inferiority to which even the best Mahometan government must condemn its non-Mahometan subjects is aggravated by the inborn cruelty and faithlessness of the Ottoman character into that reign of terror against which Bosnia, Herzegovina, and less lucky Bulgaria have risen. They have risen, not to reform the rule of the Turk, but to free the land which is theirs and not his from his hateful presence. It was perhaps a more charming display of simplicity than all the rest, when Lord Derby, in one of his despatches, said that the insurgents "seemed to be fighting, not for administrative reforms, but for independence." That men should fight for independence seems to be in the eyes of Lord Derby a new and a strange thing. Those who do not shut their eyes either to the past or to the present know that men have often in the like case fought for independence, and that, whenever the like case comes, they will fight for independence again. When a land is suffering from simple misgovernment, its people will fight for administrative reforms. Eng lishmen have so fought in many centuries from the thirteenth to the seventeenth. But when the evil is not mere misgovernment which may be reformed, but the presence of an invading horde carrying havoc into the lands and homes of other men, they do not fight to win administrative reforms from that alien horde;

they fight for independence; they fight to cleanse their land altogether from the presence and the evil deeds of the stranger.

Those again who do not shut their eyes to the experience of the past, will not be greatly surprised nor greatly shocked, if those who have risen to get rid of the most brutal of tyrannies have now and then repaid the evil deeds of their tyrants in kind. It is strange how hard some people find it to understand that the yoke of a barbarian tyrant is not an improving discipline. They seem to think it something strange and unnatural if, after four to five hundred years of dealing with the Turk, his victims should now and then have shown themselves a little Turk-like. We believe that we in our own land have made no small progress in the course of the last four or five hundred years. We should hardly have made that progress if we had been all that time the subjects of the Turk. In such a case our progress would most likely have been the other way. It would be very much to our credit if we kept ourselves from getting a good deal worse than we were five hundred years back. We may believe that Bosnia and Bulgaria in the fifteenth century were less advanced than England was at the same time. Since then they have had everything to make them worse, and nothing to make them better; yet not a few people seem to think it monstrous if they do not in everything come up to the standard of Western Europe in our own time. Whenever we speak of the

atrocities of the Turk, we are immediately told by Mr. Disraeli or some one of the same spirit, that there are atrocities on the other side also. It is however a remarkable fact that, till Europe began to ring with the true tale of the atrocities of the Turk, very little was heard of atrocities on the other side. When men began to see what the Turk really was, it was found convenient to say that the other side was as bad. Now I can well believe that ugly deeds have been done on the insurgent side as well as on the Turkish side. The experience of all history teaches that this is no more than is to be looked for. Very ugly deeds were done by Hollanders as well as by Spaniards in the great revolt of the Netherlands, very ugly deeds were done by Greeks as well as by Turks in the War of Independence. But in the first place, in none of these cases was the amount of ugly deeds on the insurgent side at all to be compared with the amount of ugly deeds done on the side of the oppressors; and in the second place it is monstrous to look on deeds of retaliation, however horrible, as being of the same degree of moral blackness as deeds of wanton oppression. In all reasonable morality the vices of the slave ought to be largely set down to the account of his master. Be the Christians of the East as bad as their worst enemies represent them, while the Turk is amongst them they cannot mend; take away the Turk and they may mend. But the official rule seems to be to make the least of the evil deeds of the wanton oppressor, to make the most of any

evil deeds which may be done in withstanding his oppression. The foulest deeds of the Turk are gently censured as "excesses," while any deviation on the part of the patriots from the highest standard is at once raised to the technical rank of an "atrocity." It is the strangest of all arguments that, because people have not improved under a degrading and corrupting yoke, they should therefore, as a punishment for not improving under it, be condemned to remain under its weight.

On some of these points I venture to think that this little book, written in 1855, may throw some light in 1876. What was true then is true now, with the experience of twenty years more to confirm it. As to the book itself, I did not attempt any revision of it, because I really knew more of eastern history when I wrote it than I do now. The six lectures were the result of a good deal of reading of the kind described in the original preface, reading which I have not since kept up, except in the case of the life of the Prophet himself. On that subject I have, long since this book was written, contributed an article to the *British Quarterly Review* for January, 1872, which was the result of a good deal of study of more recent books, German and English. I must therefore leave the book as it is to take its chance. From professed eastern scholars I can only beg a charitable construction. Defective of course they will find it; I shall be satisfied if they find the general impression that it gives to be accurate as

far as it goes. To western readers I believe that it may still have the kind of use described both in this preface and in the original one.

A few passages may require some little comment. I can now have no need, as I had in p. 138, to make any kind of apology for the Montenegrins and the prince. No reproach of "freebooting" or the like applies to the people who, under two vigorous princes —the name of Vladika is no longer in use since the princes ceased to be Bishops—has made greater advances than any other state in Europe has in the same time. In p. 151 I got perhaps a little too rapturous over the character of Isabella of Castile; and both in p. 92 and 161 I was led, by a natural indignation at the way in which a hero of Constantinople has been neglected, to do scant justice to one of the heroes of Germany. Leo the Isaurian and Charles Martel may be placed side by side as the two deliverers of Christendom at its two ends. I am also now inclined to look somewhat more favourably than I was in p. 194 on the English kings who had a share in the Hundred Years' War. One can feel very little respect for the empty chivalry of Edward the Third; but it is certain that he was goaded into war by the endless attempts of Philip of France upon Aquitaine. Henry the Fifth, a statesman and captain of the highest order, had at least a technical justification. Between Bretigny and Troyes there was no peace; the peace of Bretigny was undoubtedly broken on the French side. Henry

the Fifth inherited a war which he was technically justified in beginning afresh at the end of any time of truce. All that he did was to change a lingering and desultory war into a war carried out with the highest wisdom and energy.

COLCHESTER,
August 4, 1876.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE present Volume consists of a somewhat revised form of a Course of Lectures delivered last year before the Philosophical Institution at Edinburgh, at the request of that body. They are given to the world under the idea that a brief survey and commentary on the principal facts of Mahometan History might be acceptable to a considerable class of readers. It is even possible that to many there may be some advantages in a treatise composed, not by a professed oriental scholar, but by one who looks at Eastern history with Western eyes, and who is therefore naturally inclined to give most attention to those parts of his subject which, in the way either of connexion or contrast, possess some bearing upon the history of the West.

The course, as laid down for me, included the Spanish Arabs, but excluded the Crusades (which were assigned to another lecturer), as also the history of the Ottoman Turks. The Spanish division of this subject I endeavoured to avoid, but the Council of the Institution regarded it as indispensable. To all the other portions of the history I had given more or less attention before I was called upon to lecture; but to Spain I had never devoted any attentive study; I was therefore placed in the awkward position of reading in order to lecture, instead of lecturing

because I had read. I had also to get up the story how I might from a private library which had been collected without any special reference to the subject. There can be no excuse for either writing or lecturing on a whole subject with which one is insufficiently acquainted; there may be some for not declining a whole subject on the ground of inadequate information on one small portion of it.

I have thought it necessary to bring forth, as distinctly as I could, the position of the Roman and Persian Empires at the time of the Arab invasion, and the relation of the Eastern and Western Empires to the Caliphate. And here I must record the great benefits which I have derived from the writings of Mr. Finlay, who has stood forth with such learning, and, I may add, such courage, to vindicate an important and neglected portion of history from the contempt poured upon it by combined ignorance and misrepresentation. On this, and on some other points connected with these Lectures, I would venture to refer to two articles contributed by me to the "North British Review," one on *the Byzantine Empire*, in February 1855, and another on *Mahometanism in the East and West*, in August 1855.

The last Lecture does not belong to strictly Saracenic history, but the subjects contained in it are highly interesting in themselves, and they seemed necessary to complete the cycle. I must here acknowledge my great obligations to Sir John Malcolm's History of Persia and to Mr. Elphinstone's History of India. These are books which a western student may fairly be expected to read, and he may derive great benefit from so doing. Mr. Erskine's History of India under Baber and

Humayun, evidently a work of first-rate research and criticism in its own class, belongs rather to the professed oriental scholar.

With regard to the spelling of oriental names, till oriental scholars shall have agreed on one uniform mode of orthography, those who do not claim that title may be pardoned if they fall into some inconsistencies. All that I have endeavoured to do has been to spell the same name in the same way throughout the book. But writing, as I have done, from different authors in different places, I am by no means clear that I have succeeded even in this humbler attempt. I may add, that it is equally desirable to fix some certain rule for the spelling of Greek names. Those who read no Greek book newer than Aristotle may perhaps not feel the difficulty; but to those who take in the whole cycle of Hellenic literature, from Homer to Trikoupes, it is a very practical one. There can be no good reason for expressing early Greek names through the medium of Latin, and more recent ones through that of French or Italian. There is no reason why we should talk of *Mavrocordato* and *Colocotroni* any more than of *Alciviadhi* and *Aghisilao*. The only way is to write letter for letter in all names, old and new. This has been done partially by Mr. Grote, more completely by Professor Max Müller in the recent Oxford Essays. In the few Greek names introduced in the present Lectures I have done the same as far as I dared.

One exception I would make in both classes of names. When a name is thoroughly naturalized, and has acquired an English form, I would retain that form. Thus I call the Arabian Reformer *Mahomet*, rather than *Mohammed* or *Muhammad*. Indeed, I would

carry this rather farther than is commonly done. Many old Hebrew names are in common use both among ourselves and among the orientals. In such cases I think it is of more importance to mark the fact of such community of use than to express the exact Arabic or Turkish pronunciation. I therefore call the great Sultan *Solomon*, rather than *Solyman* or *Suleiman*. I would, if I dared, call the conqueror of Spain *Moses*, and the devastator of Peloponnesus *Abraham*.

In days like these, and especially with such a subject as this, it is impossible to avoid all reference to recent events. Some allusions will therefore be found to the present state of the Ottoman Empire. If any one cares to see more of somewhat unpopular views on that point, I would refer him to some of the tracts contributed by me to Sir Arthur Elton's series entitled "Tracts for the Present Crisis."

OXFORD,
May 23rd, 1856.

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HISTORY AND CONQUESTS

OF

THE SARACENS.

OF THE
BOMBAY
BRANCH
OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC

LECTURE I.

THE WORLD AT THE COMING OF MAHOMET.

THE rise and progress of the great Mahometan nations forms a subject which possesses an interest of its own, of a character altogether different from that of almost any other portion of history. In studying the records of Greece, of Rome, of mediæval Europe, we are studying the history of our own predecessors, of men and of nations whose direct influence we carry about us to the present day. From the days when art and civilization and freedom first sprung into being in their native soil of Hellas to the last event recorded by the contemporary chroniclers of our own stirring and eventful age, all are but links in one great chain ; every event influences every subsequent event in the direct relation of cause and effect. European history forms one great drama, which can never be thoroughly understood if divided by unnatural and arbitrary barriers into "ancient" and "modern." It is essentially the history of progress. There have been some times of real, and more of apparent retrogression; but, as a whole, the system of Western society has gone on steadily developing for nearly three thousand years. One nation has been worn out, and another has taken its place ; but the work has never entirely stopped for want of hands to carry it on. Western society may be easily distinguished by three characteristics.

It is a system governed by Law. It admits of every form of political constitution; but in all, despotic or democratic, written law and not an arbitrary will is at least supposed to be the rule. Again, in domestic life, monogamy has been, with very few exceptions, the immemorial custom of every Western nation; and women have, with a rather more numerous list of exceptions, been regarded as the equal partners of the other sex. Again, for many centuries past, it has been distinguished as a system which assumes the Christian Religion as an integral portion of its being. Europe and Christendom were long synonymous expressions; and, if we may so construe Europe as to include European colonies, they remain so still. In fact, the immemorial habits of the European nations prepared them in many respects for the reception of the Gospel; while its character, as a system purely of religion and morals, was no impediment to the European mind in its career of progress. Christianity prescribes the general obligations of justice and mercy; but it prescribes no form of political government, no system of civil jurisprudence. We may then define European society as a progressive, a legal, a monogamous, and, for the last fifteen hundred years, a Christian society.

In direct opposition to all this stands the social and political condition of the eastern nations. Earlier as it appears in the field of history than the West, the East has lagged far behind the development of its rival. The East contained mighty empires, of vast power and great external splendour, with a sort of civilization, a sort of art, a sort of science, while the West was shrouded in a darkness which neither history nor tradition can penetrate.

Egypt and Assyria probably contained palaces and temples, regular monarchies and organized priesthoods, while wild beasts or naked savages roamed over the future sites of Athens and Rome and Florence and London. But while the West has been progressive, the East has been stationary. If we may trace the germs of modern European society in our first glimpses of infant Hellas, we may see the empire of Ninus or of Nabuchodonosor reproduced in every essential feature at the court of any modern oriental despot. While the West has been ruled by preordained laws, the East knows no government but the will of arbitrary rulers. No check is known except the sanctions of religion, no appeal except to the conscience of the despot or the longsuffering of his subjects. Again, as the East has always known despotism for its political, it has always known polygamy for its social state. And, just as many of the characteristics of Western society have been developed and purified by Christianity, so the characteristics of the East have been stereotyped in their general character, though reformed in many of their details, by the preaching of that wonderful religious system, whose history forms the subject of our present consideration. We defined the West to be progressive, legal, monogamous, and Christian; we may define the East to be stationary, arbitrary, polygamous, and Mahometan.

From the two characteristics which I have designated by the words "stationary" and "arbitrary," there arises in oriental history a certain sameness and monotony which we do not find in the history of any western country. In European history we find indeed most remarkable and most instructive analogies

between events of widely distant ages and countries, but they are analogies which perhaps afford even more instruction in the points of difference than in those of similarity. In the East analogy rises well nigh to identity; instead of the gradual development of political systems, we find only the personal substitution of ruler instead of ruler, of dynasty instead of dynasty, of nation instead of nation. A western people, groaning under oppression, removes the tyranny itself by a Licinian Law, a Magna Carta, or an Oath of Rutli; an eastern people never looks farther than to effect a personal change in the tyrant, while the tyranny remains untouched. The great mass of events in oriental history is summed up in one brief and typical narrative in the Hebrew Scriptures—"The people who followed Omri were more than the people who followed Tibni. *So* Tibni died and Omri reigned."

From this it follows that there are large portions of oriental history which are alike unprofitable, and well nigh impossible, to be remembered by any but those who make oriental history the study of their lives. The mind refuses to be burthened with the genealogies, or with the massacres, of the countless series of unknown princes and unknown dynasties which flit across the canvas in dazzling and perplexing succession. All western history is interesting; all western history is instructive. The records of some ages and of some countries are of course far more interesting and instructive than others, but none are absolutely without a charm and a lesson. There is no single city or district, however small, of old Greece, of mediæval Italy, of Switzerland down to our own day, whose internal history cannot afford more poli-

tical information than the whole succession of oriental governments from Nimrod to Abdul-Medjid. Not a spot, not a year, of western history deserves entire neglect; whole centuries and Empires in the East may be safely passed over by all except professed oriental historians. Here and there a hero or a monster appears on the scene whose glory or whose crimes at once rivet our attention; the pure virtue of an Akbar and the splendid infamy of a Timour are as attractive as any personal narratives in the history of the West. The whole succession of those tremendous scourges of God who reared the vast fabric of Ottoman oppression forms one of those portions of the history of the world which deserve our most attentive study. A more pleasurable interest may be found in the twofold regeneration of the Persian nation, twice, after ages of slavery, in the third century and in the fifteenth, called to new life by the preaching of a national religion. Persons, dynasties, nations such as these, stand out conspicuously, and arrest our attention, in marked contrast to the dull succession of despot after despot, of dynasty after dynasty, whose names, to which we hardly attach an idea, are forgotten as soon as read. But far above all stands out that marvellous history on which we are now about to enter; the history of Mahomet and his Creed. Call him Prophet, Reformer, or Impostor, as we will, the camel-driver of Mecca, the conqueror of Medina, soars above every other man recorded in the history of the East. Nowhere in the history of the world can we directly trace such mighty effects to the personal agency of a single mortal. He found a barbarous and disunited people; he left a flourishing empire, which actually existed for centuries, and

which in its effects exists to this day. He put forth a new religion; so have others before and since; but his religion was not destined to influence a single sect or a single nation; it was to stamp the mind and the destiny of the whole oriental world; to be at once the truest of false religious systems and the deadliest antagonist of the truth itself. No man was ever more emphatically a reformer in the history of his own age and country; no man was ever more emphatically a destroyer in the general history of the world.

The history of this wonderful man, and of the establishment of his religion by himself and his first successors, is one of those points in oriental history which challenge the attention alike of the philosopher, the historian, and the Christian, no less forcibly than anything in the history of the West. Other points too there are in the later history of the Mahometan nations, which, though they cannot compete with the interest and importance of the earliest times of Islam, are well worthy of diligent study. One especially, the marvellous career of the Ottoman Turks, might well nigh rival that of the first followers of the Prophet. But this is a subject by itself, one so vast and so interwoven with many others that it would be utterly impossible to deal with it as something merely subsidiary. In like manner the history of the great struggle between Islam and Christendom, for the possession of the Holy Land, is not purely oriental history, but belongs to the history of East and West alike. My own immediate subject embraces the history of the establishment of Mahometanism, and of those Mahometan nations which could lay any claim to civilization or historical importance, with the great exception of the Ottoman Turks. This subject

will naturally divide and arrange itself in the following manner.

It is needless to say that, thoroughly to realize the nature and results of the changes effected by Mahomet, we must thoroughly understand the state of things which he found in existence both in his own country of Arabia, and in those adjoining empires of Rome and Persia, which were, the one wholly conquered, the other greatly diminished, by the victories of his first successors. And as this brings us into a portion of history which has been far too much neglected, and is generally very imperfectly understood, I shall treat it rather more at length than might otherwise have been necessary with matter merely introductory. I shall therefore devote the whole remainder of the present Chapter to the state of *the World at the Coming of Mahomet.*

The second, on *Mahomet and his Creed*, I shall devote to the personal career of the Arabian Prophet, and to the general character of the religion which he established.

The third, on *the Undivided Caliphate*, will embrace the romantic history of the first successors of Mahomet; the conquest of Persia, Syria, and Egypt; the origin of the great schism between the followers and the enemies of Ali; the Ommiad Caliphate of Damascus; and the final establishment of the Caliphate in the house of Abbas.

In the fourth, on *the Saracens in the East*, I shall trace the history of the Abbaside dynasty, the gradual weakening and dismemberment of the Saracen power, by the appearance of rival Caliphs in Spain and in Egypt, and by the growth of various Turkish dynasties in the East. This general subject I shall carry

down to the commencement of the Crusades, continuing the history of the Caliphate itself down to its final extinction as a temporal power by the hands of the Moguls.

The fifth, on *the Saracens in the West*, will be devoted to the history of the Mahometans in western Europe, to the Caliphate of Spain, the states which arose out of its ruins, and to the Saracenic settlements in France, Italy, Sicily, and Crete.

Finally, in my sixth Chapter, I propose returning to the remoter East, to a consideration of *the Later Dynasties of Persia and India.* We shall there see Mahometanism under very various and some very remarkable forms. The Persian dynasty of the Sophis, the Indian dynasty of the Moguls, the victories of Ishmael and Baber, the purer glory of the illustrious Abbas and the still more illustrious Akbar, will be found among the most attractive portions of oriental history, and by no means devoid of an important practical reference at the present day.

With thus much of preface, I will now endeavour to produce a general picture of

THE WORLD AT THE COMING OF MAHOMET.

When Mahomet commenced his career, the two prominent powers of the world were the Empires of Rome and Persia. They divided between them all the fairest and most famous regions of Europe, Asia, and Africa; and their relations with each other had the most important bearing upon the career of the Prophet and his followers. As soon as they carried their arms beyond the Arabian peninsula, it was at

the expense of these two powers that their first conquests had to be won. Within a few years after the death of Mahomet, Persia was entirely subdued, and Rome was shorn of its oriental provinces.

Mahomet was born in the year 569, in the reign of Justin II., Emperor of the Romans, and of the famous Khosru or Chosroes, surnamed Nushirvan, King of Persia. The Roman Empire, the seat of whose government was then fixed at Constantinople, the New Rome, still extended over nearly all the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. The commands of Cæsar Augustus were still obeyed from the Atlantic to the Euphrates. And it is quite erroneous to look upon the Empire seated at Constantinople at this period as having as yet at all assumed the character of a Greek state. Not only did both sovereign and people, as indeed they did for ages after, recognize no title but that of Romans, but Latin was still the official language of the Empire, and in many provinces it was still the language of the people. It should be remembered that what is ordinarily called the Fall of the Western Empire, in 476, was, in its formal and outward aspect, the reunion of the Western Empire to the Eastern. The Roman Senate voted that a separate Emperor in Italy was unnecessary, and the imperial insignia were returned to the Emperor of the East, who was now held to be the sole sovereign. Odoacer and, after him, his conqueror, the great Theodoric, reigned in Italy really as independent Kings, but nominally as lieutenants of the Roman Emperor at Constantinople. In the next century, when the Gothic monarchy had lost the vigorous guidance of Theodoric, the murder of his daughter Amalasontha gave the Emperor Justinian a

fair pretence for interfering in the affairs of Italy. By his great generals Belisarius and Narses the Gothic monarchy was overthrown, and the whole peninsula, with the great good will of its Roman inhabitants, was reunited to the Empire. Africa also, in the Roman sense, that is its northern coast, together with the southern part of Spain, and the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, were also similarly reunited. In short, with the exception of Britain, Gaul, and northern Spain, Justinian reigned over very nearly the whole extent of the dominions which had been subject to any Emperor since Aurelian. He kept his court at Constantinople, but Constantinople was not yet thoroughly and definitively Greek. He reigned also over the old Rome, and over Carthage, the capital of a province as truly Roman as Italy itself. In the East too the Empire still retained the oriental provinces of Syria and Egypt. It will be seen that the whole circuit of the Mediterranean, except the coasts of France and Aragon, formed part of this vast Empire. The Franks in Gaul were supposed to be allies, but were formally released from even nominal dependence. Our own island had quite passed out of the imperial calculations.

It would probably have been much wiser if Justinian, reigning, as he did, at Constantinople, had been contented to be a Greek Emperor, and had confined his policy to his eastern dominions. In fact he greatly neglected them, and, while his generals were conquering Italy and Africa, the Persians waged a formidable warfare on the Euphrates, and every wandering horde from the north braved him with impunity in his capital. But the idea of any but a Roman Empire never occurred to any one. As

Emperor, it appeared his right and duty to recover the dismembered provinces, whose Roman inhabitants still looked to him as their legitimate sovereign. And in truth, in every political sense, Justinian and his Empire were essentially Roman. The Eastern nations, especially, during the whole Byzantine period, knew the Empire by no other title, and the Roman name exists to this day, both in formal and in familiar use, as the designation of the Greek inhabitants within the Ottoman dominions. The year before Mahomet's birth, a large portion of Justinian's conquests in Italy were lost by the invasion of the Lombards, but large districts, including Rome itself, were retained. Indeed some portions of southern Italy remained attached to the Byzantine Empire five hundred years after.

The Roman possessions in Asia consisted of the peninsula of Asia Minor, Syria, and part of Armenia. To the east lay the great kingdom of Persia, the constant rival and enemy of Rome. As the two Empires were almost always engaged in warfare, the boundary was extremely fluctuating, but the Romans could never maintain themselves permanently very far to the east, nor the Persians at all to the west, of the Euphrates. The Kings of Persia at this time belonged to the illustrious dynasty of the Sassanidæ, the greatest of whom probably was Nushirvan, the prince reigning at the time of Mahomet's birth. The greatness of Persia under this dynasty is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of the world. The old Persian monarchy, that of Cyrus and Darius, was, I need not say, overthrown by Alexander the Great. After the partition of his Empire, Persia remained for some time subject to the Seleucidæ, the

Macedonian Kings of Syria. Then came the Parthians, probably a Turkish tribe, who entered the country from the north-east, and founded a mighty empire, which all the power of Rome could never vanquish. The Parthian Kings, however, were by no means opposed to the spread of western ideas in their territories; both Greek civilization and the Christian religion made considerable progress under them. But in the third century of our æra a wonderful revolution took place; the native Persians after six centuries of bondage, rose in revolt, overthrew the Parthian dynasty, and proclaimed as their King Ardeshir or Artaxerxes, who was said to be a descendant of their ancient princes. He founded the dynasty of the Sassanidæ, which reigned down to the Mahometan conquest. As far as regards its political and military relations, the revived Persian kingdom simply stepped into the place of its Parthian predecessor, and carried on the long struggle with Rome with still greater energy. But in an intellectual and religious point of view, the change was a most important one. The revolution which again gave Persia a native King was essentially a national and a religious one. The creed, language, and manners, of ancient Persia were alone to be tolerated. Thus the spread of Christianity in the East received a most formidable check. The national existence of Persia became closely connected with the creed of Zoroaster. In like manner we may say that the existence of the Roman Empire had become inseparably interwoven with the religion of Christ.

The Persians must, I suppose, be counted among heathen nations, but their creed, as long, at least, as it retained anything of its original purity, cannot be

classed among forms of idolatry. It was perhaps the most remarkable of the many attempts to solve the greatest of moral and religious problems, the existence of evil in God's creation. The fact of the existence, we might say the predominance, of moral and physical evil in the world, strikes the thoughtful man at every glance. Every fault or weakness of himself or his neighbours; every undeserved calamity of the righteous man, every reverse of the righteous cause; nay, every instance of pain, sickness, and death; storms too, earthquakes, blight, ravenous beasts, unfruitful seasons, the constantly recurring veil of darkness, were all instances of one great class of Evil, which it seemed difficult to reconcile with the existence of a single Almighty Being, all-righteous, and all-benevolent. They all seemed as if they must emanate from a being of a malignant nature, the foe of man and of his divine guardian. Hence arose the peculiar character of the old Persian religion. It recognized indeed one Supreme Being, but one that could hardly be called a personal Deity, a dim and shadowy abstraction, known as Time without Bounds. The real energies of the universe were divided between the contending powers of Ormuzd and Ahriman, the lords of light and of darkness. Ormuzd, the beneficent and holy being, the guardian and friend of man, was engaged in perpetual strife with his rival, the evil and malevolent Ahriman. Their warfare too was typified on earth. Persia, or Iran, was the holy land of light, the chosen heritage of Ormuzd, the home of his faithful servants, the royal seat of his representative on earth. Beyond its boundaries lay Turan, the land of winter and of darkness, whence Ahriman sent forth his barbarous votaries to ravage the sacred land of

the lord of light. A creed like this, of so philosophical a character, was accompanied, in its earlier days, by a ritual no less pure and elevating. Under the old Persian monarchy Herodotus describes them as possessing neither temples nor altars; they worshipped under the expanse of heaven, and their devotions were directed by the sublime precept that no man should pray or sacrifice for himself alone; he must pray for the King and for all other Persians. An organized and powerful priesthood, the famous Magi, were the chiefs of this religion, and swayed the consciences both of King and people. But in later times the Magian religion had greatly fallen off from the purity of the original teaching of Zoroaster. The visible type of Ormuzd was the physical lord of light, the sun; and his visible type was the sacred fire, which became the practical object of adoration in the temples which were no longer forbidden. And though the Persians never perhaps fell into absolute idolatry, their religion became infected with much mysticism and superstition, which in later times had a most important effect on the Mahometan faith.

As the Persian Empire was inseparably connected with fire-worship, so the Roman seemed no less bound up with Christianity. With the Persian his religion and his nationality were identical; the same revolution had recovered both from the dominion of strangers. And the preaching of Galilæan fishermen had made a conquest hardly less complete of the Empire of the Cæsars. The whole Empire was now entirely Christian; the last feeble remnants of paganism, a few speculative philosophers of Athens, disappeared under Justinian. In fact the history of those times has its

main interest centred upon ecclesiastical matters. A despotic power extinguished all political life and discussion; but much of freedom still existed in the constitution of the church. The active minds of the age therefore betook themselves to the synod instead of to the pnyx or the forum; nations, subdued but neither crushed nor incorporated, adopted a religious dogma as the badge of their nationality, and waged war with anathemas instead of armies. The busy mind of the Greek, the speculative mind of the Oriental, devised countless forms of heresy; the practical and lordly intellect of old Rome was already beginning to build up a new fabric of Roman domination. The Bishops of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch, were acute logicians, eloquent orators, subtle controversialists; those of Rome were already profound statesmen, paving the way by which their successors advanced to spiritual empire. As yet there were no signs of formal separation between East and West; though at the very time when Mahomet commenced his mission, the claims of the Roman see were already beginning to excite jealousy in the rival Prelates of Constantinople. The great struggles of those times was to be seen in the Eastern provinces of the Empire.

It should be observed that though the Empire embraced so many different nations, all were alike regarded as Romans; all professed the same Christian faith; all accepted the same Græco-Roman civilization; all spoke either the Greek or the Latin language, or some modification of one of them. Such was the *primâ facie* aspect of the whole Empire; and from the Atlantic to Mount Taurus it was a true one. At the time when the Teutonic irruptions began, the old

languages and the old national feelings lingered on only in remote and obscure corners, such as Wales, parts of Spain and Africa, and some tribes in the interior of Asia Minor. But these races could contribute nothing to the intellectual, religious, or political life of the Empire; they did not affect the general truth of its thoroughly Greek and Roman character. But in the Oriental provinces, Syria and Egypt, the case was widely different. They had been for centuries portions of the Roman Empire. For centuries before the Roman conquest they had been ruled by Macedonian Kings. They contained many Greek cities, two of which, Alexandria and Antioch, were for a long time the greatest cities of the Grecian world, the most famous centres of Hellenic literature and cultivation. But Syria and Egypt each boasted of a language, a literature, a civilization, a general national being, earlier than that of Greece and Rome. And these elements of national life were only overshadowed, not extinguished, by Macedonian and Roman domination. Syria and Egypt were not hellenized; Antioch and Alexandria remained Greek colonies in a foreign land. And indeed, when the seat of government was transferred to a Greek city, Byzantium became the great centre of Greek intellectual life, so that Antioch and Alexandria lost something of their Greek character and became more identified with the national life of the provinces. That national life, as was natural in those ages, took an ecclesiastical turn. The Syrians and Egyptians showed their independence by the establishment, not of rival dynasties, but of rival forms of belief. They adopted Christianity, and became among its most zealous professors; but they adopted it in forms moulded by the national character, and

alien from the standard of Roman and Byzantine orthodoxy. The truth or falsehood of these views on the most mysterious points of our religion does not concern our present subject. The doctors alike of Greek, Roman, and Protestant theology agree in condemning them ; but it is certain that the Nestorian and Jacobite heresies were the national faith of the national churches of Syria and Egypt. Anathematized by Catholic Councils, persecuted by Catholic Emperors, the inhabitants of those provinces became as lax in their civil as in their spiritual allegiance. Heresy became the badge of nationality ; the orthodox party were *Melchites*, literally Royalists, men of the Emperor, assertors of a foreign and usurped jurisdiction. When the seventh century commenced, they were very precarious and unprofitable appendages to the Roman Empire, ready to fall away at the first touch of an invader.

The heterogeneous assemblage of nations within the Roman Empire, their religious dissensions, and the doubtful tenure of the distant provinces, formed a marked contrast to the strong religious and national unity of Persia. But Rome had one great countervailing advantage. Persia was an ordinary Oriental despotism ; its government consisted in the arbitrary sway of one man, with no check on his personal will except the obligations imposed on his conscience by religion. The national life moreover seemed bound up in the sway of one family, those glorious descendants of Sassan who had restored to Persia her national independence and her national faith. But the Roman Empire, hardly less despotic in practice than the Persian, was still emphatically the Empire of Law. The Imperial power, which had gradually

grown up from Augustus to Diocletian, still retained something of the old constitutional forms. The whole legislative and executive power were indeed practically vested in the sovereign; but that sovereign was in theory not an hereditary monarch but an elective magistrate. Election indeed sometimes took the form of revolution, sometimes that of quiet hereditary succession; but in theory the sovereign Roman People were conceived to transfer by a formal act to the ruler of their choice those attributes of sovereignty which were held to be inherent in themselves[1]. There was still a Roman Senate, a Roman People; some of the old republican titles lingered on; Belisarius invaded Italy in the character of a Roman Consul, and that nominal office, abolished by Justinian, was restored by his successor Justin, to the delight of a people who still venerated the name. The Roman Emperor then, himself the creature of law, was bound to rule according to law. Justinian himself, the great restorer of the Empire, is still more famous as the compiler of that great system of Roman Law, which has formed the groundwork of the jurisprudence of nearly every European nation. The subject of his Empire, though enjoying no more real political rights than his foe beyond the Euphrates, not only contrasted his heathen blindness with his own orthodox Christianity, but, as a Roman citizen, living, as he deemed, under a system of law and liberty, he looked down with contempt on the Persian bondslave,

1 "Quod Principi placuit, legis habet vigorem; utpote quum Lege Regiâ, quæ de ejus imperio lata est, Populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat."—Digest., lib. i. tit. iv.

The popular origin of the Imperial power was therefore clearly the theory as late as the reign of Justinian; but of course ideas of this kind gradually died out in the later Empire.

who knew no law but the caprice of an arbitrary will.

I have already said that the Romans and Persians were almost always engaged in warfare. Their last and most terrible war was contemporary with the preaching of Mahomet. Its immediate cause is to be found in the internal revolutions of the two countries. Khosru or Chosroes, surnamed Parviz, the Persian King, being expelled from his kingdom, took refuge in the Roman territories, and by the assistance of the Emperor Maurice, regained his throne. In 602 Maurice was murdered in a revolution at Constantinople, and the brutal and bloodthirsty tyrant Phokas was placed on the throne. Khosru, under pretence of avenging the wrongs of his benefactor, invaded the Roman provinces, and commenced a war which lasted more than twenty years. The wretched Phokas did nothing to hinder the complete conquest of the Asiatic provinces, and the Persian Empire was again, as it had been in the days of Darius, extended to the Mediterranean and the Ægæan. But in 610, almost simultaneously with the commencement of Mahomet's mission, the great Heraclius, son of the exarch or governor of Africa, with the general good will of all the provinces, sailed to Constantinople, deposed and slew Phokas, and assumed the Empire. For some time he was obliged to submit to the sight of a Persian army encamped at Chalkedon, but after some years' preparation, he entered on a series of campaigns which place his name alongside of those of Hannibal and Belisarius. Leaving the Persians in possession of his own dominions, he struck at the heart of the enemy's country; by a series of victories, one of them gained on the site of Nineveh, he utterly overthrew

the Persian power, till Khosru was slain by his own subjects, and his successor Siroueh concluded peace. From that time Persia was the scene of a series of intestine commotions till it fell an easy prey to the Saracens. In 629 Heraclius returned in triumph to Jerusalem, and almost at the same moment the Roman territories were first attacked by the followers of Mahomet. The Prophet had no doubt been diligently watching the course of the war, which is once at least directly alluded to in the Koran[1]. He could not but see the immense advantage which he gained by finding the two greatest powers of the world utterly exhausted by this tremendous struggle. In such circumstances it seemed hardly possible that either could resist a new enemy, full of such vigour and enthusiasm as the early Saracens. Yet we shall see that of the provinces of Rome it was only the disaffected eastern portions, just recovered from the Persians, which the Mahometan invaders could subdue. Those provinces where Roman dominion and Greek theology had thoroughly taken root, resisted for centuries; they only fell when the Saracens themselves had fallen also, and when a new race of Moslem conquerors had taken up their place and mission.

The Arabian peninsula, the native land of Mahomet, lies on the confines of the two great rival states, and was therefore naturally brought into relations with both. Some of the tribes on the confines had become the dependent allies of Rome and Persia respectively,

[1] Koran, cap. xxx. "The Romans." Sale (ii. 258) translates *Al Roum*, "the *Greeks*," which of course obscures the fact that *Roman* was the only name known to the Orientals. Maracci (ii. 536) has, properly, *Romani*.

In this chapter, composed during the triumphs of the Persians, Mahomet predicts the future successes of the Romans.

and some of them had adopted the religion of their powerful friends. But as a general rule, the Arabs have maintained their independence from patriarchal times to the present day. A very unnecessary controversy has been raised on this point. Christian divines have thought it necessary to assert, in an exaggerated way, the absolute independence of Arabia at all times, in order to maintain the credit of the promises to Ishmael recorded in the book of Genesis. Gibbon, on the other hand, and writers of his school, in order to invalidate the force of those predictions, have brought into equally exaggerated prominence every instance of Arabian subjection to a foreign master. The fact is that, though different parts of Arabia have at various times been subjected to strangers, yet, as a whole, compared with most other countries, it may be fairly said to have always been independent. No people of sufficient note to have a history have preserved their race so pure through a long course of ages as the Arabs of the peninsula; none have been so generally free from subjugation by foreign conquerors. Persians, Macedonians, and Romans failed to make any extensive or permanent impression. In later times neither Western nor Eastern conquerors have overcome them; neither the Frankish Crusader nor the heathen Mogul ever violated the sanctity of Mecca or Medina; and even the authority of the head of their own law, the Ottoman Padishah himself, has generally been, in the greater part of the peninsula, of the most nominal character.

It ought to be noticed, as being probably one of the moving causes of Mahometanism, that in the period immediately before the coming of Mahomet,

the independence of Arabia had been more extensively violated than perhaps in any preceding or subsequent age. The great kingdom of the Hamyarites in Yaman in southern Arabia had for some generations been tributary to the Christian sovereigns of Abyssinia, till in the reign either of Khosru Nushirvan or of Khosru Parviz[1], the then prince of Hamyar transferred his allegiance to Persia, and after his death the country was governed by Persian viceroys. In other parts of Arabia the various tribes and cities were, for the most part, alike independent of foreigners and of one another; but, as I before mentioned, the frontier Arabs, forming the kingdoms of Hira and Ghassan, had long been the allies or vassals of Rome and Persia respectively. It was one great object of Mahomet's mission to unite the whole of the Arabs under one head, and to lead them to the conquest of those foreign powers to which a portion of them had owned submission.

The manners of Arabia have often been described. They exhibit the spirit of the East in its primitive and patriarchal form, as yet unbroken by the pompous slavery of despotic courts. In the East unhappily government has always been synonymous with despotism, generally with tyranny; liberty has always been synonymous with anarchy. The Arab was free, but his freedom was not, like that of the old Greek or the modern Englishman or American, a civil freedom enjoyed in common with his brethren; it was the mere absence of any legal restraint upon his individual action. Every man of a free tribe was himself his own Cæsar and Chosroes; every man

[1] Sale (Koran, i. 14) makes it the former; Wright (Early Christianity in Arabia, 146) makes it the latter.

asserted the royal prerogative of avenging his injuries by the sword; many assumed the further royal prerogative of appropriating their neighbours' goods at pleasure. Again, in a regular Oriental state, nothing is more remarkable than the absence of hereditary rank or rights. Wherever any such exist, it is at once a sign that the central power is not thoroughly established. No democracy is half so levelling as a true despotism. All men indeed are not "free and equal," but all men are at least "equal," as being alike the slaves of their Caliph or Padishah. But nowhere is the feeling of ancestry so vigorous as among the tribes of the desert; without the aid of heralds or kings-at-arms, the science of genealogy flourishes in its utmost perfection. Among the Arabs of the days of Mahomet all the virtues and vices of the half-savage state, its revenge and its rapacity, its hospitality and its bounty, were to be seen in their full force. Gambling, drunkenness, and unrestrained licentiousness abounded; the horrid practice of female infanticide was prevalent among the pagan tribes. Learning or literature in a strict sense hardly existed, but the quick intellect of the Arab was always ready with a native vein of rhetoric and poetry, and nowhere did compositions of this kind procure greater honour for their authors.

The wild Arab of the desert and the comparatively civilized Arab of the cities naturally differed in many respects, but the same great elements of national character may be discerned in each. Both alike are widely distinguished from the contemporary Romans and Persians, and from their own descendants when their day of empire came. In the most civilized of the independent Arabs, those of Yatreb

and Mecca, the tribe feeling had led to the establishment of a form of government aristocratic rather than despotic. The noblest tribe was the Koreish, the noblest family of the Koreish was that of Hashem; the family of Hashem then were the rulers of Mecca and the guardians of its Kaaba. Arabian nobility however did not, like that of Europe in the middle ages, confine itself to war; every Arab was of course a warrior, but the warrior did not despise the character of a merchant, nor deem it inconsistent with his own. The riches of Mecca and Yatreb were derived from commerce. To our ideas commerce seems strangely out of place in cities removed from the sea and still farther removed from any navigable river. But in the East, and in Arabia above all, the track of the caravan has borne on it greater riches even than the ships of Tarshish. Mecca, placed at the intersection of two such tracks, was the great emporium where the goods of India and of Africa were interchanged, and where the gold of the Roman Empire was weighed against the spices of the "Happy" Arabia.

In short Mecca, without being at all the political capital, was both the commercial and the religious centre of the whole peninsula. The original religion of Arabia appears to have been the patriarchal monotheism. Down even to the time of Mahomet the professors of Sabianism had by no means lost all knowledge of a single personal Deity. One supreme God was still worshipped, but, in the language of the Koran, they "gave Him companions;" they paid adoration to various subordinate powers, to the host of heaven—Sabaoth, whence, it is said, the name of Sabianism—to three female intelligences spoken of as the daughters of God, to various national, local,

and family idols. One feature of their superstitious worship is too remarkable to be passed by. In offering their first fruits and similar oblations, the offering was divided into two parts, one for God, and one for the idols. If any portion of the share of the idols fell over into the space set apart for God, it was carefully replaced, but if any of God's share was mingled with that of the idols it was allowed to remain. The supreme Deity, they held, was less exacting, and more easily pacified than His subordinates. In this reasoning they probably transferred to the court of heaven what they might have observed in those of earth. In every despotic government, the most formidable oppressor is generally he who rules with a delegated authority; the Grand Turk or the King of Kings has commonly been just and merciful compared with his Satraps and Pashahs.

The great temple of this religion was the Kaaba of Mecca, built according to Arabian tradition, by the patriarch Abraham, whom so large a portion of the Arabs reverence as their forefather, and by him dedicated to the true God. Others make it well nigh coeval with the world. Adam, when expelled from Paradise, sighed after the celestial temple to which he had been accustomed to direct his worship; in answer to his prayers, a representation of it was let down from heaven, which lighted at Mecca, immediately under its celestial prototype. Some say it was drawn up again on the death of Adam, others at the deluge; according to the former theory its place was supplied by an erection of the patriarch Seth, which was lost in the deluge. This building was in after ages, reedified by Abraham and Ishmael; and traces of their presence are still extant on the sacred spot.

There is the print of Abraham's footstep; there is the holy well Zemzem, identified by a bold stretch of geography, with the spring that rose miraculously from the earth to quench the thirst of Hagar and Ishmael in the wilderness, There too is the black stone, once white, but which has changed its hue, either from the sins of mankind or from the kisses of the faithful. This was one of the stones of Paradise which fell down with Adam; being taken up at the deluge, it was brought to Abraham by the angel Gabriel as a sacred ornament for his restored temple. Such are the legends. By whomsoever founded, there is no doubt that the Kaaba has been more than once rebuilt both before and since the time of Mahomet. To what faith soever it was first dedicated, there is no doubt that he found it the great centre of worship and place of pilgrimage for the idolaters of Arabia. There they came to worship and to sacrifice to the 360 graven and molten images which had accumulated within it; there they compassed the temple seven times naked, as putting away the encumbrance of their sins; there they ran backward and forward seven times between Mounts Safa and Merwa, to commemorate Hagar seeking water for her son; there they threw seven stones in the valley of Mina, to commemorate those which Abraham threw at the Devil, when he sought to disturb the patriarch in his offering of Ishmael. For Ishmael, as might be expected, takes a higher place than Isaac in Mahometan reverence, and he, and not his younger half-brother, is held to have been the real intended victim. That all these rites themselves formed part of the ancient Sabian worship cannot be doubted; but we may very well suppose that the legendary

explanations of them were the device of Mahomet or his commentators.

The Sabian creed however was by no means the universal religion of Arabia. Many Jews had settled in the peninsula, and had made numerous proselytes among the native inhabitants. Other tribes had largely embraced Magianism. Christianity also had made extensive and rapid advances. It was chiefly known in the Jacobite form, that prevalent in Egypt and Ethiopia; but some few were Nestorians, and Arabia also produced heretics of its own, including some who worshipped the Virgin Mother of Christ as a sort of goddess, with an offering of cakes. Two months before the birth of Mahomet, a miracle alone, it is said, saved the Kaaba from being converted into a Christian church. The great kingdom of the Hamyarites had at one time professed Judaism, and the Christians were cruelly persecuted. Its subjection to Abyssinia, which has been already mentioned, was the consequence of an invasion of the Abyssinian monarch to avenge the wrongs of his Christian brethren. Abrahah, the vassal King of Hamyar, was a zealous Christian. He erected a splendid church in his capital, Senaa, not without a political motive, like that of Jeroboam, that its attractions might draw away pilgrims from Mecca, and thereby draw away influence from the rulers of that city. An idolater of Mecca contrived to enter the church by night, and besmeared it with filth. Abrahah's demands for redress were rejected by the Koreish, who ruled at Mecca, and the army with which he then proceeded to enforce his claims was discomfited before the holy city.

Had the expedition of Abrahah succeeded, the whole destiny of the East might have been different.

Mahomet might have been brought up as a Christian, and he would thereby have lost the main inducement which led to his prophetic career. His spirit would not have been moved within him to see his native city wholly given to idolatry. No wonder then that such an event is, perhaps unconsciously, adorned in the Moslem traditions with marvels in proportion to its importance. The tale is briefly alluded to in the Koran,[1] and is greatly expanded by its commentators. It was no human hand which smote Abrahah and rescued the Kaaba. The elephants which he brought in his army stood awe-struck and immoveable before the holy place. Presently appeared a flock of green birds, each of whom let fall three stones—from its bill and its two feet—on the army of Abrahah, each stone being marked with the name of the soldier whom it slew.[2] Lest their bodies should prove offensive to the Meccans, a flood swept them into the sea. Abrahah, alone, fled to the court of his Abyssinian suzerain, and recounted his calamity. Asked by the King what manner of bird had wrought such destruction, he pointed to one over head. It had followed him from Mecca, and reserved its fire till this moment. But it too carried a stone, which, like the rest, had its billet, and Abrahah fell down lifeless before the whole Abyssinian court. The inventors of this tale do not seem to have perceived the inconsistency of representing God as fighting for infidels, and working miracles to prevent His temple, desecrated by idolatry, from being transferred to a creed which, according to Mahomet's own showing, was *then* the last manifestation of His will.

[1] Chap. cv. "the Elephant," (Sale, ii. 503.)

[2] The Koran says merely that "God sent against them flocks of birds, which cast down upon them stones of baked clay."

Idolatry then was the prevailing religion of Arabia, but Judaism, Christianity, and Magianism numbered many votaries. It should be observed that none of the Arabian religions presented the same obstacles to Mahomet's teaching which the early Christians found in the polytheism of Greece and Rome. The corner-stone of his creed is the proposition, "There is but one God." Now to the worshippers of Zeus and Athene, the notion of a single, personal, almighty Being was something unheard of and unintelligible. Here and there a philosopher or two had grasped the merest approximation to the idea. But all the Arabian creeds recognized it more or less clearly. With Jews and Christians there was of course no difficulty. The Sabians recognized one supreme God, though they associated idols with His worship. The Magian idea of "Time without Bounds" was perhaps too shadowy to be practical; but all that was needed was to confess that Ahriman was not the coequal rival of Ormuzd, but one of his creatures in rebellion against him.[1]

There can be no doubt that the coming of Mahomet took place at a time when there was a great religious movement going on in Arabia. Some of the pagan Arabs had cast off all religion, and had become positive infidels. Others were seeking after something better, and were making approximations, more or less close, to clearer views of the divine nature.[2]

Such was the condition of Arabia and the two great Empires between which it lay, during the early part of the seventh century. A very hasty glance will suffice for a survey of those countries which lay beyond

[1] See Elphinstone's History of India, i. 512.

[2] See a deeply affecting narrative on this head in the powerful article on "Mahometanism" in the *Christian Remembrancer*, January, 1855, p. 105.

the power of Persia and Rome. In the extreme East, India slumbered on in its immemorial religious and social state; hardly any trace remained of the Macedonian invasion, or of the Greek kingdom of Bactria to which it gave rise. In the extreme West the Gothic monarchs of Spain had taken advantage of the eastern wars of Heraclius to annex the Byzantine province, and thus to reunite the whole peninsula. In Gaul the Merovingian dynasty was running its course of crime, dissension, and weakness. Northern Europe was still chiefly Pagan, but the first step to its conversion was taken, in Augustine's mission to England, about fifteen years before the first preaching of Mahomet. In northern Asia the Turkish and Mongolian tribes had not commenced those migrations through Persia which were afterwards of such infinite moment to the Mahometan world; they rather poured to the north of the Caspian and Euxine Seas into those north-eastern parts of Europe where everything was unsettled. Huns, Avars, Chazars, passed through what is now Russia and northern Turkey to trouble the Roman frontier on the Danube; and the æra of the more permanent settlement of the Bulgarians is not far remote. Heraclius had permitted Slavonians to occupy the Illyrian provinces, there to grow up in time into the valiant Christians of Servia and Montenegro and the Mahometan oligarchy of the neighbouring Bosnia. In short, the Roman and Persian Empires seemed the only settled governments in the world; beyond their limits was little but barbarism, anarchy, and national migrations; and Rome and Persia alike, exhausted by their long conflict, seemed too weak to resist the attacks of a fresh and vigorous invader. It was indeed a moment for Mahomet and his Saracens to change the face of the world

LECTURE II.

MAHOMET AND HIS CREED.

I NOW enter fully into my subject, into the history and teaching of the great Arabian legislator, who was destined so completely to change the face of the world in his own age, and to exercise so important an influence upon it for all time. And in dealing with the character of this mighty man, I rejoice that justice can now be dealt to it without fear of misconception or misrepresentation. It is no longer thought any part of the duty of a Christian writer to see nothing but wickedness and imposture in the author of the great antagonistic creed. And let me observe that this is by no means wholly the result of recent political events. Many indeed, because Britain has become, rightly or wrongly, the close ally of a Mahometan power, have deemed it their duty to take up the cause of Mahometans in general; and strange indeed have been the misrepresentations both of the past and of the present which this supposed necessity has occasioned. We have been told that Islam is a mild, tolerant, and beneficent creed, so far from being a foe to literature and civilization that there was a time when its professors monopolised all the literature and civilization of the world. We have been told that the presence of a Mahometan power in Europe is not only a political necessity, but something absolutely desirable in itself, and that it would be a bad day for liberty and civilization when a Maho-

metan despot should cease to be enrolled among the sovereigns of what once was Christendom. For my own part, as one anxious to do justice to an illustrious man, I beg to disclaim all views of this kind. Mahomet, the legislator and reformer of Arabia, I venture to revere along with the legislators and reformers of other lands. But Mahometanism, seated on the ruins of Christianity and civilization, I can only regard as an object of abhorrence. Because I can appreciate a man who was a benefactor to his own age and country, I am not prepared to rejoice in the presence of his degenerate disciples in ages and countries for which they are manifestly unfit. So far from my wish to do justice to Mahomet arising from any sympathy with existing Mahometanism, my real and heart-felt admiration for the ancient Arab does not even lead me to look with the slightest complacency upon the modern Turk. I reverence the man who could gather the scattered tribes of his people into one great and united nation, who could sweep away the idols of the heathen from the ancient temple of the Divine Unity. But this does not lead me to rejoice in seeing his supposed representative enthroned as lord over millions of our Christian brethren, or in hearing his creed professed within the most glorious temple of our religion. Mahomet the chief of Arabia, Mahometanism within the walls of the Kaaba, are very different things in the eye of a Christian historian from the Caliph of Mahomet seated upon the throne of the Cæsars, from the rites of the Mahometan law performed beneath the spreading cupola of St. Sophia. In brief, so far from admiring Mahomet from any love for the Turks, I cannot bring myself to love the Turks because I admire Mahomet.

A truer appreciation of Mahomet and the early Mahometans has been steadily growing for a long time. And that, not merely among ephemeral politicians or superficial oriental tourists, not merely among professed oriental scholars, who might be biassed by the direction of their favourite studies, but among historians, philosophers, and divines of various Christian churches. Till at least the last century the truest and most liberal account of the Mahometan system was to be found in the mediæval traveller Sir John Maundevile. Writers, like Sale, who ventured to do some justice to Mahomet and his followers, were branded as being themselves Mahometans. But the time is now past for such productions as those of Father Maracci and Dean Prideaux, or even for the Bampton Lectures of Dr. White. Gibbon, of course, favoured Mahometanism, as being a form of opposition to Christianity; but Gibbon had hardly the turn of mind fully to appreciate a great national reformer and a great religious enthusiast. A more liberal spirit now prevails, and men have learned to recognise both greatness and goodness in the heroes of systems alien from their own. Protestants can now do justice to the great Popes and Saints of the mediæval Roman Church; Christians can now do justice to the apostles and heroes of the Mahometan law. In fact, it shows very little confidence in our own system not to be ready fully to recognize whatever amount of excellence may be found in that of our adversaries.

It is no part of my intention to enter on a detailed biography of Mahomet. I shall rather confine myself to those salient points in his life which tend most to illustrate his character and mission. Such are his first

mission at Mecca; his first appeal to arms after his flight to Medina; and his first invitation to nations beyond the limits of Arabia. These points clearly mark three great stages in his career, perhaps three changes in his own character and in that of his teaching.

In the first stage of his prophetic career Mahomet appears as a preacher of righteousness, a meek and persecuted apostle. He next developes into a warrior and conqueror, uniting the scattered tribes of Arabia under one bond of spiritual and temporal obedience. Finally, he commences that career of universal proselytism and conquest which he left to his successors to accomplish as regards so large a portion of Asia, Africa, and Europe. Let us contemplate the most important actions of his life in each of these three characters.

Mahomet, the son of Abdallah, was born of the noblest race in Mecca and in Arabia. To his family belonged the hereditary guardianship of the Kaaba and a high place among the aristocracy of his native city. Personally poor, he was raised to a position of importance by his marriage with the rich widow Khadijah, whose mercantile affairs he had previously conducted. In his fortieth year he began to announce himself as an Apostle of God, sent to root out idolatry, and to restore the true faith of the preceding Prophets, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. Slowly and gradually he makes converts in his native city; his good wife Khadijah, his faithful servant Zeyd, are the first to recognize his mission; his young cousin, the noble Ali, the brave and generous and injured model of Arabian chivalry, declares himself his convert and Vizier; the prudent, moderate, and bountiful Abu-Bekr acknowledges the pretensions of the daring

innovator. Through mockery and persecution the Prophet keeps unflinchingly in his path; no threats, no injuries, hinder him from still preaching to his people the unity and the righteousness of God, and exhorting to a far purer and better morality than had ever been set before them. He claims no temporal power, no spiritual domination; he asks but for simple toleration, for free permission to win men by persuasion into the way of truth. He is sent neither to compel conviction by miracles, nor to constrain outward profession by the sword. He is but a preacher sent to warn men that there is one God and that there is none other but He, that all that He requires is that men should do justice and love mercy, and walk humbly with their God, and, as the sanction of all, that there will be a resurrection of the dead, as well of the just as of the unjust. Such was the teaching of one who in his own person fulfilled the duties which he taught, a thoroughly good and righteous man according to his light. As yet at least his hands were not stained with blood, nor his inner life with lust. The faithful husband of Khadijah, the beneficent master of Zeyd, the firm friend of Abu-Bekr and Omar and Othman and Ali, he was at once just and bountiful in his dealings with his fellow-creatures, and full of zeal and devotion for the God whose sole claim to adoration he proclaimed. As yet nothing can be alleged against his life which even a higher morality than that of the Koran could condemn. His virtues *may* have been hypocrisy, his mission *may* have been imposture; but have we a right to assert this of any man, above all of one whose every action creates a presumption in his favour?

The days of persecution at last are over; the day of power and victory commences. The Prophet who had no honour in his own country is received with homage in the city of refuge. Gradually he appears in a new character; the persecuted apostle is transformed into the triumphant warrior; he is no longer come to send peace, but a sword; where the warnings of the Prophet have failed to convince, the strong arm of the conqueror must compel. The faithful are bidden as their first duty to wage warfare with the unbelievers; angels fight at the side of the conquerors of Beder and bear to paradise the souls of the martyrs of Ohud.[1] No competitor is to be endured; no toleration to be granted to unbelievers, who do not at least redeem their lives by submission and tribute. He who had once asked for mere toleration for himself, now applauded as heaven-sent a judgement which condemned seven hundred captives to the slaughter.[2] He who in his youth had lived as the faithful spouse of the aged Khadijah, now in his own age, multiplies wives to himself, absolves himself from the restraints of his own law, and brings forth divine revelations to justify in himself the gratification of passions which he condemned in others. Yet, whether his head was turned with unexpected prosperity, whether the sincere enthusiast had become a conscious impostor, his old mission and his old virtues had by no means wholly forsaken him. Whatever his motives, whatever his intentions, he at least rose

[1] At Beder Mahomet was victorious, as he professed through angelic help; at Ohud his followers were defeated.

[2] The Jews of Koraidha, when besieged, agreed to surrender to the discretion of Saad, one of Mahomet's companions, who, in revenge for a wound he had received, pronounced the ferocious judgement in the text.

far above the vulgar claims either of temporal conquerors or of spiritual pretenders. He was still the servant and apostle of God, and claimed no homage in any other character. A vulgar impostor would have claimed miraculous powers or have decked himself in the pomp of earthly royalty. But Mahomet still only proclaimed himself as God's Prophet; personal honours he disclaimed; his demeanour was as courteous and equable as ever; the friends of his adversity were never forgotten. Crown and sceptre, court and palace, he had none; the lord of Arabia lived in the humblest dwelling, on the plainest fare, accessible to the meanest of believers. The master of thousands of willing slaves still patched his own shoes and milked his own cattle, as he had done when his whole substance consisted of five camels and an Æthiopian maidservant. Though he had condescended to adopt baser means to compass his end, that end was still the proclamation of the unity and the righteousness of God. Sublime indeed is the scene when the victorious Prophet made his triumphant entry into the sacred city, where he had preached so long, and whence he had been driven at the peril of his life. Compare Mahomet with his own degenerate followers, with Timour at Isfahan, with Nadir at Delhi, with the wretches who in our own times have desolated Chios, and Cyprus, and Kassandra. The entry of an eastern victor is ordinarily the signal for plunder and massacre, alike of the armed and the unarmed, of the innocent and the guilty. Mahomet had his wrongs to avenge; but they are satisfied by a handful of exceptions to a general amnesty, and the majority even of these are ultimately forgiven. It is the temple of God desecrated by idols which he had

come to ransom. With the sublime words, "Truth is come; let falsehood disappear," he shivers in succession the three hundred and sixty abominations which were standing in the holy place; as Hezekiah broke in pieces the brazen serpent of Moses, so Mahomet destroys the forms of the patriarchs of his race, when Abraham and Ishmael are represented in the act of a superstitious divination. And, his work once accomplished, he did not, like his victorious namesake in later times, fix his throne in the city he had won. He reared no palace for his own honour by the side of the temple which he had recovered to the honour of God. The city of his fathers, the metropolis of his race, the shrine of his religion, was again deserted for his humble dwelling among those who had stood by him in the day of trial, who, while he won baser hearts by costly spoils, had taken God and his Prophet for their sufficient portion.[1]

Mahomet was now alike spiritual and temporal chief of his own people; it remained for him to appear in the character of universal Prophet and universal conqueror. "There is no God but God; Mahomet is the Apostle of God." If these be indeed the words of saving truth, it is not to the sons of Ishmael alone that they must be proclaimed, it is not within the Arabian peninsula alone that obedience is due to him who proclaims them. "There is no God but God." The Persian must no longer divide his homage between good and evil, but must turn to the worship of one Almighty Lord who reigns alike over the just and unjust. "There is no God but God." The Christian must cast away his Panagia and his images,

[1] Abulfeda, cap. lvi. (p. 119, Gagnier.) See Washington Irving's Life of Mahomet, chap. xxxi.

which of a truth he learned not from Isa the son of Mariam. "Mahomet is the Apostle of God;" and Chosroes and Cæsar must be told that He from whom they hold their crowns has another and more special Vicegerent upon earth. But that Vicegerent lived not himself to teach them the lesson. He indeed in warning letters summoned their allegiance, and placed the name of the camel-driver of Mecca before those of the successors of Augustus and of Artaxerxes. The proud Persian, descendant of a line of kings, scatters to the winds the insolent missive; his doom is fixed—"So shall God tear his kingdom." The Roman, who had himself shown how a bold man might rise to empire, knew better with whom he had to deal. The African provincial arrayed in the imperial purple could sympathize with the bold Arab, and dismissed the messenger with honourable treatment. It would have been a strife indeed, had the victor of Beder been matched in deadly conflict with the victor of Nineveh. But the immutable will had doomed it otherwise: the Saracen was indeed to measure himself with the Roman, and to overthrow the hosts which had delivered Byzantium and had conquered Persia. But the Arabian Prophet, the Carthaginian hero, were no more among them. Heraclius, worn out with toils and triumphs, resigned the defence of Syria to weaker hands; and Mahomet, in his tomb at Medina, left the mightiest work of his prophetic mission to the sage policy of Abu-Bekr the Righteous and to the irresistible arm of Khaled the Sword of God.

Now, putting aside for the present the question of Mahomet's supposed imposture, and assuming for the time his principle of propagating his religion by force, there is really but little to condemn in his character

and conduct. According to the morality of his own age and nation, there was absolutely nothing to censure in his public, and very little in his private life. Even judging him by a higher and severer standard, we may fairly say that few men have risen from a private station to sovereign power, with so noble an end before them, and with so little of recorded crime. His early life appears to have been absolutely blameless; he won the esteem of many who did not admit his pretensions; and it is certainly in his favour that those who knew him best, trusted him the most. No man, they tell us, is a hero to his valet-de-chambre. The simple life of the Arab admitted of no one in that exact capacity; but in the nearest approach to it, in his noble freedman Zeyd, Mahomet found on in whose eyes he was emphatically a hero. The con fidence and affection of a wife to whom he owed hi. position, and one fifteen years older than himself; the constant confidence and affection of men of the noblest and at the same time the most opposite characters—the calm Abu-Bekr, the chivalrous Ali, the fiery Omar—certainly tend to show that the personal character of Mahomet in no way gave the lie to his lofty pretensions. To say, with Prideaux, that his early life was "very wicked and licentious," is mere calumny without proof. Everything shows that, at least during his residence at Mecca, Mahomet lived externally the life of a really good man according to his light. If he was a hypocrite, he was a hypocrite of the most consummate subtlety.

In the second period of his career it is impossible not to recognize a deterioration. From the moment of his appeal to the sword, something of baser leaven seems to fasten itself upon his career. In that appeal

there is indeed nothing wonderful. It is easy to argue, as persecutors have done in all ages, that toleration is soul-murder; that if we forbid the public dissemination of poison for the body, much more should we forbid the dissemination of poison for the soul. Yet this is a view which, if logically followed out, would lead to conclusions yet more sanguinary than those of Mahomet. No submission, no tribute, ought to be accepted; the accursed thing should be utterly put away. Mahomet had before him the example of Mosaic Law, which preached a far more rigorous mandate of extermination against the guilty nations of Canaan. He had before him the practice of all surrounding powers, Christian, Jewish, and Heathen; though, from the disaffection of Syria and Egypt to the orthodox throne of Constantinople, he might have learned how easily persecution defeats its own end. That the Almighty allows differences in religion to exist, and leaves the conversion of His erring creatures to the ordinary course of His providence, might well be deemed an argument against His servants resorting, in His supposed behalf, to violent and extraordinary means. But experience shows how slowly and with what difficulty the human mind is brought to embrace this truth. It is one as yet hardly of perfect acceptance in western Europe. Elsewhere it seems to require nothing short of the mighty mind of an Abbas or an Akbar to grasp it. Yet I cannot but turn out of my way to pay homage to an illustrious example in an intermediate land. In the modern Greek kingdom, among a people with whom nationality and religion are almost convertible expressions, and who for centuries have been held in cruel bondage by masters of an alien faith, the first

constitution of 1822 secured perfect civil equality to the Mahometan and the Jew, and by the present laws of the kingdom, all rights, civil and political, are extended alike to the professors of every creed.

But to return to Mahomet. Under his circumstances, it is really no very great ground for condemnation that he did appeal to the sword. He did no more than follow the precedents of his own and every surrounding nation. Yet one might say that a man of such mighty genius as Mahomet must have been, might have been fairly expected to rise superior to the trammels of prejudice and precedent. And it cannot be denied that from this moment we discern a certain taint upon his whole conduct, one which does not indeed affect the general righteousness of his career, but which comes out in individual errors from which he had previously been free.

With his first appeal to the sword, there appears to have come upon him a general unscrupulousness as to the means whereby his ends were to be compassed. Compared with most oriental conquerors Mahomet stands generally clear both of cruelty and perfidy. He did not, like even Baber, mark his triumphs by pyramids of skulls; nor did he, like the later Ottomans, enslave, impale, or flay alive, men who had surrendered upon an honourable capitulation. But compared with the peaceful preacher of Mecca, the warrior of Medina may be called both cruel and perfidious. In his first campaign he caused his generals to attack his enemies in the sacred month, during which the Arabs abstained from warfare; he then, like Elizabeth in the case of Davison, tried to throw the blame on his subordinate, and finally produced a revelation to abrogate the sacred month

entirely. Surely this revelation should at least have been promulgated before it was acted upon. Again, in one instance to which I have already alluded, when the Jews of Koraidha agreed to surrender to the discretion of Saad,[1] Mahomet openly applauded the decision by which that warrior sentenced them to a general destruction. Yet it is only fair to acknowledge that even this massacre was a trifle compared with the ordinary horrors of oriental warfare, and that it stands alone in the career of Mahomet. Certainly, as a general rule, few eastern victors of any time, few western ones of that and many subsequent ages, kept their hands so clear from unnecessary bloodshed as Mahomet and his immediate followers.

The permission of polygamy has undoubtedly proved in its ultimate results, one of the greatest and most fearful evils in the Mahometan system. But how far are we to consider it as a legitimate ground of personal blame to the prophet, that he allowed and practised plurality of wives? It should not be forgotten that in this, as in every other respect, he was, in his own age and country, a reformer. For an utterly irregular profligacy, Mahomet substituted a regulated polygamy which must, then and there, have seemed almost as heavy a yoke as his prohibition of the other Arab delights of strong drink and games of chance. Whatever Mahometans may choose to make their own practice, the law of the Prophet is express. Every man of the faithful is to confine himself to four women, whether under the title of wives or concubines.[2] Any excess beyond this limit is strictly for-

[1] See above, p. 36.

[2] See Koran, chap. iv., "Women," (Sale, i. 182,) and Sale's Preliminary Dissertation, 183, and the references there given. It is, I

bidden and severely punished. One can hardly blame a man who attempts a great reform, because he does not attempt a still greater. But the reformer is of all men the most bound to observe his own laws. Had Mahomet practised polygamy all his days, and, after the promulgation of his precepts, sternly kept himself within his own limits, no man could have blamed him. But in Mahomet, living as he had previously lived, the practice of polygamy at all was a sad falling off. The man who could spend his youth, apparently in perfect constancy, certainly in perfect harmony and affection, with the motherly Khadijah, really need not have set up a seraglio of youthful beauties in his own declining years. Still less should he have restricted others, and absolved himself from his own restrictions, keeping other men to four, and allowing unlimited numbers to himself. Least of all should he have produced divine revelations to justify in himself what was condemned even by the imperfect morals of his times. If I can believe that Mahomet ever stooped to conscious imposture, it certainly was in the cases of Zeinab the wife of Zeyd, and of Mary the Egyptian. The beauty of Zeinab drew from Mahomet an expression of admiration. Her husband Zeyd divorced her. But, by Arabian custom, for a man to espouse the widow or divorced wife of his freedman was esteemed a species of incest. A new revelation obviated the difficulty. In this case the only thing that can be urged in Mahomet's favour is the very monstrousness of the proceeding. The imposture, if an imposture, was almost too barefaced to be ventured upon. And, strange to say, the

think, clear that the meaning of Mahomet is to confine his followers to four only, whether wives or concubines.

proceeding does not seem to have seriously shaken the faith of any of his followers, least of all, of those who were most interested and injured.

Judging Mahomet then according to his own principles, we find in him comparatively little to condemn. As in every one else, a few crimes and errors deface a generally noble career. He wrought a great reform, and that, on the whole, by what his fellows regarded as noble means. For a corrupt, debasing, and sanguinary idolatry he substituted the worship of the one God, and taught men that that one God was alike almighty and all-righteous. He gathered his people together into one nation, and gave them civil and moral precepts, imperfect indeed, but far better than any that they had previously possessed. Their most revolting practices, as infanticide, he utterly abolished. Others, as polygamy and private revenge, he subjected to stringent regulations. In some respects, as the prohibition of wine, the character of his teaching was positively ascetic. To the world at large, Mahomet has been of a truth the Antichrist, the False Prophet, the Abomination of Desolation; but to the Arab of the seventh century he was the greatest of benefactors. The reply of the Saracen envoy to the Persian King Yerdejird, when he reproached the Arabs with their poverty and savage mode of life, contains a grand summary of the immediate results of Mahomet's teaching.

"Whatever thou hast said," replied Sheikh Magkareh, "respecting the former condition of the Arabs, is true. Their food was green lizards; they buried their infant daughters alive; nay, some of them feasted on dead carcasses and drank blood; while others slew their relations, and thought themselves great and

valiant, when, by such an act, they became possessed of more property; they were clothed with hair garments; knew not good from evil; and made no distinction between that which is lawful and that which is unlawful. Such was our state. But God, in His mercy, has sent us, by a holy prophet, a sacred volume, which teaches us the true faith."[1] Pity indeed that so noble a discourse should thus continue: "By it we are commanded to bear with infidels, and to exchange our poor and miserable condition for that of wealth and power."

But, after all, comes the great question: Was the man who effected, in his own day, so great a reform, an Impostor? Was his whole career one of sheer hypocrisy? Was his Divine Mission a mere invention of his own, of whose falsehood he was conscious throughout? Such was the notion of the elder controversialists, like Prideaux; but to an unprejudiced observer it carries its confutation with it on the face of it. Surely nothing but a consciousness of really righteous intentions could have carried Mahomet so steadily and consistently, without ever flinching or wavering, without ever betraying himself to his most intimate companions, from his first revelation to Khadijah to his last agony in the arms of Ayesha. If the whole was imposture, it was an imposture utterly without parallel, from its extraordinary subtlety, and the wonderful long-sightedness and constancy which one must attribute to its author. Whether persecuted or triumphant, whether in the hour of victory at Beder or in the hour of defeat at Ohud, whether corre-

[1] Malcolm's History of Persia, i. 172. Kingsley's Alexandria, 148. The deputation is described much more at length by Price, Mahommedan History, i. 105—9.

sponding with the Kings of the earth or with rivals of his own people, his lofty spirit never deserted him for a moment. Compare Mahomet with the notorious impostors who appeared in imitation of him at the close of his career. Mahomet had no miracle but his Koran; Al Assouad, Tuleila, and Moseilama deceived the senses of their followers by tricks of vulgar sleight of hand, while some of them relieved them from the heavy observances of prayer and fasting laid upon them by the ascetic of Mecca. Compare Moseilama and Mahomet. Compare their letters. "From Moseilama the Apostle of God to Mahomet the Apostle of God. Now let the earth be half mine and half thine." "From Mahomet the Apostle of God to Moseilama the Liar. The earth is God's; He giveth it for inheritance to such of His servants as He pleaseth; and the happy issue shall attend those that fear Him." Surely in one we see the timid, bungling, doubting production of a conscious impostor, while the other displays the lofty confidence of one who fully believed in his own claims. Again, in the hour of death, amidst agony and delirium, not a word escapes him to betray any flaw or doubt in his pretensions. His last, unconnected, half-inarticulate words still spoke of his hopes in Paradise, of his "fellow-citizens on high." Surely he was not playing the hypocrite at that awful moment.

That Mahomet in his early career was actuated by the noblest intentions and that he fully believed in his own mission, is, I think, perfectly evident. That prosperity corrupted him, though it did not wholly turn him astray, is, I think, no less evident. That confidence in his own teaching followed him to the last is equally so. But this is by no means inconsistent

with some alloy of conscious imposture during the later and less noble portion of his career. This view has been adopted by many eminent writers who fully acquit him of all imposture at the beginning. That he fell off in many respects is clear; he may have even fallen so far as to put forth as divine revelations mere excuses for his own frailty or devices to obtain his own ends. Yet I would not willingly believe this. I would rather believe, as appears to have been the view of Dr. Möhler, that, even where Mahomet most grievously erred, he still never stooped to conscious forgery. Accustomed to regard all his impulses as arising from divine inspiration, he may, when one false step had permanently degraded him, have sincerely recognized a divine command in the mere impulse of his passions, or even in suggestions the reverse of divine. His moral sense was evidently obscured; he may have been open to the charge of self-delusion; but I do not believe that at any moment he was the conscious deluder of others. What I have chiefly in my view is the story of Zeinab. If Mahomet was a hypocrite at all, it is clear that he was a most adroit and consummate one, with unexampled mastery over himself. Voluptuous and impulsive as he may have been, it is utterly impossible to believe that such an actor as Mahomet the impostor must have been, would ever have perilled his whole reputation and success in order to make a single addition to his haram. The very weakness and lack of adroitness is a sign of sincerity. And it should not be forgotten that, if Mahomet had any sufficient acquaintance with the Hebrew prophets, he might have found in their writings dark and mysterious passages, which might easily be perverted into parallels to his own conduct.

Let us believe then that Mahomet was fully convinced of his own mission, that in the name of God and in the character of His Apostle, he wrought a great, though imperfect reform in his own country. I will go even further; I cannot conceal my conviction that, in a certain sense, his belief in his own mission was well-founded. Surely a good and sincere man, full of confidence in his Creator, who works an immense reform both in faith and practice, is truly a direct instrument in the hands of God and may be said to have a commission from Him. Why may we not recognize Mahomet, no less than other faithful though imperfect servants of God, as truly a servant of God, serving Him faithfully though imperfectly? Why may we not believe that he was, in his own age and country, a preacher of truth and righteousness, sent to teach his own people the unity and righteousness of God, to give them civil and moral precepts suited to their condition? Now, were it not for the all-important fact that Christianity had been preached in the interval, the mission of Mahomet would appear exactly analogous to that of Moses. If the religion of Mahomet was imperfect, so was that of Moses; if the civil precepts of Mahomet were adapted only for a single nation, so were those of Moses also. Indeed in some respects Mahometanism is a clear advance upon Judaism. It more distinctly represents God as the God of the whole world and not of one nation only; it preaches with more clearness the doctrines of God's general providence, of a resurrection and of a final judgment. Indeed the Koran is remarkable for overdoing the matter in its threats of hell and promises of paradise, forming a marked contrast to the unfrequent and undefined allusions by which the future

life is described in the Christian Scriptures. Yet even here, in the sensual descriptions of paradise, Mahomet is, as usual, far outdone by his followers. Many, indeed, of his most respectable disciples take these dangerous passages in a figurative sense. This is indeed no more than we do by several passages in our own Scriptures, which taken alone, might countenance that other form of sensuality by which some Jewish rabbis have promised themselves a paradise of eating and drinking. In short, had Mahometanism only preceded Christianity, it might have been accepted as another step towards it; the mosque might have been an appropriate and friendly halting-place between the synagogue and the church. As it is, Mahometanism, coming after Christianity, has proved its deadliest enemy. Its claim to be to Christianity what Christianity was to Judaism, is belied by the fact that this supposed reformed and developed Christianity is in fact a retrogression, denying nearly all those points in which Christianity is a reformed and developed Judaism. It preaches the Unity of God in a sense which denies His Trinity; it utterly casts aside the distinctively Christian doctrines of Mediation and Atonement. And to do all this, Mahomet was driven to the shift of asserting not only, what was indeed too true, that the Christianity of his times was exceedingly corrupt, but that it was so corrupt as to have ceased to be Christianity at all. To justify him, his followers are driven to assert that all existing Christian sects had so utterly perverted their faith, their practice, and the very text of their sacred books, that the mission of Isa the son of Mariam had been practically in vain, and that the field was as clear for the Prophet of the Koran as if the Gospel had never been delivered.

Mahomet then, I believe, erred in two great points. He did not sufficiently examine into the true nature of Christianity, and he forced upon other nations at the point of the sword, to be received throughout the world for all time, a system suited only to the age and nation to which it was delivered. Considered as delivered only to pagan Arabs, the religious, moral, and civil precepts of the Koran are admirable. The error of their author was in delivering them to others besides pagan Arabs, and even in delivering them to pagan Arabs when something yet more admirable was within reach. Mahomet might have known more of Christianity than he did. Possibly he never read or heard any genuine portions either of the Old or the New Testament. He saw that many Christians of his time were practical idolaters, and he too hastily confounded the worship of Christ with the worship of His Mother and His servants. Christianity was distracted and confounded by unintelligible disputes as to the Divine nature and attributes of Christ; Mahomet too hastily cast them all aside as alike violations of the Divine Unity. Too many Christians had made themselves many Mediators; Mahomet too hastily rejected the one true Mediator, and represented Jesus as a mere preacher like himself; distinguished indeed by a miraculous birth and miraculous powers, but still not the Son of God and the Saviour of Man. All this was extremely natural on the part of one in Mahomet's position; but he was clearly blameworthy in not more fully informing himself on such all-important questions. Consequently his system became one of mere retrogression and bitter antagonism to the truth. To the pagan Arab he was the Apostle of God, the preacher of righteousness; to the Christian of the most corrupt

sect who still acknowledged Christ as his God and Saviour, he was of a truth the very Antichrist, and his followers are justly branded with the name of Infidel.

The other point in which I said that Mahomet was blameworthy was in endeavouring to establish his system beyond the limits of his own country. We may feel certain that Mahomet began his career merely as the Prophet of Arabia, and gradually persuaded himself that he was the Prophet of the whole world. Even when his pretensions had developed to their full developement, when he claimed the heathen for his inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for his possession, Arabia was still to remain the peculiar and holy land of the Faithful. Elsewhere the Infidel might be tolerated on payment of the prescribed tribute; but within the sacred peninsula only the Faith of Allah and His Prophet was to be endured. The local religion of Arabia was to become the religion of the world. The result has been that a system adapted only for one age and country has been pressed upon the necks of all ages and countries in which its votaries have been dominant. Mahometanism is a national system, which attempts to be universal, and which most grievously fails in the attempt. Its great rite is typical of this its aspect. Mahomet did not, or could not, rise above a local worship; he had therefore a holy place, a place of pilgrimage. Sprung from the blood of the hereditary guardians of the Kaaba, it was the object of his life to restore that venerated temple to its true purpose, to expel the idols from the holy place of Abraham and Ishmael. His traditionary love so clung around it that he adopted from its local worship many grotesque and

superstitious ceremonies which seem strangely at variance with the generally reasonable and decorous ritual of the Moslem. In an Arab, a son of Ishmael, all this was, if not rational, at least natural. But why should Persians, Moors, Turks, and Indians, aliens from the stock of Abraham, be sent to worship at a shrine the whole of whose associations belong to another nation? Going on pilgrimage somewhere seems a natural impulse among men of all creeds, but why should any but Arabs compass the Kaaba of Abraham, or reverence the holy well of Ishmael? To a devout Mahometan the tomb of Mahomet himself would seem the most natural object of pilgrimage. And so it is; to this day many of the faithful from distant lands are not satisfied with the communication in the national worship of Arabia which their Law requires, but follow a truer impulse in turning aside to pray at the tomb of the Prophet of their own faith.

But the creed of Islam showed in far graver points how ill suited it was to be transplanted beyond the limits of its native soil. The Koran, it should be remembered, was preached not merely to pagans, but to barbarians; it brought them out of the state of things which Sheikh Maghurah so graphically described to King Yezdijird. Now doubtless Yezdijird and his people might learn much from the theological and moral precepts of the Koran, but the civil precepts adapted for the dwellers in the Arabian desert could hardly be suited to all the exigencies of the magnificent empire of Persia. Still less could the Moslem code be needed within the neighbouring realm, where the immortal code of Justinian was as yet barely a century old. But the Koran was driven

down the throats of Persian and Roman as the all-sufficient code of jurisprudence as well as of theology. It is hardly possible to believe that so great a mind as that of Mahomet would have perpetrated this absurdity. He was cut off on the very threshold of his career of external conquest before he had put forth any legislation adapted to the new condition of his followers. He was cut off, it should be remembered, almost in the very act of attempting to dictate a new Koran. In fact, nothing is more preposterous and absurd than the bibliolatry of the Mahometans. The Koran, as Mr. Kingsley quaintly, but truly, says, "after all is not a book, but an irregular collection of Mohammed's meditations and notes for sermons." It is not a code, it is not a journal, it is a mere gathering together of irregular scraps, written on palm-leaves and bones of mutton, which Abu-Bekr put together without the slightest regard to chronological order, only putting the long fragments at the beginning, and the short fragments at the end. But so far from having the Koran of Mahomet, we have not even the Koran of Abu-Bekr. Caliph Othman, we know, gave enormous scandal by burning all the existing copies, which were extremely discordant, and putting forth his own version as the *textus ab omnibus receptus*. How much, then, of the existing Koran is really Mahomet's; how much has been lost, added, transposed, or perverted; when, where, and why each fragment was delivered, it is often impossible even to conjecture. And yet these baskets of fragments are positively worshipped. A man is a heretic not only who doubts whether Mahomet put them all forth, but who doubts whether the Koran, as we now have it, is eternal and uncreated.

One cannot help thinking that the Prophet himself would have set such a doctrine aside as contradicting the first and weightiest clause of his brief confession of faith.

Again, Mahometanism, as a national faith, proclaimed by one who grew from a preacher into a sovereign, united the spiritual and temporal powers in one. Now this is bad enough in one nation, but much more so when it is applied to a universal empire. In strictness, all Moslems should form one political society, under one head, the Caliph of the Prophet. In strictness, the whole civil and political code of this society is to be found in the one book of the Koran. In strictness, the Grand Turk might claim the allegiance of a vast number of subjects, not only of his enemy, but of his allies, and might judge them all according to precepts which Mahomet's scribe may or may not have written down on a mutton-bone at Medina twelve hundred years back. Of course so preposterous a theory could not be permanently carried out in its fulness, but it has been carried out enough to stifle in a very great degree the national and political life of every Mahometan people. Christianity puts forth no civil precepts; it is equally suited to every age, every country, every social condition. Mahometanism has always remained, even on the shores of the Atlantic, a system exclusively oriental.

The great evils of the old oriental system were despotism, polygamy, absence of law. None of these has Mahometanism removed. It has indeed partially alleviated them, but by the very fact of alleviating, it has sanctioned and stereotyped them. The old despots of Nineveh or Babylon knew no law

but their own will, recognized no responsibility to God or man. The legitimate Mahometan despot either claims to be himself the Caliph or Representative of the Prophet, or to act as the lieutenant of one who does. Such a character ought indeed to lead its possessor to the most awful sense of responsibility; his sway may fairly be expected to be an improvement on that of his merely earthly predecessor; but it is clear that the institution of despotism is thereby established and consecrated. His will is indeed bridled by the precepts of the Koran and the expositions of its commentators; but the existence of this check effectually precludes the existence of any other. Consequently Mahometanism has done really little or nothing for the political improvement of the eastern world. No Mahometan nation has attained, or ever can attain, to constitutional freedom. While the same man is Pope and Cæsar, while the same volume is Bible and Statute-Book, there is no choice but despotism or anarchy. The individual Caliph or Sultan may be got rid of when his yoke has become insupportable; but the institution of an irresponsible Caliph or Sultan can only be got rid of when the creed of Mahomet is got rid of also.

So too with polygamy. Mahomet, in the act of restricting, necessarily sanctioned this enormous evil. His limit was, then and there, a prodigious moral reform, but it must always stand in the way of any more complete reform. This is one of the cases in which the first step is everything. The difference between one wife and two is everything; that between four and four thousand is comparatively nothing. See too how Mahomet's own precept is observed. His followers have found it much easier to remember

that he allowed four wives than that he allowed only four. Indeed that respect for women, which in old Arabia, as in chivalrous Europe, strangely co-existed with great licentiousness of manners, soon passed away when the Arabs found themselves in the palace of Chosroes. The household of a modern Mahometan prince has surely more resemblance to that of Xerxes or Nabuchodonosor than to that of Omar or Ali, or of the Prophet himself.

In one or two respects indeed Mahometanism has actually appeared as a retrograde system, even among heathen nations. One cannot doubt that the doctrine of fatalism had a wonderful effect in animating the spirits of the first Saracens; but its ultimate effect has been pernicious to the last degree. When the first heat of enthusiasm is over, this same doctrine leads to quite opposite results. It becomes a mere excuse for stupid and listless idleness; submission to the divine will is held to render all human exertion superfluous. Nothing in the world is so energetic as a Mahometan nation in its youth; nothing is so utterly feeble as a Mahometan nation in its old age.

In all these respects the temporary and partial reform effected by Islam has proved the surest obstacle to fuller and more permanent reform. A Mahometan nation accepts a certain amount of truth, receives a certain amount of civilization, practises a certain amount of toleration. But all these are so many obstacles to the acceptance of truth, civilization, and toleration in their perfect shape. The Moslem has just enough of all on which to rest and pride himself, and no longer feels his own deficiencies. Bring a tribe of savage heathens within the Mahometan pale, and their immediate gain is immeasurable.

But then you shut out the hope of still greater gain. Left in their heathen and savage state, they would be far more likely to accept complete truth and complete civilization. Hence it is that Christianity and Mahometanism have ever been more directly antagonistic to each other than to any form of heathenism. Each, unlike heathenism, proclaims itself as the one truth; each finds in the other its most formidable rival.

The historical working out of these tendencies will form a subject for future examination. I will now only observe that I have hitherto been speaking of the true faith of Islam, and the tendencies which seem inevitable in it. I have not been speaking of the various corruptions which have gradually accumulated around it. The true history and the true teaching of Mahomet have been as much disfigured by fables and comments as the history and teaching of any Christian saint. The notices in the Koran are almost as unlike the legendary history of Mahomet as the genuine narrative of the Gospel is unlike the imaginations of Bonaventura.[1] Mahomet disclaimed all miraculous power; yet all manner of miracles, great and small, have been fathered upon him; and a single unintelligible allusion in the Koran has grown into the portentous tale of his night-journey to Heaven. Mahomet protested against all religious reverence to any creature; yet something very like saint-worship has crept in even among orthodox Sonnites, while the whole Shiah sect canonize at

[1] The life of Mahomet by Abulfeda comes midway between the simple notices in the Koran and the wild imaginings of more fervent hagiographers. No document is more worthy of attention as showing in what light his Prophet appeared to a learned and sensible Mussulman some centuries after.

least, while some of them almost deify, his own son-in-law and Vizier. Mahomet was resolved to have no monks in his religion; yet among his modern votaries are to be counted dancing dervishes. This is of course the fate of every religion. These absurdities are no more to be charged upon true Mahometanism than the Feast of the Ass or the performances of the Jumpers are to be charged upon true Christianity.. In pointing out the evil side of Mahometanism, I have endeavoured to avoid all these excrescences, and to confine myself to those evil tendencies which seem inherent in the Prophet's own teaching.

Of course I am far from having exhausted all the reflections suggested by "Mahomet and his Creed." I have chosen chiefly such as seemed necessary fully to understand the man himself, and to serve as a groundwork for our consideration of the history of his successors. And certainly the religious and moral aspect of Mahomet is one of the most wonderful phænomena which history or moral philosophy can present. A man, himself sincere and righteous, the greatest of reformers and benefactors to his own people, a preacher and legislator of truth and civilization, has eventually done more than any mortal man to hinder the progress alike of truth and of civilization. The religious reformer has checked the advance of Christianity; the political reformer has checked the advance of freedom, and indeed of organized government in any shape; the moral reformer has set his seal to the fearful evils of polygamy and slavery. Whether Mahomet be personally the Antichrist of Scripture I do not profess to determine, but I do know that his religion, approximating as it does so

closely to Christianity, without being Christian, has eventually proved, above all others, emphatically Antichristian. Such has been the fearful result of one, at most of two, false steps, in his personal history. A little more inquiry, and Mahomet might have proved a Christian missionary; and had he only abstained from attacking other nations, he might in any case have been honoured as the benefactor of his own. As it is, from the Atlantic to the Ganges, the Creed of Islam, engrafted on the old social and political system of the East, has proved the bitterest of all foes to Christian faith and Western law. No opposition, political or theological, ever approached the bitterness which reigned for centuries between the champions of either faith, whether in the school of disputation or on the field of battle. No warfare has ever called forth such enthusiasm on either side as that in which the Cross and the Crescent have sunk and risen with the defeat and the triumph of the contending hosts.[1]

LECTURE III.

THE UNDIVIDED CALIPHATE.

IN my last lecture I briefly stated the fact that Mahometanism, from the national faith of Arabia, was transformed into a system claiming to be the universal faith of mankind. I mentioned also that the genuine Mahometan system united the spiritual and temporal powers in the same hands. The corollary

[1] See some of the points treated in this Lecture worked out more at length in an article in the *North British Review* for August, 1855, vol. xxiii. pp. 461—70.

from these two propositions was the foundation of an universal empire. Every land which, by force or by persuasion, accepted the faith of Mahomet, accepted at the same time the temporal sway of his successor. Had Mahometanism become the religion of the whole world, the whole world must have become united under a single government. As it was, for a century at least, the representative of Mahomet ruled over a vaster continuous empire than the world has beheld before or since. For a brief period indeed the same will was absolute on the banks of the Indus and on the banks of the Douro, the same sovereign was prayed for in the temples of Narbonne and in the temples of Samarcand. The recent empire of Spain, the actual empire of Britain, may surpass the Caliphate in population and extent; but these are empires consisting of provinces scattered over distant portions of the globe. The present empire of Russia may exceed it in actual continuous extent, but only by balancing barbarous or uninhabited regions against fertile provinces and splendid cities. And this enormous realm was untimately rent asunder, not by national revolts against a foreign government, but by disputes as to the person in whom the government was lawfully vested. That the Caliph of the Prophet was the lawful lord of the world, no true believer thought of doubting; but who really was the Caliph of the Prophet was a question on which opinions might widely differ.

I do not of course mean that national feelings did not often lurk under disputes of this kind, just as they lurked under the theological disputes among the Eastern Churches. Still less do I mean that able men did not take advantage of the circumstances of

different nations and countries to found really independent kingdoms, while nominally disputing a rival claim to universal empire. But for centuries the idea of this universal empire still existed. Every Mahometan Prince either gave himself out as the real Caliph in opposition to other claimants; or, if he could not with decency set up such a claim on his own account, he was content to bear himself as the nominal vassal of some one who did. The Caliphate in this respect resembled the Roman Empire. The idea of the Emperor and the Empire was accepted as a political necessity. Some one must be the Emperor; but who is he? Is it he of Constantinople or he of Aix-la-Chapelle? As in earlier times Gothic and Frankish Kings were proud to receive the title of Roman Consul or Patrician; so, in later days, independent Italian and Slavonian Princes thought it no degradation to admit, and French and English monarchs thought it necessary expressly to deny, that their inferior crowns owed suit and service to the Holy Roman Empire.

But the Caliphate was more than an Empire. One source of contention in the western world was avoided in the eastern. The throne of Cæsar could not be set up against the chair of Peter; the keys of Alexander could never clash with the sword of Barbarossa. The successor of the Prophet was Pope and Cæsar in one. His spiritual character comes first. The Prophet, from a spiritual teacher, gradually became a temporal lord; consequently his successor is only Emperor because he is Pontiff. The Mahometan Empire was a religious society turned into a political one. Church and State, religion and loyalty, heresy and rebellion, were, in its case, respectively identical. A sedition,

a revolution, a change of dynasty, all take place on theological grounds. A political meeting ordinarily takes place in the mosque at the time of prayer; the leader of the people's devotion is the civil governor or the civil governor's rival; a political harangue comes in the shape of a sermon to the faithful. This system is the very opposite to Erastianism; the monarch does not usurp spiritual functions; but the preacher, for a Mahometan Pontiff is not a priest, is invested with temporal power. The nearest parallel to the state of things among the early Saracens is to be found among the English Puritans and Scottish Covenanters of the seventeenth century. In both, religion and politics had become actually identical; in the English case especially the resemblance was still more perfect. The military officer leading the devotions of his soldiers was the exact reproduction of an early Saracen Imam.

Mahomet either died without naming a successor, or, if he named one, the bequest was concealed by his wife Ayesha. Again we must remember that his dying wish to indite a new Koran was frustrated. As it was, the new society was left without a head and with no rule to direct them in the choice of one. Was the Successorship, the Caliphate, to be elective or hereditary? If elective, who were to be the electors? If hereditary, what was to be the rule of succession? These questions divide the Mahometan world to this day.

At this distance of time one is inclined to wonder at the actual result, and to sympathize with that sect of believers who stigmatize that result as unrighteous and impious. Ali, the First of Believers, the boldest warrior of Islam, the chosen Vizier of the Prophet,

his nearest kinsman, the husband of his favourite and only surviving child, the father of the only descendants who could transmit the blood of Mahomet to future generations, seemed pointed out on every ground as his rightful successor. No claim could be so strong on any notion of hereditary right; no claim could seem stronger if an elective office were to be filled up according to merit. Yet Ali did not actually obtain the Caliphate till three rivals had preceded him, and even then he did not secure the allegiance of the whole empire. The objection made to him that he was a "man of blood," sounds strange among a nation of soldiers, and especially strange as applied to one who appears never to have shed a drop of blood except on the field of battle. If Mahomet made any bequest in Ali's favour, it was sure to be concealed by his mortal enemy Ayesha. As it was, when the first irregular election took place, Ali was not present, being engaged in the last duties to his illustrious kinsman. And probably, after all, Ali would not have been the right man in the right place. Brave, just, merciful, chivalrous in the best sense, Ali was clearly wanting in the political sagacity of Abu-Bekr and Omar. It is impossible not to sympathize with Ali and his partizans; yet it is clear that it was not without reason that the father-in-law of the Prophet was preferred to his son-in-law, the father of Ayesha to the husband of Fatima.

The Four First Caliphs stand distinguished from all who came after them on many grounds. Under them only did Islam appear in its genuine character in its genuine original seat. Abu-Bekr, Omar, Othman, Ali were truly Commanders of the Faithful, Successors of the Prophet, ruling the world from beside his tomb.

The Caliphate of Damascus and Bagdad, removed from its sacred seat, and become the prize of the strongest, soon sank into a common oriental monarchy. The later Caliphs retained indeed the same spiritual claims, but it is easy to see that in them the temporal character was predominant. Indeed the orthodox Mussulman belief recognizes in the first Four a peculiar character of sanctity, a special Vicarship of the Prophet, which did not extend to their successors.

As Mahomet had left no rule for the appointment of his successors, the mode of appointment fluctuated in each particular case. The first, Abu-Bekr, was raised to sovereignty by a sort of tumultuous election by the whole mass of the faithful assembled in the mosque at Medina. Election indeed it hardly was; it was the single act of Omar in suddenly pledging his allegiance to Abu-Bekr which carried the day in his favour. But neither Abu-Bekr nor Omar chose to allow so perilous an experiment to be again risked in the selection of their own successors. Abu-Bekr ventured to bequeath the Caliphate by will to Omar; Omar, when his own turn came, shrank from the responsibility, and committed the choice to a conclave of six, who were, under pain of death, to elect a Caliph within three days. Their ultimate choice was Othman. Othman died in an insurrection, and with his murder the days of violence and dissension commence. Hitherto the whole empire had accepted the sovereign named, by whatever process, in the City of the Prophet; but Ali, elected at Medina, was disowned in Syria, and from hence, till the extinction of the Ommiad dynasty, we find a series of attempts on the part of the ruling house, to convert the Vicarship of the Prophet into a mere hereditary monarchy. These schemes meanwhile

were balanced by the attempts of rival Caliphs to assert their own claims and those of the whole body of the faithful. But it was not till the expulsion of the Ommiads from Syria that any permanent separation took place; so that we may fairly call the period embraced in this Lecture that of the Undivided Caliphate.

The golden age of the Saracens was the twelve years, A.D. 632—644, comprised in the reigns of Abu-Bekr and Omar. This was a period of uninterrupted internal harmony and external conquest. The two fathers-in-law of the Prophet, for Omar held that place as well as Abu-Bekr, commanded an allegiance which never fell to the lot of his sons-in-law Othman and Ali. Ali clearly felt himself wronged by the three successive elections to his prejudice, but he did not allow his disappointment to hinder a true and dutiful allegiance to his successful rivals. Nor did any other sect or party disturb the perfect unity of the Faithful. The false prophets who arose in the last days of Mahomet fell "before the sword of the Lord and of Khaled,"[1] and Moseilama, who would have divided the world with Mahomet, received, like Harold Hardrada from his English namesake, only seven feet of ground for a grave. The proud realm of Persia sinks before the warriors of the desert, and the King of Kings is driven forth to wander as a homeless exile. Rome loses her oriental provinces; Antioch, the birthplace of the Christian name; Jerusalem, the holy place alike of Jewish, Christian, and Moslem faith; Alexandria, the seat of the subtlest wisdom of heathen and of Christian, are all numbered among the subject cities of Islam. And, once grant-

[1] Gibbon, cap. li. (ix. 353, ed. Milman).

ing the principle of aggressive conquest, there is comparatively little to condemn in the conduct of the conquerors. The alternative, Koran, Tribute, or Sword, is always fairly offered to those attacked; and if Khaled is always found most inclined to the last of the three, Abu-Obeidah is always equally ready to commute vengeance for submission. We read of no such massacres, above all of no such breaches of faith, as have commonly disgraced the triumphs of later Moslem victors. When Mahomet the Second conquered Eubœa, the Venetian general Erizzo stipulated for the safety of his head. His head indeed was untouched, but his body was sawn asunder. A century later Sultan Selim conquers Cyprus, that its wines may the better enable him to violate the precepts of his own faith. The Venetian commander Bragadino capitulates on condition that he and his garrison are transported in safety to Crete. Ottoman good faith sells the garrison for slaves and flays alive their commander. Not such were the deeds of the first Caliphs. The cruel and treacherous Ottoman is indeed an unworthy representative of the noble Saracen whose creed and mission he dishonours. The conduct of Omar at the surrender of Jerusalem is perhaps the most signal instance of good faith that history records. He secures to the Christians the possession of their churches; he refuses to pray in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, lest his followers should afterwards make his example an excuse for converting it into a mosque. Succeeding Caliphs destroyed or desecrated this very temple and others secured by similar stipulations. Omar was an illiterate barbarian; he burnt the Alexandrian library; he went clad in a dirty sheepskin, and rode on a red

camel which carried the bag and the wooden platter which formed all his household wealth. Succeeding Caliphs surpassed the pomp of Chosroes and Cæsar; their courts were crowded with savans; their palaces were filled with their writings. But Omar was just and righteous and faithful to his word; his splendid successors sank into all the vulgar tyranny of the old-world despots of Babylon and Susa.

The fact was that the stern virtues of the first Saracens were the result of a religious enthusiasm too powerful to be lasting. When the Caliphate embraced half the civilized world, when it became the possession of unprincipled soldiers of fortune or of dissolute youths born in the purple, it was not in human nature that the Caliphs should continue to regard themselves as great public servants, mere trustees for the whole body of the Faithful. While the wealth of Persia and Syria was being poured at his feet, Abu-Bekr took for himself a daily salary of about three shillings, with maintenance for himself, one slave, and one camel. Omar divided his time between preaching to the people and administering justice among them. He made his meal of barley and water on the steps of the mosque, and invited every one who passed by to partake. Ali, when his brother asked him for a pension, recommended him rather to rob a rich neighbour; it were better for him to be accused by one man at the Day of Judgement than by the whole assembly of the Faithful. All this was natural in the companions of the Prophet; we admire it in them; we do not expect it to be continued in their successors. The early Caliphs at Medina were indeed wise and good men; their successors would have been more than men had they

lived in the same way at Damascus, Cordova, or Bagdad. Indeed such extreme simplicity, noble as it was, would have been out of place under their circumstances. The holy Imam might safely practise it in the sacred city, amidst the first fervour of devotion; the temporal Sovereign could hardly continue it when love had begun to wax cold in a more artificial state of things. Still we might reasonably have expected that something of the old Moslem virtues would have continued. They revive indeed, to some extent, with every new race, with every fresh conquest; but we seldom indeed find them on the throne of the Commander of the Faithful. We do not expect Haroun-al-Rashid to have imitated Omar in his private life; we might have expected him to have imitated his justice and mercy, and not to have stained his hands with the blood of the Barmecides. In everything we see at once how great was the immediate reform effected by Mahomet in his own land, and how utterly inadequate his system was to effect a permanent reform in other lands. The master of such immediate scholars could not have been the "wicked impostor" depicted by Dean Prideaux; but the author of such ultimate results must surely have mistaken his calling when he announced himself as the Prophet of the whole world.

So early indeed as the reign of the third Caliph the scene begins to change. The golden age lasted no longer than Abu-Bekr and Omar; with Othman the fine gold has become dim. The personal virtues of Othman were indeed not inferior to those of his predecessors; his piety was equally exemplary; he had accompanied the Prophet in his first adversity,

and he died with his eyes fixed on the Koran; but perhaps he had never possessed the same capacity for government as his predecessors, or, if he had, he had lost it beneath the weight of seventy years. He did not affect the same simplicity of life as his predecessors; he began to assume something of the state of worldly royalty; he allowed himself to be swayed by unworthy favourites, and was culpably lavish to members of his own family. He met with his punishment in the earliest insurrection recorded in Mahometan history. Omar died by the hand of a Giaour, the victim of personal vengeance; Othman perished in a rebellion of the Faithful, stirred up by her who styled herself their Mother, headed by her brother, the son of the first Caliph, and by the old companions of the Prophet. The Commander of the Faithful slaughtered at Medina by the hands of Ansars[1] and Mohajerins[2] shows that, even before the close of its first generation, the glory of Islam had begun to fade away.

Upon the murder of Othman, Ali at last obtained the post of which he had been so often defrauded; and now begins the tragic tale of the wrongs and martyrdoms of the immediate family of the Prophet. The province of Syria was now ruled by the crafty Moawiyah, whose father was Abu-Sofian, so long the bitterest enemy of Mahomet, and at last a tardy and unwilling proselyte. His mother too was Henda, the female fury who made herself a name by devouring the heart of Mahomet's uncle Hamza after the battle of Ohud. Such was the parentage of the man who was to deprive the descendants of the Apostle of

[1] *Helpers* = those who received Mahomet at Medina.
[2] *Fugitives* = those who accompanied Mahomet from Mecca.

their heritage. Moawiyah gave himself out as the avenger of Othman; Ali was represented as his murderer, although his sons, the grandsons of the Prophet, had fought, and one of them received a wound, in the defence of that Caliph. Othman, cursed as a tyrant while alive, was revered as a martyr when dead; his bloody robe, the Koran stained also with his blood, the fingers of his wife, cut off in a vain attempt to save him, were treasured up as sacred relics and employed by Moawiyah to stir up the zeal of the Syrian army. Ayesha too, the Mother of the Faithful, Telha and Zobeir, the Prophet's old companions, revolted on their own account, and the whole of the brief reign of Ali was one constant succession of civil war. For the details I must refer to those writers whose object is direct narrative; how Moawiyah shrank from the challenge of Ali and the edge of his sword Dhulfekkar; how, worsted in battle, he appealed to the Koran to judge between them; how his arbitrator Amru outwitted the pedantic Abu-Musa; how the empire was distracted by the rival claims and rival curses of Ali and Moawiyah, should be studied in the pages of Price and of Ockley. At last Ali fell by the sword of an assassin, while Moawiyah escaped with his life from that of his confederate; and Hassan, his eldest son, finding himself unable to cope with the fortunate usurper, was driven to resign his claims into his hands.

The bright days of Islam have now quite passed away. Moawiyah was both a statesman and a soldier, an able and fortunate founder of a dynasty, but he was a man of very different cast from the saintly heroes whom he succeeded. Abu-Bekr and Omar

sought no advancement for their own families; their sons remained in the condition of private Moslems. If Ali asserted the rights of his offspring, he was asserting the hereditary claims of the offspring of the offspring of the Prophet. The Caliphate might conceivably be allotted to the worthiest of the Faithful; it might conceivably be hereditary in the family of the Apostle; but Mahomet could never have imagined that it would become hereditary in the family of his bitterest enemy. Yet this was what Moawiyah laboured, and laboured successfully, to effect; and, in so doing, he stuck at no act either of violence or perfidy. When Hassan surrendered his claims, it was on condition that Moawiyah appointed no successor, and that if Hassan survived Moawiyah, he should himself become Caliph. Moawiyah carried out these stipulations by poisoning Hassan, and securing the succession to his own son, the odious Yezid. He thus founded an hereditary monarchy in his own family, which lasted in the East for nearly a century, and which, translated beyond the Pillars of Hercules, endured nearly three centuries more.

But in thus converting the Caliphate into an hereditary monarchy he utterly changed its character. It soon assumed the character of a common oriental empire. Under the Ommiad dynasty we soon begin to hear of the same crimes, the same oppressions, which disfigure the ordinary current of eastern history. The first Caliphs had been the chief among their brethren; they took counsel with the people in the mosque; their authority rested on the reverence of believers for their spiritual head The Ommiads were masters of slaves instead of leaders of freemen; the public will was no longer consulted, and the public good as

little ; the Commander of the Faithful sank into an earthly despot, ruling by force like any Assyrian conqueror of old. The early Caliphs dwelt in the sacred city of Medina, and directed the counsels of the Empire from beside the tomb of the Prophet. Moawiyah transferred his throne to the conquered splendours of Damascus ; and Mecca and Medina became tributary cities to the ruler of Syria. At one time a rival Caliph, Abdallah, established himself in Arabia ; twice were the holy cities taken by storm, and the Kaaba itself was battered down by the engines of the invaders. No avenging birds appeared to visit the fierce Hejaj with the fate of Abrahah ; and the result of the mission of Mahomet and the conquests of his followers was practically to make his native country a subject province to the land which they had subdued.

Such a revolution, however, did not effect itself without considerable opposition. The partizans of the house of Ali continued to form a formidable sect. In their ideas the Vicarship of the Prophet was not to be, like an earthly kingdom, the mere prize of craft or of valour. It was the inalienable heritage of the sacred descendants of the Prophet himself. If Hassan surrendered his rights to Moawiyah, he surrendered that which he had neither the right nor the power to alienate. The descendants of Ommiah might be *de facto* temporal sovereigns, but the spiritual headship of the Faithful could never be taken away from the descendants of Mahomet. This was the origin of the Shiah sect, the assertors of the rights of Ali and his house. The strange forms into which this doctrine has developed I shall say more of at another stage of our subject. At present we have chiefly to

deal with the house of Ali as rivals of the house of Moawiyah. In the reign of Yezid, the second Ommiad Caliph, comes the tale of the martyrdom of Hossein, which I do not hesitate to call the most pathetic story in the whole course of history. It is probably well known from the pages of Gibbon, but it should be read in its full detail in those of Ockley and Price, who write respectively from Arabian and from Persian—that is Shiah—authorities. The grandson of the Prophet, beguiled by the promises of the fickle people of Cufa, comes from Arabia with his whole family to assert his hereditary claims. Deserted by his faithless partizans, surrounded by the armies of the usurper, cut off from the water of Euphrates, of which beasts and Giaours are allowed freely to partake, he sees his friends slaughtered around him, his infant is pierced in his arms by an arrow, he sees his female relatives condemned to captivity, and he is himself threatened with instant death. For a long time no believer can be found willing actually to smite his Imam, the heir of his Apostle; at last he is struck down, his body is trampled into the ground by the horses' hoofs, his head carried in triumph to his brutal conqueror. Obeidollah strikes the lifeless lips in mockery, while an aged Moslem by his side weeps as he murmurs, "Alas, on those lips I have seen the lips of the Apostle of God."

This whole scene has always appeared to me one of those events which are simply inexplicable. One can understand a misguided zeal leading to any atrocities perpetrated against men of another faith; but here is treatment to which Khaled himself would hardly have exposed a Christian or a Fire-worshipper, inflicted, in the name of the Mussulman religion, upon

those for whom that religion inculcated reverence. In many cases we cannot condemn a settled government for inflicting punishment upon rebels, even when our sympathies are on the side of rebellion. But it is clear that there were persons in the army of Obeidollah, who did not carry about with them this calm conviction of the necessity of supporting the powers that be, but who were actuated by real religious enthusiasm for Yezid and against Hossein. As they encircle him they congratulate him on his speedy prospect of hell-fire; when he craves for a short truce at the hour of prayer, they ask how such a wretch as he could venture to address the Almighty. Yet it is hard to understand any enthusiasm for the debauched and cruel Yezid against the brave and saintly Hossein; it is hard to understand a religious enthusiasm which saw a heretic and a rebel in the grandson of Mahomet, a true Commander of the Faithful in the grandson of Abu-Sofian. In earlier times we might understand a feeling in favour of an elective Caliphate against hereditary succession even in the sacred family. But now the controversy was becoming purely dynastic; the choice no longer lay between an elective and an hereditary monarchy; but between an hereditary monarchy in the family of the Prophet, and one in the family of his bitterest antagonist.

But bad as Caliph Yezid undoubtedly was, he was not so bad as his followers. He treated the surviving captives with comparative gentleness, and declared that if Hossein had fallen alive into his hands, his life would have been spared. Hossein's son Ali was in Medina during its first revolt against the Ommiads, and, as he took no share in it, he received the most

honourable treatment from the victors, by the Caliph's express orders. The sacred line was continued in the succession of twelve Imams, descendants of the Prophet, and, in the opinion of the Shiah sect, the legitimate claimants of the allegiance of his followers. Watched with a jealous eye, sometimes persecuted, sometimes poisoned, by the successive Ommiad and Abbasside Caliphs, they occasionally headed revolts, but more usually lived a life of retirement, devoted to the constant performance of religious exercises. Their succession is not however fully agreed upon even among their own sectaries. The orthodox Shiahs continue the line to the twelfth Imam, Mahomet, who, as they say, disappeared, as the Sonnites say, died, in 879. He still wanders through the world, destined at some time to take upon himself universal empire. Till that happy moment the Faithful remain deprived of any lawful spiritual sovereign; they must be ruled how they can by temporal governors, regarding themselves as his devoted slaves. Such is the Shiism of modern Persia. From a disputed succession to the seventh Imam, arose the famous sect of Ishmael, of so terrible a notoriety at the time of the Crusades. To them we shall have again to return.

The modern Mahometans of the Sonnite sect, the orthodox creed of Turkey, though they acknowledge no special sanctity or authority in Ali and his family, yet revere them as good men, and assign a garb of honour and pay great respect of every kind to the Seyuds, or descendants of the Prophet. But in the days of Moawiyah and Yezid it was not so. Then Ali and his family were publicly cursed, at every assembly of the Faithful, in every mosque of the

obedience of Damascus. It was not till the reign of the virtuous Omar II., who stands out as a marked exception to the odious princes before and after him, that this disgraceful ceremony was abolished. The forbearance has not been reciprocal. Omar II., indeed, on account of this act of tolerance, is respected by the Shiahs, but all the other Caliphs, except their own Ali and Hassan, are held in abhorrence by every faithful Persian. The earlier and greater Omar is the special object of their hatred. As Ali is almost identified with the Deity, Omar is almost identified with the Power of Darkness. They become in fact their old Ormuzd and Ahriman under other names.

From this brief sketch of the internal history of the Saracens during this period we must now turn to their external conquests. These, during their best and earliest days, were made wholly at the expense of the Roman and Persian Empires. And abroad, as at home, the twelve years of Abu-Bekr and Omar, while their whole attention was given to foreign conquest, and while their strength was not yet wasted in internal quarrels, form the brightest period of Mussulman history. Before the end of Omar's reign the King of Kings ranked no longer among the princes of the earth, and the Emperor of the Romans had ceased to reign in Syria and Egypt.

The Saracens, in the first burst of their zeal, did not hesitate to attack at the same moment the two potentates who divided between them all that they knew of the habitable world. Had the combined hosts of Chosroes and Cæsar been arrayed against them, they would have looked, like their Prophet at Beder, for legions of angels to disperse them. To the first Saracens the call to the battle-field was like

the call to a wedding-feast. The day of each man's death was immutably fixed; he who shrank from toil and danger would as surely be overtaken at home as he who ventured himself boldly in the strife for Allah and his faith. No man would shrink from hostile numbers, no man would turn his back for thousands and tens of thousands, when "Paradise was before him, the Devil and hell-fire in his rear." Press boldly on, and victory or martyrdom is the alternative. Conquer, and all the joys of earth are before you; fall bravely, and you exchange them for those of heaven; for hath not the Prophet said that "Paradise is under the shadow of swords?" The young and ardent, as he rushed upon death, beheld the black-eyed girls waving to him with handkerchiefs of green silk. Higher and graver souls, like Ali and Abu-Obeidah, looked forward, we may not doubt, in all sincerity, for that purer Beatific Vision which the Apostle had promised for those who wrought the will of Allah upon earth. And these men, so terrible in battle, are, compared with all other oriental victors, eminently mild in victory. The plighted faith was rigidly kept; we hear of no indiscriminate massacres of the defenceless, of no torments or mockeries inflicted even on the most obstinate. In dealing with the Saracens of Omar men knew exactly what they had to expect. "Koran, Tribute, or Sword;"—the conditions were hard indeed, but such as they were, they were never violated. Any unnecessary violence on the part of the fierce Khaled is promptly checked by the gentle Abu-Obeidah, and as promptly censured by the stern justice of the Prince whose "palace was a mud hut, and his companions beggars and poor people." If the law of the Prophet has been violated by forbidden

luxuries, the guilty come forward to accuse themselves, and to receive the personal chastisement which the ascetic Caliph has decreed. Two parallels only occur to me; the Hebrews under Joshua, the English and Scottish Covenanters of two centuries back. In all we behold the same faith in the direct interposition of the Almighty; in all, the same union of religious enthusiasm and military obedience. The Spaniards in America, even the first Crusaders are shut out from the comparison by those deeds of vulgar avarice and of ruthless, unnecessary cruelty, which would infallibly have exposed them to the bastinado of Omar, perchance have made Khaled himself for once draw the Sword of God on behalf of the defenceless Infidel.

It was no sort of disgrace to the armies either of Rome or of Persia to have been discomfited by enemies like these. The ordinary and natural inducements of the soldier, average courage, average patriotism, average professional honour, could not possibly keep him up to a conflict with men whose whole spirit and motives savoured of the extraordinary and the supernatural. The Saracens had indeed potent allies in their Syrian and Egyptian conquests; but they were not to be found in the cowardice of the Roman legions, but in the disaffection of the Syrian and Egyptian people. So too with Persia; it was not the actual decline in military vigour, but the temporary decay of the national spirit, which made her an easy prey. The veterans of Heraclius and Chosroes were equal to a conflict with any ordinary enemy; but they were not equal to a conflict with foes who seemed to belong to another world. Every pitched battle, whether with Romans or Persians, was stoutly contested, and not

won by the Arabs without many alternations of good and evil fortune. On many a day of conflict in the Syrian war, Christian and Moslem were so fairly matched that one man's presence might have turned the scale. Had Heraclius appeared by the stream of Yermouk, as he had done over the ruins of Nineveh, mounted on his horse Phallas, with his resistless lance in his hand, how many a veteran legionary might have been inspired to yet greater deeds as he fought under the eye and by the side of Cæsar. The spear which had pierced three Persian chiefs in succession, which had torn from Rhazates the last *spolia opima* of a Roman general, might have clashed in no unequal warfare with the Dhulfekkar of Ali, or have cloven the consecrated turban which made the arm of Khaled resistless. Persia had indeed no such champion; her sceptre passed to and fro among women and more effeminate men; but her steel-clad horsemen could inflict at least one undoubted defeat upon the invaders; and on the field of Kadesia seven thousand slaughtered Moslems could testify that Persia in her last days had produced a Roostam well nigh as valiant, though less fortunate than his mythical namesake. But Persian history is forgotten altogether; Byzantine history is only thought of to be despised; Heraclius, the Carthaginian Cæsar, is held to have been a "Greek of the Lower Empire," and a Greek of the Lower Empire was of course incapable of any worthy action either in peace or war.

The peace between Rome and Persia had been concluded in 628, and in the next year Heraclius made his famous pilgrimage to Jerusalem with the True Cross. That very year witnessed the first

desultory warfare between the Romans and the Saracens, during the life-time of Mahomet. In 632, the year of the Prophet's death, commenced the decisive invasion of both empires. Four years only had the Romans and Persians had to recover, after their internecine struggle of more than twenty. That those years were not spent in vain by Heraclius is clear, as Mr. Finlay observes, from the state of defence in which the Arabs found the country, and from the resistance which it offered to them compared with the ease with which it had been subdued by Chosroes twenty years earlier. Heraclius does not appear to have returned to Constantinople after his pilgrimage to Jerusalem, but to have remained at Antioch engaged in the affairs of his eastern provinces. That he did not appear personally in the field is sufficiently accounted for by his bodily illness, without resorting to the theory which represents him as a fool and a coward at the beginning and end of his reign, and a hero during its intermediate portions. Meanwhile in Persia all was confusion; sovereign after sovereign was set up and deposed; and at the moment of the first Saracen invasion the crown was worn by a female, Arzem-docht. The first attack under Abu-Bekr only added the tributary province of Ghassan to the Saracenic empire, and, when Khaled was removed from the Persian to the Syrian war, the Arabs met with serious reverses. Meanwhile, the Persians deposed their Queen, and set Yezdijird, their last native sovereign, on the throne. In 636 commenced the war which only ended with the entire destruction of the Persian monarchy. In the battle of Kadesia the Persians lost the banner and palladium of their empire, the famous apron of Gavah; in that of Nahavend

the last struggle took place which the Arabians describe as "the Victory of Victories." Yezdijird prolonged his life as a fugitive till 651, when the last of the Sassanidæ perished by an ignoble treason. No monarch was ever more unfortunate; none has ever met with less pity. Had he fallen, like a Harold or a Constantine, the foremost among his people, he might have been ranked among the world's heroes; but no act of valour or of counsel is attributed to him, and even in his flight he encumbered himself with all the trappings of oriental luxury. Persia has never since seen a really national sovereign, but we shall perceive, as we go on, that her national spirit was very far from being extinguished.

Persia, as a political power, suffered utter extinction; the rival empire meanwhile underwent a seasonable and healthful amputation. The victorious Saracen relieved the Roman Emperor of his troublesome oriental possessions. The Roman provinces at that time formed, as I showed in my first lecture, three distinct classes,—the Greek and the Latin provinces, both orthodox, and the heretical and rebellious races of Egypt and Syria. Of these, Egypt welcomed the invaders with open arms; and Syria, it is clear, was only prevented from doing so by the presence of the Emperor and his legions. But Latin Africa was only subdued after years of constant conflict, after many hard-won victories and many signal reverses; while in Greek Asia Minor the Saracen could never maintain any permanent footing at all. In short, wherever the inhabitants had anything really to lose by submission, there, even in the first heat of Mussulman enthusiasm, submission was found no easy matter to enforce. In Syria the imperial armies maintained

themselves well in pitched battles, but the governors and inhabitants of the individual towns were always ready for a truce at the cost of their neighbours. Frequently they were not averse to entire submission, while not a few were prepared wholly to throw in their lot with their invaders. From Romanus of Bostra to Omar Pasha the cause of Islam has always been most effectually served by renegades from the Christian faith.

The details of the Syrian war ought by all means to be studied in the charming pages of Ockley; at the same time I do not profess to pledge my faith to his facts quite so unreservedly as to the testimony of Thucydides or the Saxon Chronicle. Ockley represents the Arabic writer Al Wakidi; but in the first place, Al Wakidi was in no case a contemporary witness, and in the second, oriental scholars entertain grave doubts whether the book in question was really written by Al Wakidi at all. But, if it be not a true history, it is certainly one of the most delightful of romances, and the quaint simplicity of its English interpreter is exactly adapted to do justice to the theme. If we may not trust it for the details of battles and sieges, we may at least accept it as a genuine picture of Saracenic character and manners in their best days. The characters live in the memory as if they had been drawn by Scott or Bulwer. Who can forget Khaled and Abu-Obeidah, Dames and Derar, and Caliph Omar himself? Then there are the valiant maidens and matrons of Islam, not yet shut up in harams, but ready to do battle alongside of their brothers and husbands. There is Caulah with her companions, laying valiantly about them with their tent-poles; then there is that strong-minded

widow, "a brave virago, one of the fighting sort, that could use a bow and arrows very well," and who therewith so effectually avenged her husband upon the eye of the imperial commander. These things surely come fresh from genuine Arabian traditions. But the descriptions of Christian affairs bear the ordinary stamp of oriental ignorance, an ignorance, by the way, fully repaid in kind by their western enemies. They do not err quite so ludicrously as Major Price's Persian guides, who convert all the Roman officers into Patriarchs and Bishops, the natural error of a people among whom ecclesiastical and military rank were for a while identical. But one is really tempted to doubt about the brothers Peter and Paul, one commanding the infantry and the other the cavalry; and my faith at least is far too weak to take in the tale of the Emperor's son-in-law Thomas, living as a private man at Damascus, assuming the command as a volunteer, and shooting a great number of Saracens with poisoned arrows. In this and in every other age, when the oriental writers deal with the affairs of their enemies, they fall into grotesque blunders and overlay their narrative with the most monstrous fables.

Six years' warfare accomplished the conquest of Syria. Bostra, Damascus, Heliopolis, and Emesa, were subdued by 635; the next year witnessed the fight of Yermouk, the next the capitulation of Jerusalem. In 638 Heraclius uttered his famous farewell to Syria, and Aleppo and Antioch were added to the list of tributary cities. For more than three hundred years Syria remained a Saracenic province, till, under Nikephoros and Tzimiskes, "the sway of Christ and Cæsar" was again restored on the banks of the Orontes and the Euphrates.

If Syria fell in six years, Egypt may be said to have fallen in a single moment. Alexandria indeed was long defended, and more than once recovered, by its Roman garrison, but the dominion of the Roman Empire and the orthodox Church had no charms for the native Jacobites. They hailed the invaders as deliverers; the Koran indeed they declined, but tribute to the Caliph they considered as a burden less heavy than bondage to Cæsar. In fact, the Copts joined the Saracens in arms, and fought as zealously against the hated Melchites as the true Believers could do against Infidels in general. Had they always found rulers like their first conqueror, the politic and liberal Amrou, the change might have been for the better; but the future history of Egypt shows how far such was from being the case. No new line of Ptolemies arose to make Egypt again a kingdom. Fatimite Caliphs indeed reigned there, and so did Mameluke Sultans; but the most devoted Jacobite could hardly have deemed Heraclius a sterner persecutor than Hakem.

Turn to the west, and we shall find that, while Egypt was won almost without a blow, Latin Africa took sixty years to conquer. It was first invaded under Othman in 647, but Carthage was not subdued till 698, nor was the province fully reduced for eleven years longer. And why? Doubtless, because Africa contained two classes of inhabitants, not over-friendly to each other, but both of whom had something to lose by a Saracenic conquest. The citizens of Carthage were Roman in every sense, their language was Latin, their faith was orthodox; they had no wrongs beyond those which always afflict provincials under a despotism; wrongs not likely to be alleviated

by exchanging a Christian despot at Constantinople for an infidel one at Medina or Damascus. Beyond them, in the inland provinces, were the native Moors, barbarians, and many of them pagans; they had fought for their rude liberty against the Cæsars, and they had no intention of surrendering it to the Caliphs. Romans and Moors alike long preferred the chances of the sword to either Koran or tribute; but their ultimate fate was different. Latin civilization and Latin Christianity gradually disappeared by the decay and extermination of their votaries. The Moors, a people not unlike the Arabs in their unconverted state, were at last content to embrace their religion, and to share their destinies and their triumphs. Arabs and Moors intermingled went on to further conquests; and the name of the barbarian converts was more familiarly used in Western Europe to denote the united nation than the terrible name of the original compatriots of the Prophet.

Thus far the conquests of the Saracens had been made wholly at the cost of the Roman and Persian empires. At length they began to outstrip their limits; they had indeed done so in mere temporary plundering incursions from a very early time; in the reign of Othman they had penetrated into Spain, and in that of Moawiyah into India; but as yet they made no abiding conquests. At length, in 710, the Arabian power began to extend itself alike over pagans who had never submitted to Chosroes, and over Christians who had thrown off their allegiance to Cæsar. The Saracens then came into permanent contact with the two races which were, in future days, to carry on that old strife between the West and the East, which had already become one between

Christendom and Islam. In the same year the first Turks and the first Franks became subjects of the Commander of the Faithful. That Commander was the careless and luxurious Walid, who, from his seraglio at Damascus, graciously permitted Tarik and Casim and Catibah to gather in kingdoms to his obedience. The Caliphate now exhibited the spectacle of a body rotten at the heart but still vigorous at its extremities. The Court of the Ommiads was no better than the court of the Sassanidæ, but the spirit of eighty years earlier survived in no small degree on every frontier. Each new conquest again rekindled the old enthusiasm, and, in many cases, communicated it to a new race of men. In this *annus mirabilis*, 710, the creed of Islam gathered in the firstfruits of the race which was hereafter to supply its firmest champions; the germ was planted which was to grow up into the imperial forms of the Grand Turk and the Great Mogul. The Oxus had hitherto divided the land of darkness, Turan, from Iran, now doubly the land of light under the allegiance of the Prophet. Much desultory border warfare between the Arabs and the Turks had been the necessary result; but now the whole land between the Oxus and the Jaxartes was permanently conquered and converted into a Saracenic province. From those regions were to issue in future ages the warriors who carried the faith of Islam alike into the native land of Iskender and into regions beyond his furthest conquests, who planted the standard of the faith upon the banks of the Ganges and the shores of the Adriatic; the Ghaznevid, the Seljuk, the proud Mogul of India, the terrible and abiding Ottoman of Europe.

In the same year that Catibah crossed the Oxus,

Tarif crossed the straits of Hercules. The Gothic Kings of Spain, as I have already mentioned, had, during the wars of Heraclius, reannexed the Byzantine province in the south of the peninsula; they had also some possessions on the African side, and they had aided the Romans of Carthage in their gallant defence against the Saracens. In 710 they were themselves invaded; in the next year the Gothic monarchy was overthrown by Tarik on the banks of the Guadalete. Two or three more years subdued all Spain except the inaccessible mountain fastnesses, and even carried the Saracenic possessions beyond the Pyrenees into the Gallic province of Septimania or Narbonne. The quickness of this conquest strangely contrasts with the long resistance of Africa. The King of Spain in his own kingdom lost his dominions far more speedily than the distant Emperor of Constantinople. The inference naturally is that the Gothic monarchy was not yet neutralized in the peninsula; and we must not forget that it was only during the preceding century that the Spanish Goths had embraced the Catholic faith. Undoubtedly the disputed successions to the Gothic throne had greatly weakened the power of the monarchy, and the large Jewish population, weary of Christian oppression, looked for deliverers in an oriental and circumcised people. Yet these two causes will hardly suffice to account for the entire absence of national resistance, except in those regions which Roman, Goth, and Arab alike failed wholly to subdue. We cannot avoid the inference that the Roman and Romanized inhabitants of Spain regarded both Witiza and Roderic much in the same light in which those of Italy and Africa looked upon Totila and Gelimer during the wars of Belisarius.

To continue our synchronisms, the same year which witnessed the overthrow of Roderic, beheld also the first and only Saracenic establishment in India Casim, a nephew of the merciless Hejaj, annexed Sind to the empire; it proved however only a temporary possession. The career of conquest in this direction lasted only during Casim's lifetime; and in 750, simultaneously with the fall of the Ommiad dynasty, the Mahometan power of Sind was wholly overthrown by the valiant Rajpoots.

These three conquests, of Spain, Transoxiana, and Sind, extended the Caliphate to its utmost limits. The will of the High Pontiff of Islam was supreme from the Jaxartes to the Atlantic. But there was one conquest yet to be won. The Prophet had promised forgiveness of all their sins to the first Moslem army which should enter the city of the Cæsars. To obtain this absolution was the first desire of every ardent Mussulman, during the eight hundred years which elapsed between the promise and its fulfilment. Province after province might be lopped away; the dominions of the Emperor of the Romans might seem small beside those of the Commander of the Faithful; but the victory was imperfect while the metropolis of Christianity and civilization remained untouched. While the throne of Cæsar still stood unshaken by the Bosporus—while the incense of Christian worship still went up from the most glorious of earthly temples—while, from Taurus to Sardinia, men had their rights secured to them by the laws of Servius and Justinian—the blood of the martyrs of Islam might seem to have been poured forth in vain. There, at the junction of two worlds, still sat the Queen of nations, bidding defiance to

the arms against which Persian and Goth and Turk had vainly struggled. Nahavend was falsely called the Victory of Victories, while the prize of prizes still eluded the grasp of the invader. There was the conquest, ever wished for, never won; "Seek ye the seven-hilled city[1]" was as truly the watchword of Saracen and Turk, from Mahomet the Prophet to Mahomet the Conqueror, as it has since been, in a holier cause, the watchword of the race still, for a while, banished from their imperial home. But mark how the prize eluded them. Syria and Egypt were their own, but beynd Mount Taurus the empire of Grecian intellect and Roman law withstood alike the preaching of the Prophet and the arms of his disciples. Plunder indeed they might; conquer they never could. And more than this, not many years elapsed before the Caliph became tributary to the Cæsar. In 659, the thirty-seventh year of the Hejira, the twenty-seventh since the invasion of Syria, the twenty-first since the farewell of Heraclius, Moawiyah bought peace of the Emperor Constans by a round sum of ready money and the payment of a daily tribute. Undoubtedly he was induced to this degradation by the necessities of his struggle with Ali, but it is worth noticing how early in his history the irresistible Saracen found it expedient to contend with gold instead of steel against the "Greek of the Lower Empire."

But after a while the Saracen power was reunited, and Moawiyah was enabled to employ his strength against the enemies instead of the children of his

[1] "τὴν ἑπτάλοφον ζητεῖτε,
καὶ νικᾶτε πρὸ παντοῦ."
Greek War-Song.

Prophet. In 673 the Saracens for the first time landed in Europe, and besieged the imperial city. But the ramparts of Constantinople were too strong for their attacks either by sea or land; the Greek fire swept away their warriors; may we not even deem that Christian faith and Roman valour had some share in the destruction of the invading host? In vain had the Caliph sent on the holy errand his own son Yezid, and Abu-Ayub, the last of the Ansars; in vain did the Imam Hossein forget his wrongs, and hasten to join in the warfare with the Infidel. Abu-Ayub left behind him a grave, to be discovered and reverenced eight centuries after; Yezid returned to receive the crown of the Caliphate, and Hossein to win the crown of martyrdom. But their comrades were cut off in the passes of Taurus or dashed against the shores of Pamphylia; and the Commander of the Faithful was fain once more to purchase peace by an annual tribute of 3,000 pieces of gold, fifty slaves, and fifty Arab horses.

At a later period a still larger tribute was paid by Abdalmelik to Justinian II.; but the mal-administration of that insane tyrant, and the revolutions which led to and succeeded his downfall, brought the Roman monarchy to such a pitch of decay and confusion that the time at last seemed really to have arrived for its utter destruction. In 711 the Heraclian dynasty was extinguished at Constantinople, and the Caliphate of Damascus attained its widest extent. Six years later Constantinople was again besieged by a Saracen army. But the last revolution of all had called to the throne a man worthy of the crisis. Leo the Isaurian again beat back the invader with utter defeat, and no Moslem army ever again appeared under the walls of

the New Rome till the Caliphate had passed away, and a sterner race of conquerors had assumed its mission.

But Leo the Isaurian did even more. As Mr. Finlay has shown in so masterly a manner, he renovated the Empire on a better basis within and without. The loss of Syria, Egypt, and Africa, the approaching loss of Latin Italy, rendered the Roman Empire, as it was still called, conterminous, or nearly so, with the Greek language and the Greek form of Christianity. It therefore began to acquire something like a national character. The Emperors of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries ruled over a dominion far smaller, but far more compact, united, and really powerful, than the unwieldy realm of Justinian and Heraclius. Leo the Isaurian, by preserving Byzantium and the Byzantine Empire, preserved Christianity and civilization. Never were they in such awful peril as when Moslemah landed before Constantinople. As far as we can see, had the Caliph once been acknowledged in St. Sophia, all that Constantinople then represented, law and literature and theology, all that distinguishes the Christian West from the Mahometan East, must have perished from the earth. Yet this peril and this rescue are unfamiliar to most European ears; the name of the great Leo is known only to the few who dive into Byzantine annals, while Charles Martel has won everlasting fame by driving back a plundering expedition, and the world rings with the name of a bloodthirsty savage like Richard Cœur-de-Lion.

The condition of the subject races within the Saracenic monarchy doubtless differed much in different parts of the empire; certainly it differed much

under individual Caliphs. The payment of tribute secured the vanquished in possession of his life, his property, and the public exercise of his religion. His condition did not necessarily involve personal oppression, but it opened every avenue to it, and it always involved civil degradation. Such was the theory, one strictly carried out in practice by the unswerving righteousness of the first Caliphs; in after times, sometimes we find policy relax, but more frequently we find fanaticism aggravate, the state of bondage to which the vanquished were reduced. Moawiyah did not scruple to rebuild Christian churches, and Casim carried on his eastern warfare in partnership with Hindoo allies. But ordinarily the condition of the subject races grew worse and worse, and when Abdalmelik gave the tribute of the Christians the odious form of a capitation-tax, another fetter was added. Yet it seems probable that nowhere, under the Saracenic rule, did the condition of the subject people at all approach the horrors of Ottoman oppression in the worst governed provinces of that empire. We read of no Saracen province resembling the condition of Crete before the War of Independence; we read of no Saracen emir who ever perpetrated enormities like the massacre of Chios. If any parallels occur, we must look for them in the atrocities which Hejaj and Mokhtar inflicted upon brother Moslems, not in the nobler warfare of Khaled and Zobeir, of Tarik and Casim and Catibah.

The vast extent to which the victories of the three last conquerors carried the dominions of the undivided Caliphate lasted only about forty years. The house of Ommiah reigned less than a century, and their fall entailed the dismemberment of the empire. In 750

the Caliphate of Damascus was transferred, by the result of a ferocious civil war, from the descendants of Moawiyah to those of Abbas, the uncle of Mahomet. But not only was the loss of Sind, as we have seen, contemporaneous with the change, but a prince of the Ommiad race established himself in Western Europe, and made Cordova the seat of a rival Moslem empire. When once the spell of union was broken, other provinces followed the example; and in our next lecture we shall have to trace the process by which the vast empire of the Saracens was torn in pieces by rebellious lieutenants and rival successors of the Prophet.

LECTURE IV.

THE SARACENS IN THE EAST.

THE first half of the eighth century is, as we have seen, the period of the greatest extent of the Caliphate. In the middle of that century it lost its most eastern and its most western possession. In Sind a national revolt expelled the Arabian intruders. In Spain a rival prince gave himself out as the true Commander of the Faithful. The claims of the house of Abbas were successfully preached in the east; the contending parties met on the true scene of Moslem disputation, the field of battle. Victory decided for the cousin of the Prophet; the descendants of Ommiah were hunted down through all Asia, and Abul Abbas was established as Caliph on the throne of Damascus. But a single youth of the doomed race escaped from destruction. After a long series of romantic adven-

tures, he found his way into Spain; he there found partizans, by whose aid he was enabled to establish himself as sovereign of the country, and to resist all the attempts of the Abbassides to regain, or rather to obtain, possession of the distant province. From this Abderrahman the Ommiad proceeded the line of Emirs and Caliphs of Cordova, who reigned in splendour in the West for three centuries after their house had been exterminated in their original possessions.

From this moment Mahometan history loses its unity. Hitherto we have more than once seen rival Caliphs arise, but, as the division was merely temporary, the weaker parties were conveniently stigmatized as rebels. From this time the empire was permanently divided; never again did all the disciples of Islam unite in allegiance to a single representative of the Prophet. We shall henceforth find two, sometimes three, rival Caliphs, each asserting his own exclusive rights, each imprecating maledictions on his antagonist and his supporters. Around the rival thrones of the East and the West, of Bagdad and of Cordova, the subjects of the present and the next succeeding lecture will naturally group themselves. The Abbassides of Bagdad form the natural centre for the history of Mahometanism in Asia, the Ommiads of Cordova for its history in western Europe. Africa we shall find connected with both in turn, but its western portions, as well as Sicily, Sardinia, and even Crete, will properly attach themselves to the Spanish division of the subject.

This division of the Caliphate, it should be observed, was very nearly contemporaneous with a similar division in Christendom. The seeds of this separation

were sown by the attempted religious reforms of Leo the Isaurian. As these were resisted in Italy, the Latin[1] portions of that peninsula gradually fell off from their allegiance to the throne of Constantinople, and finally, in the year 800, the last tie was broken. In that year the Pontiff and the citizens of the old Rome proclaimed Charles King of the Franks, the famous Charlemagne, to be the true Emperor of the Romans. Christendom and Islam were thus alike divided, and a curious interchange of alliances took place. The rival Caliphs made friendship with the rival Emperors. The Western Caliph was glad to league himself with the Eastern Cæsar against their common enemy at Bagdad. In like manner the Emperor of the West and the Caliph of the East were often on excellent terms, neither being dangerous to the other, but both having common foes at Cordova and Constantinople.

The new Caliph[2] and the new Cæsar each gave himself out as the one lawful Caliph and the one lawful Cæsar. I have already[3] pointed out the error involved in the common mode of speaking of the fall of the Western Empire under Augustulus, its restoration under Charlemagne. Rome was never without an Emperor, real or nominal; only, between Augustulus and Charlemagne, she was content to acknowledge one who reigned upon the Bosporus instead of upon the Tiber. The formal aspect of the event of 476 was that the whole Empire was reunited under the Byzantine monarch. The formal aspect of the event of 800

[1] It must be remembered that southern Italy and the island of Sicily remained Greek in every sense for some centuries after this period.

[2] How far the early Princes in Spain were strictly Caliphs will be seen in the next Lecture.

[3] See above, page 9.

was that Rome asserted her right to elect her own Emperor, refused to acknowledge Eirene, and chose Charles the First as the successor of Constantine the Sixth. Peace, and even alliance, often existed for a while between the two rivals; but a patriotic Byzantine always saw in the Western Cæsar a mere King of Germany, a patriotic Latin saw in the Eastern Cæsar a mere King of Greece.

The new Western Empire failed to become a lasting centre of unity for Western Christendom. It soon lost all practical connexion with the city of Rome. But Rome supplied Western Christendom with an efficient head and centre in another form. The same series of events which led to the separation of the Eastern and Western Empires led also ultimately to the separation of the Eastern and Western Churches. Rome furnished in her Pontiffs what she failed to furnish in her Emperors. The successor of Peter assumed the office which slipped from the hands of the successor of Augustus.

In short, the establishment of the rival Empire and the rival Caliphate really amounted only to the loss of a province by the old Empire and the old Caliphate. For all practical purposes the lord of Byzantium remained the true Emperor of the Romans, the lord of Bagdad remained the true Commander of the Faithful. One lost Spain, the other lost Latin Italy. Probably in neither case did the diminution of territory involve the loss of a single particle of real power.

The Eastern Caliphate existed, as a temporal power, somewhat more than six hundred years from the death of Mahomet, and almost exactly five hundred from the establishment of the Abbassides. During that whole period it remained in the possession of the

house of Abbas, being thus restored to the Prophet's immediate family, though not to his own actual offspring. Their claim to the Imamate did not, like that of the Ommiads, rest upon mere possession. It was[1] derived from Ali, though in a manner not very intelligible, passing, not through Hassan or Hossein, but through their brother Mahomet Haneifa. But Mahomet Haneifa was not the child of Fatima, nor does Abul Abbas appear to have been a descendant of Mahomet Haneifa. Whatever, however, were their rights, the line of the Abbassides, though their establishment was accompanied with the most revolting cruelty, seem to have been, on the whole, a better race than the Ommiads. They produced a very fair proportion of good and able rulers, according to oriental standards, and, for the first century at least of their existence, they maintained the throne of the Caliphate in greater dignity and reputation than their predecessors. The days of conquest indeed were past; the frontiers of the empire had receded in both directions; but these frontiers were honourably defended, and a vigorous and fairly just government was maintained at home. We are of course not to look either for the barbaric virtues of the first Caliphs, nor yet for really good government according to the standard of western civilization. But viewed as one among the common run of oriental monarchies, the first hundred years of the Abbasside Caliphate are certainly to be placed above the average. We shall indeed hardly find a single Caliph not stained by cruel executions; but these are the common events of eastern despotisms, and must be looked for as a matter of course. Even the best were often guilty of

[1] See D'Herbelot, Bibliothèque Orientale, Art. Imam.

extreme barbarity to the house of Ali ; but it must be borne in mind that the house of Ali ever and anon rose in revolt against the house of Abbas.

Al Mansor, the second Abbasside Caliph, removed the seat of empire from Damascus to his newly founded city of Bagdad. Bagdad was the last of those capitals which had risen and fallen within so small a distance of each other—Babylon, Seleukeia, Ctesiphon, Bagdad—each no doubt contributing materials for the construction of its successor, as Ctesiphon or Al Modain is distinctly recorded to have done for the construction of Bagdad. Under this Caliph too the Saracens ceased to deserve the old stigma of illiterate barbarians. Bagdad became the dwelling-place of art, science, literature, and philosophy. Nor was Cordova behind the rival capital. Indeed I shall reserve the general consideration of Saracenic learning and science for my next lecture on the Spanish Caliphate, which will be less crowded with important political history than the present.

The most famous of the Abbasside Caliphs is the fifth in the series, Haroun al Rashid, the hero of the Arabian nights. He reigned from 786 to 809, being contemporary with Charlemagne, with whom he exchanged friendly embassies. His name is doubtless more familiar to western ears than that of any other oriental prince; and his reputation in western imaginations appears to be on the whole a favourable one. Yet the enchanting legends by which he is chiefly known hardly put his character in a very estimable point of view. He is indeed described as executing impartial justice in matters where his own interest was not involved ; he is not described as executing impartial justice against himself. One cannot conceive

him, like Nushirvan, allowing the poor widow to retain her unsightly piece of ground beneath the windows of his palace. Any supposed insult to himself is always avenged alike on innocent and guilty with the most barbarous cruelty. And even his public justice seems sometimes of a questionable character. It is a strange proceeding to threaten the grand-vizier and his kindred with death because a corpse is found in the Tigris, and then to forgive them because some one can tell a tale still more extraordinary. All this is perfectly in character with a vulgar eastern despot; but it is a sad falling off from Omar and Ali, or from Haroun's own excellent father Al Mehdi. And history does not contradict the picture drawn by romance. The real murder of his vizier Jaffer and his kindred the Barmecides, without any crime and under circumstances of the most revolting treachery, is enough to stamp the name of Haroun with infamy. Like nearly all the Abbassides, except his own father, he was addicted to wine, in defiance of his own religion. He appears indeed as a warrior and a conqueror, but one not after the pattern of the first Caliphs. They fought to win realms for Allah and his Prophet; the plundering expeditions of Haroun were those of a mere slave-hunter intent on his own gain or on the parade of his palace.

Haroun however, though I hold that he has been unduly extolled, was an able and successful ruler, and one certainly above the average of oriental princes. During his reign we may consider the Caliphate of Bagdad as attaining the height of its glory. After him it gradually declined, and we cannot help seeing that Haroun himself greatly contributed to its downfall. It marks how far the Caliphate had sunk into a

common oriental monarchy, that Haroun, like Lewis the Pious, divided his dominions among his sons. Each indeed endeavoured to preserve to one among them a certain supremacy over his brethren, annexed to the superior title of Caliph and of Emperor; in each case the attempt was alike fruitless. The division made by Haroun seems to have originated in purely personal causes. His eldest and ablest son, Al Mamoun, was the child of an obscure concubine; Al Amin was younger, and had no personal merit; but his mother was Haroun's favourite wife, his royal kinswoman Zobeide. Unable to decide between them, he assigned the Caliphate to Al Amin, bestowing what we may call feudal appanages on Al Mamoun and his other son Al Motassem. This was utterly contrary to the original notion of the Caliphate. The Commander of the Faithful, the Vicar of Allah upon earth, was not to be a mere external suzerain, receiving homage from vassal princes; he was to be an immediate sovereign, ruling, if need be, his distant provinces by his mere personal lieutenants. The result was that the Caliph Al Amin attempted to deprive Al Mamoun of his appanage of Chorassan; a civil war ensued, which issued in the establishment of Al Mamoun as Caliph.

The reigns of Al Mamoun and his brother and successor Al Motassem, extending from 813 to 841, form an important period in Saracenic history. Though the apparent splendour and power of the Caliphate were as yet in no way decayed, it is easy to see that the first steps towards its destruction had been taken. Four things destroyed the Caliphate: 1st, the claims of the rival Caliphs; 2nd, the rise of utterly anarchical and destructive sects; 3rd, the

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gradual separation of the remote provinces from the central power; 4th, the insolence of foreign mercenaries at home. All these causes of decay date chiefly from the reigns of Al Mamoun and Al Motassem.

The actual establishment of a rival Fatimite Caliphate began during this period; but as, at present, it appeared only in western Africa, it has more to do with the Spanish than with the oriental division of our subject. But we must not omit the extraordinary fact that Al Mamoun himself was converted to Shiism, and endeavoured to establish the Imam Ali as his successor in the Caliphate. Indeed none of the Caliphs of this period appear to have been strictly orthodox. Several of the immediate successors of Al Mamoun gave great offence to their subjects by denying the eternal and uncreated character of the Koran. Of all the absurd dogmas with which the simple creed of Mahomet has been encrusted, this certainly stands unrivalled. That any book, especially a collection of odds and ends like the Koran, should be held to be, not merely divinely inspired, but itself absolutely divine, appears to transcend all other vagaries of human folly. The natural inference seems to be the existence of two deities, Allah and Koran, the very error which Mahomet deemed himself specially sent to extirpate.

The heresy of these Caliphs was undoubtedly the result of their own common sense; but when the Commander of the Faithful went astray, what could be expected to befall his flock? The ninth century was fertile in heresies. No religion, I may observe, has been more disturbed by sects than that of Mahomet; and this prevalence of schism is not only acknowledged by the Moslem doctors, but is alleged as a sign of the purity of their creed. Christianity,

they say, an improvement on Judaism, can boast of more sects than Judaism; Islam, an improvement on Christianity, can boast of more sects than Christianity. The argument is an odd one; but, notwithstanding all the diversities among Christians, I believe they have a full right to it, such as it is. The history of these sects, in a theological and philosophical point of view, is an excessively curious subject. I have however chiefly to deal with them in a historical and political aspect; and the little I have to say about them in the other character I shall reserve till I come to treat of the distinctive peculiarities of Persian Mahometanism.

The Caliphate, it will be remembered, was essentially a theocracy; church and state were identical. Consequently every religious difference implied a political movement, and, during the two first centuries of Islam, every political movement implied or alleged a religious difference. The Caliph reigned only because he was the Imam of the Believers; those who rejected his creed or his Imamate naturally rejected him also as their temporal sovereign. Those on the other hand who rejected him as their temporal sovereign could have no excuse for doing so, unless they could show some defect in his claim to their spiritual allegiance. Every new sect, therefore, rose in rebellion, and required a civil war for its suppression. During the ninth and tenth centuries several such sects arose and desolated the Empire. The greater number arose in Chorassan, but the most famous and formidable were the Karmathians of Irak.

While the throne of the Caliphs was thus shaken by these combined religious and political disturbances, crafty men were able to turn the troubled state of things to their own account. Separate dynasties

gradually arose in the remote provinces, which acquired a real independence, though they nominally recognized the Commander of the Faithful as their sovereign. By this they are sufficiently distinguished from the rival Caliphates of the West. Under the successive dynasties of the East, all real power slipped out of the hands of the Caliph of Bagdad, but his name was still retained on the coin and in the public prayers, the two great emblems of sovereignty in the Mahometan world, as indeed in the world in general. Dynasty succeeded to dynasty with a rapidity which puzzles the brain, and which makes it almost impossible to remember more than a very general notion of their order of succession. The details of the Taherites, the Soffarides, even the more important Samanides and Dilemites, must be left to the professed oriental scholar. Such portions of their history as can be remembered by a western reader will suggest some profitable reflections.

These dynasties did not all arise in the same manner. The simplest and most gradual origin was when a lieutenant of the Caliph in a distant province contrived to transmit his government to his children, who thus rose imperceptibly into the character of hereditary monarchs. This same process, except so far as its natural development has been hindered by foreign interference, has been going on before our own eyes in the case of the Pashas of Egypt. This process, in the case of the Caliphate, was as old as the reign of Al Mamoun. His valiant general Taher Zulyemnin, to whom he owed the throne of the Caliphs, was made Governor of Chorassan, and his posterity imperceptibly grew into the dynasty of the Taherites. Other dynasties owed their origin to open

domestic rebellion, or even to open foreign invasion, both of which it was often convenient to cloak under the appearance of vassalage. A soldier of fortune obtains possession of a province; he or his son endeavours to obtain a more legitimate title, and is willing to own a nominal allegiance to the Caliph. The Caliph is no less willing to make a show of authority by sending him a commission for the government of the province he has usurped, and by investing him with some sounding title. By this means the domestic robber, the chief of mercenaries, the unmistakeable foreign invader, becomes the faithful vassal of the Caliph, and is honoured with the designation of the Pillar of the State, or the Right Hand of the Commander of the Faithful. Often again the Caliph found it convenient to withdraw his commission from a weaker and to transmit it to a stronger claimant, who was thereby entitled to pursue his predecessor as a rebel and a schismatic. Now and then, but far more rarely, the Caliph was enabled to recover for himself the dominions of a refractory vassal. All this is exactly similar to the state of things in both branches of the Roman Empire. In the fifth and sixth centuries Teutonic Kings rejoiced in any vain title which connected them with the imperial power. Alaric often served as a Roman general; his successor Adolphus founded the Visigothic Kingdom of Spain as a lieutenant of the Emperor. Clovis was honoured with the Consulate. Odoacer governed Italy as Patrician; his commission was transferred to Theodoric; and finally their dominions were re-incorporated with the Empire. In later times who can tell the exact moment when Venice and Servia ceased to pay any allegiance to

the Byzantine monarchy? Even our own century has seen the dissolution of a Holy Roman Empire whose Arch-Treasurers, Chancellors, and Cup-bearers were sovereign Princes often entitled to rank as the equals of the Emperor whom they might be called upon to attend as ministers or as menials. The course of ambition and the disguises by which it cloaks itself, the grasping at the shadow of power after its essence has departed, are peculiar to no age, country, religion, or state of society.

One of the analogies suggested in the last paragraph may be pushed further. I just before alluded to the Teutonic tribes in the Roman Empire. What they were to Western Christendom, the Turks have been in every respect to Islam. The relation of the Slavonic nations to Eastern Christendom is also not without analogy, though the parallel is less exact. In the reign of Al Motassem the Turks begin to play an important part in the history of Islam. Now, in mentioning the Turks, as I have already more than once done incidentally, I hope no one's mind will fly off at once to the people with whom we are just now rather too familiar under that name. The Ottomans are only one branch out of many of the great Turkish family; they are moreover the junior branch of all, and do not figure in history till four hundred years after the times with which we are dealing. The Turkish race is probably that which has the greatest extent, continuous or nearly so, in the whole world. From the Adriatic to the Icy Sea, it forms a greater or less proportion of the inhabitants of every intermediate region. And it exists, or has existed, in every degree of civil society, from the condition of mere savages to the highest degree of civilization

compatible with oriental despotism. But the true native land of the Turk is the western portion of Central Asia, and his true social condition is that of a nomad wanderer. To the east of him lies the Mogul race, with which we shall have to deal in course of time. In common parlance, the Moguls and all Turks but the Ottomans are confounded under the name of Tartars, while the name of Turk is reserved for the Ottomans only. This nomenclature may do for modern politics, but it will not do for oriental history. We read every day of the Turkish army in the Crimea and of the Tartar inhabitants of that peninsula. Now these same Tartars are true Turks, much truer Turks in blood and language than the Ottomans, who are necessarily a confused mixture of all nations. In these lectures I shall always use the word Turk in its correct extensive sense, and speak of that particular branch to which the name is commonly confined by the name by which they call themselves, Osmanli or Ottoman.

From western Central Asia the Turkish race has spread itself over Europe and Asia by two courses. Some have taken the path round the north of the Black Sea. Of these the most famous have been the Bulgarians,[1] who, settling among the Slavonians on the Danube, have long since lost all trace of their Turkish origin, and have for centuries spoken a Slavonic language, and professed Christianity according to the Greek Church. But the Turks with whom we have now to deal entered the civilized world by crossing the Jaxartes and Oxus. These Turks, as I

[1] Dr. Prichard makes the Bulgarians Turks; Professor Max Müller regards them as Fins. In either case the nationality, Finnish or Turkish, of the original Bulgarians was soon lost among the far greater number of their Slavonic subjects.

have observed, have been to Islam what the Teutonic nations have been to Christendom.

Christianity may fairly be defined as the religion of the Roman Empire. It was first preached to its subjects, and it was by them communicated to other nations. For a long time "the sway of Christ and Cæsar" were coextensive; and up to this day Christianity has had no permanent hold except upon those nations whose civilization is more or less drawn from Roman sources. It is, as I have once before observed, the creed of Europe and European colonies. But for some centuries past, its most vigorous and zealous disciples and propagators have been found among those nations who, in overthrowing the Roman power, adopted, to so great an extent, the religion, the language, and the civilization of the power which they overthrew. The religious and political heritage of Western Rome passed on to its Teutonic conquerors. What they were to the West, the Slaves were, to a great extent, in the East, half conquerors, half disciples. But there the Roman power itself survived, and it is only within comparatively recent times that a Slavonic power—first Poland, then Russia—has appeared in the forefront of the battle with the Moslem.

Precisely in the same way, Islam was the creed of the Saracenic Empire, and precisely in the same way did its championship pass on from the Saracen to the Turk, his combined conqueror and scholar. The Turks overthrew the Arabian empire, but they adopted the Arabian religion, and much of Arabian and Persian civilization. It is the Turk who for centuries past has been the great propagator of Islam. He has carried the faith into regions which the Saracen could never enter. The Saracen was stopped by

Taurus on the one hand and by the Indus on the other; the Turk has carried on his career of conquest and proselytism to the Adriatic and the Ganges. The Saracen failed before Constantinople and was expelled from India. The Turk rules to this day on the throne of Byzantium, and ruled but yesterday on that of Delhi. And when Christian and Moslem met in the most deadly conflict of all, when the warfare was most purely for religion on either side, it was not the teachers but the scholars who were the combatants. The Crusades were waged not between the Roman and the Saracen, but between the Frank and the Turk.

The Turks in the Caliphate, like the Teutonic nations in the Empire, appeared in the three successive characters of subjects, soldiers, and masters. The conquests of Catibah in Transoxiana gave the Caliphs some Turkish subjects and some Turkish enemies. The slaves and prisoners supplied by these two classes were converted by Caliph Motassem into a standing guard. He doubtless found that his own Saracens were ceasing to contend on equal terms with the Romans, and that new blood must be sought somewhere. But the Commander of the Faithful surrounded by a permanent guard of barbarian mercenaries would have seemed a strange sight in the eyes of Abu-Bekr or Omar. An utterly lawless and barbarous power was thus raised up in the very centre of the empire, which tyrannized alike over prince and people. While the distant provinces were becoming independent, the Caliph was becoming a slave in his own capital. The Turkish guards were the first Mamelukes, and acted much like the later and more famous ones, except that they did not

venture to choose Caliphs, as their successors did Sultans, from among their own body. But within the sacred line of Abbas, they set up and overthrew Caliphs just as they pleased, and subjected them to every species of personal indignity and cruelty. We seem to be reading over again the tale of Rome in the fifth century; Alaric, Ricimer, Odoacer, deposed and created Emperors; but, as no Goth or Herulan ever made himself Emperor, so no Turk ever made himself Caliph. But the lot of the Roman monarch was lighter than that of the Saracen. The Emperor was deposed and made a Bishop; at the worst he was killed outright. The Caliphs were blinded, scourged, starved, subjected to that favourite piece of eastern cruelty, being broiled alive in the sun. This state of things went on for about twelve Caliphates, from 861 to 945. In this last year the Caliphs had at least the advantage of a change of masters.

In 937 Caliph Al Radhi instituted an office called Emir-al-Omra, or Prince of Princes, who was designed to act as some curb on the Turks, but who in fact became absolute master of the Caliph and the Caliphate. Al Radhi died in peace; but his successor Al Motekki was blinded; and his successor Al Mostekfi in 945 called in the aid of Ahmed the Dilemite, the prince of a dynasty which had recently arisen and occupied a large portion of ancient Persia. Ahmed was made Emir al-Omra, and received the sounding personal title of Muezuddoula,—the Glory of the State. For more than a century the Caliphs were kept in tutelage by rulers of this family, the first instalment of whose government was the deposition andblinding of the unfortunate Mostekfi himself.

To understand the revolution by which the Dilemites

in their turn were driven from power, we must go back somewhat, and must extend our view in two directions.

Egypt, during the ninth and tenth centuries, was the theatre of several revolutions. Two dynasties of Turkish slaves, the Tolunides and the Ilkshidites, established themselves in that country, which was only reunited to the Caliphate of Bagdad for a brief period between their usurpations. But early in the ninth century a singular power had been growing up on its western border. I mentioned in my last lecture that a schism arose among the followers of Ali regarding the legitimate succession to the sixth Imam Jaffer. His eldest son, Ismail or Ishmael, dying before him, Jaffer appointed another son, Moussa or Moses, his heir. But a large body of the sect denied that Jaffer had the right to make a new nomination ; they affirmed the Imamate to be strictly hereditary, and formed a new party of Ishmaelians, who seem to have made something very like a deity of their hero. A chief of this sect, Mahomet, surnamed Al Mehdi, or the Leader, a title given by the Shiahs to their Imams, revolted in Africa in 908. He professed himself, though his claims were bitterly derided by his enemies, to be a descendant of Ishmael, and consequently to be the legitimate Imam. Armed with this claim, it was of course his business to acquire, if he could, the temporal power of a Caliph ; and as he soon obtained the sovereignty of a considerable portion of Africa, a rival Caliphate was consequently established in that country. This dynasty assumed the name of Fatimites in honour of their famous ancestress Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. The fourth in succession, Muezzeddin by name, obtained possession of Egypt

about 967. He is said to have made this important conquest by sending a large army at a time when the country was at once in a state of political confusion, owing to the death of the last Ilkshidite prince, and was also suffering from a grievous famine. The Fatimite army carried with them vast stores of corn, which they distributed to the starving natives, who thereupon willingly recognized the spiritual and temporal claims of the African Caliph. This certainly reads like a bit of oriental romance. But undoubtedly the Ilkshidites and their nominal sovereigns the Abbassides lost Egypt with great rapidity. Al Muezzeddin transferred his residence thither, and founded the city of Cairo, which he made his capital. Egypt thus, from a tributary province, became again, as in the days of its Pharaohs and Ptolemies, the seat of a powerful kingdom. The claims of the Egyptian Caliphs were diligently preached throughout all Islam, and their temporal power was rapidly extended into the adjoining provinces of Syria and Arabia. Palestine became again, as it had been in the days of Necho and Nabuchodonosor and in those of the Ptolemies and Seleucidæ, as it has been once more among the Pashas and Sultans of our own time, the battle-field for the lords of Egypt and of the East. Jerusalem, the holy city of so many creeds, was conquered and reconquered, and the mosque of Omar echoed to prayers and sermons which denounced its founder as viler than the lowest dregs of Judaism or Christianity.

The most famous of these Egyptian Caliphs is Al Hakem, who reigned from 996 to 1020. Unless, as is most probable, he was, like Caligula, out of his senses, we must accord to him the bad preeminence of being the worst ruler recorded even in oriental history. He

began his reign as a zealous Mahometan, and in that capacity was a cruel persecutor of Jews and Christians; he afterwards gave himself out as an incarnation of the Deity, and in that character he became an equally cruel persecutor of orthodox Mahometans. The Christians were compelled to drag about heavy crosses; the Jews were in like manner laden first with the head of a calf, to commemorate their idolatry under Aaron, and afterwards with large wooden bells. As a Fatimite, Al Hakem was bound to curse Omar; possibly it may have been partly to outrage his memory that he destroyed the Church of the Resurrection at Jerusalem, which had hitherto remained as a monument of the good faith of that illustrious Caliph. The assigned motive however is indignation at the fraud, then already practised, with respect to the miraculous fire at Easter. Yet he also destroyed a thousand other churches, in which no such deception is recorded to have taken place. Strange to say, when he began to give himself out as a God, he relaxed his cruelties to the Christians, and allowed them to rebuild their temples. His civil government consisted in the promulgation of petty meddling regulations about the private life of his subjects, especially the female portion of them; and in the infliction of barbarous punishments upon all who infringed them. Women were condemned to more than the ordinary oriental seclusion; one day the Caliph saw, as he thought, a woman in the streets of Cairo, in defiance of the Commander of the Faithful. On coming nearer she proved to be only an image of pasteboard, but she held in her hand a document accusing the Caliph's sister of unchastity. Hakem on the one hand ordered a general massacre of the inhabitants of Cairo, and on the other instituted a strict

inquiry into the private morals of his sister. It was easier to deal with the multitude than with the individual. The massacre took place, but the inquiry was thwarted by the sister, who hired assassins who speedily put the tyrant out of the way.

Such was Hakem, the God of the Druses. His divinity was no unnatural deduction from the Ishmaelite doctrines, and to this day he is worshipped by that extraordinary sect. The Egyptian Caliphate survived him a century and a half, and during that period it played an important part in the history of the Crusades. At last in 1171, it was abolished by the famous Saladin.[1] He himself became the founder of a new dynasty ; but the formal aspect of the change was that Egypt, so long schismatic, was again restored to the obedience of Bagdad. Saladin was lord of Egypt, but the titles of the Abbasside Caliph, the true Commander of the Faithful, appeared again on the coin and in the public prayers instead of that of his Fatimite rival.

This event however did not take place till after the name of a Fatimite Caliph had been proclaimed in Bagdad itself, the very metropolis of orthodox Islam. We left the unfortunate descendants of Abbas under the tutelage of the Bowides or Dilemites, who had been called in to deliver them from the Turkish mercenaries. For more than a century Bagdad was disturbed by the disputes of these Dilemites for the post of Emir-al-Omra. At last, in 1055, a person variously called Arslan, Abul Hareth, and Besasseri, took upon him to set aside the Caliph Al Kayem altogether, and to cause the name of Al Mostanser the Egyptian Fatimite to be substituted in the public prayers. This was too much for imperial and

[1] *Vide* Gibbon, p. 253, vol. vii.

pontifical patience to endure. But Al Kayem had no means of resistance; the arm of the Emir-al-Omra was far stronger than that of the Emir-al-Momenin[1]. The Dilemites had delivered his predecessors from the Turks; he had now nothing to do but to implore the Turks to deliver him from the Dilemites.

But the Turkish race had thriven wonderfully since we last had occasion to mention them. The Turk to whom Al Kayem applied was not a captain of mercenaries, but a sovereign prince, master of the greatest empire upon earth. He was Togrel Beg, the Seljukian. His family formed the second of those great Turkish dynasties which have borne sway in Persia and the surrounding countries. The first was that of the Ghaznevids, of whom sprang the famous Mahmoud. Of him we shall have much to say in our concluding lecture, but his dynasty was not very intimately connected with the Caliphate. Yet we may mention that even he, the conqueror of Hindostan, demeaned himself as a dutiful subject of the Commander of the Faithful. He received from the Caliph Al Kader various gifts and titles, and was the first of his race who bore the proud appellation of Sultan. The Taherites, Soffarides, Samanides, and Dilemites had been contented with the humbler title of Emir.

Togrel Beg was the son of Michael the son of Seljuk. Seljuk is said to have been a Turk in the service of the Chagan of the Chozars, who, discontented with his sovereign, retired to Samarcand, became a Mahometan, and gradually rose to power. He was followed by numbers of his countrymen, so that we now find the first instance south of the Oxus of the appearance of a Turkish horde or nation, as distinguished from

[1] Commander of the Faithful.

companies of slaves or mercenaries. His heir was his grandson Togrel, who in 1035 assumed the attributes of sovereignty in Chorassan. By the overthrow of the Ghaznevid power in Persia, he rose to the first place among the Mahometan princes of his time, and to him the Commander of the Faithful applied for deliverance. To the turbulent Bowides and the factious citizens of Bagdad, the Turk appeared as a conqueror; to the successor of the Prophet he appeared as a faithful servant and disciple. The mightiest warrior of the east prostrated himself before a potentate who could not draw a sword in his own defence. The lord of the fairest regions of Asia thankfully received a commission investing him with the vicarious government of his own territories. To the Caliph, Togrel came as a deliverer, and a deliverer in some sort he was. The holy Pontiff at Bagdad might now repose in safety under the protection of the victorious Sultan; if he was no longer obeyed on the Douro and on the Jaxartes, he was at least allowed to be undisturbed master of his own palace and city.

Ever since the days of Togrel Beg, the Turkish race has, with the exception of a single dynasty[1], been the dominant power in the Asiatic world. First the Seljuk and then the Ottoman have lorded it over western Asia while the Indian Mogul and the Persian Sophi practically belonged to the same victorious lineage. Under Togrel, his nephew Alp Arslan, and his nephew Malek Shah, the power of the Seljukian Turks rose to its height of splendour. Togrel delivered the Commander of the Faithful; Alp Arslan saw the Roman Emperor prostrate at his feet; the Vizier of Malek Shah paid boatmen on the Oxus with assignments on the revenues

[1] The Persian Moguls. See the concluding Lecture.

of Antioch, which he at once cashed without hesitation. As we usually find in the founders of dynasties, all three were men of a noble mould. The insatiable ambition of the conqueror being once allowed, we must recognize in these Turkish princes all the merits of great rulers according to the oriental standard. They are described not merely as brave, but as just, magnanimous, liberal patrons of learning, devout according to their own law. Their devotion however was too often stained with bigotry, and that of a very inferior kind to the noble enthusiasm of the first Saracens. The zeal of new converts, united to the cruelty of barbarians, led them to excesses against the Christians to which we find no parallel among the early Caliphs. Similar on the whole were the first Ottomans, though their greatness, if less disfigured by actual religious persecution, was stained by a species of cold craftiness of which we find no trace in these earlier Turks. The Seljuks too, by the speedier fall of their empire, were spared the disgrace of exhibiting to the world the degrading picture of modern Ottoman decrepitude and vice.

The establishment of the Seljukian dynasty is closely connected with a most important subject on which my plan does not permit me to enter; their conquests were the immediate cause of the Crusades. I pass by the exploits of Kilij Arslan, and Zengi, and Noureddin, and Saladin; the wars of Godfrey and Tancred, of John Komnenos, of Philip Augustus, of Frederick II., of St. Lewis, and of Edward of England. The takings and retakings of Antioch and Jerusalem, the fall of the Egyptian Caliphate, the fates of the house of Saladin, the rise of the Mameluke Sultans, belong rather to the historian of the

Crusades than to the historian of the Saracens. To me Kilij Arslan is not the defeated of Dorylæum, but the second Turkish Sultan of Rome; to me Saladin is not the capturer of the Holy City, but the man who transferred the public prayer at Cairo from the Fatimite to the Abbasside Caliph. It is round the venerable phantom which still lingered at Bagdad that the remainder of the present lecture must centre.

Malek Shah died in 1092; after him the Seljuk empire was divided among several independent Sultans, all branches of the house of Seljuk, and all owing a nominal allegiance to the head of the family, the Grand Sultan of Persia. Of these dynasties the most interesting doubtless is that which ruled in Asia Minor, first at Nicæa and then at Iconium, over territories wrested from the Byzantine Emperors. Reigning over lands which had so recently acknowledged the sway of Cæsar, these Turkish lords of an Asiatic realm described themselves as Sultans of Rome. Harassed by the Crusaders, by the Greek Emperors, by the more terrible Moguls, their dynasty survived in name into the fourteenth century. But in the course of the preceding century a power had arisen among them, dreadful and terrible and strong exceedingly, a power which should break in pieces all nations and devastate all lands; destined alike to occupy the throne of the Eastern Caliph and the Eastern Cæsar, to hold the realms of Saladin and Kilij Arslan as corners of their heritage, to reign at once on the Nile, the Tigris, and the Danube, to threaten alike the Sophi of Persia, the Cæsar of Vienna, and the Pontiff of Old Rome. From the ruins of the house of Seljuk arose the far more tremendous house of Othman. For three centuries

they were to conquer and to govern under a line of princes whose valour and wisdom and magnificence make us well nigh forget their pride and cruelty and perfidy. For three centuries more, wickedness and weakness have been combined, and the most glorious regions of the world have groaned under the sway of savage imbecility and brutal vice. Let us at least rejoice that, whether by the natural result of their own crimes, whether by the arms of enemies or of friends, this accursed race is at least speedily doomed to perish from off the face of the earth which they have devastated.

Of the nominal Grand Sultans who reigned after Malek Shah, the only one of great note was Sanjar. After him the chief power passed into the hands of another Turkish dynasty, the Chorasmians, who, at the commencement of the thirteenth century, were the most powerful Mahometan power in Asia. I do not know however that there is anything in the history either of the Chorasmians or the later Seljuks which requires any minute notice in this place. The ordinary course of an oriental dynasty seldom varies. Two or three generations of able men found an empire, two or three enjoy it, then come the degenerate ones who lose it. The Caliphs and the Ottoman Sultans are the only exceptions; but in the case of the Caliphs, to preserve their nominal authority was a recognized principle on all sides; while the Ottomans are distinguished from all other royal houses, eastern or western, by the extraordinary succession of great rulers which they produced. The Seljuks produced Togrel, Alp Arslan, and Malek Shah. The Ottomans produced a succession of still greater princes for three centuries instead of three generations.

I must here speak with the brevity which my limits prescribe of that wonderful brotherhood of the Assassins, which during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries spread such terror through all Asia, Mussulman and Christian. Their deeds should be studied in Von Hammer's history of their order, of which however there is an excellent analysis in Taylor's History of Mohammedanism. The word Assassin, it must be remembered, in its ordinary signification is derived from this order, and not the reverse. The Assassins were not so called because they were murderers, but murderers are called assassins because the Assassins were murderers. The origin of the word Assassin has been much disputed by oriental scholars; but its application is sufficiently written upon the Asiatic history of the twelfth century. The Assassins were not, strictly speaking, a dynasty, but rather an order, like the Templars; only the office of Grand-Master, like the Caliphate, became hereditary. They were originally a branch of the Egyptian Ishmaelites, and at first professed the principles of that sect. But there can be no doubt that their inner doctrine became at last a mere negation of all religion and all morality. "To believe nothing and to dare everything" was the summary of their teaching. Their exoteric principle, addressed to the non-initiated members of the order, was simple blind obedience to the will of their superiors. If the Assassin was ordered to take off a Caliph or a Sultan by the dagger or the bowl, the deed was done; if he was ordered to throw himself from the ramparts, the deed was done likewise. Under every disguise these emissaries, Fedavis as they were called, tracked out their victim, and ultimately brought him to

account. Their founder was Hassan Sabah, who, in 1090, shortly before the death of Malek Shah, seized the castle of Alamout—the Vulture's nest—in northern Persia, whence they extended their possessions over a whole chain of mountain fortresses in that country and in Syria. The Grand-Master was the Sheikh-al-Jebal, the famous Old Man of the Mountain, at whose name Europe and Asia shuddered.

The Grand-Master Hassan III., who succeeded in 1178, professed to renounce the heresies of his sect and to return to orthodox Mahometanism. As the "New Mussulman," he was greatly honoured by the Caliph Al Nasser, who, in the pilgrimage to Mecca, gave his standard precedence over that of the Chorasmian Sultan Mahomet. But, according to Von Hammer, this conversion was a mere subtle device to delude men's minds, and to enable the order to work out its nefarious designs in greater security. If so, it did not prosper. Under his successors Aladdin and Rokneddin, the order returned to its old impieties, but it never recovered its old energy.

We took leave of the Abbasside Caliphs at the time when Togrel Beg delivered Al Kayem from the yoke of the Dilemites. Malek Shah treated his successor Al Moktedi with no less reverence; but the later Seljuks appear to have encroached on the rights of the Caliphate almost as much as their Dilemite predecessors. But the Commanders of the Faithful were now once more able to stand upon their own rights; they sometimes even ventured to contend with the Seljuk Sultans by force of arms. In fact, in the decline of the Seljuk empire, the Caliphate once more became an independent temporal state, though,

instead of ruling in the three quarters of the globe, the Caliphs ruled only over the province of Irak Arabi. Their position was not unlike that of the Popes in recent times, whom they also resembled in assuming a new name, of a pious character, at their inauguration. Both the Christian and the Moslem Pontiff was the real temporal sovereign of a small state; each claimed to be spiritual sovereign over the whole of the Faithful, each was recognized as such by a large body, but rejected by others. But in truth the spiritual recognition of the Abbasside Caliphs was more nearly universal in their last age than it had ever been before. The Egyptian Caliphs had ceased to exist; the Persian Sophis had not arisen. During this period the Caliphs ruled their small dominions in peace, and, according to oriental descriptions, also in righteousness. Once only was the sacred throne exposed to an attack from a Moslem foe. The Chorasmian Sultan Mahomet, indignant, among other things, at the precedence over him given by Caliph Al Nasser to the Grand-Master of the Assassins, transferred his allegiance to a Fatimite Imam as lawful Caliph, and prepared to invade Bagdad, in order to instal his creature as Commander of the Faithful. The blow was warded off for a while by the appearance of a race of foes who were destined to overwhelm alike Chorasmians, Assassins, and Abbassides.

I have thus far traced what may be called the internal history of the Mahometan Empire in Asia down to the last stage of the Abbasside Caliphate. I call it internal history, because, though we have seen countless wars and revolutions, though new dynasties and new races have arisen and fallen, yet

throughout a nominal unity has prevailed. The principle of unity was professed; every true believer paid allegiance to some Caliph or other; whether to him of Bagdad or to him of Cairo was merely a question of practical application. We must conclude with what is a far less extensive subject, with the purely external relations of the Caliphate and the Mahometan powers connected with it; with their dealings with those who recognized no Commander of the Faithful at all; that is, with enemies of another religion. These fall under three divisions; their relations with the Eastern Roman Empire, with the nations of Western Europe, and with the Moguls of Eastern Asia. The second of these heads is equivalent to the history of the Crusades. The other two I must briefly describe.

The relations between the Caliphate, strictly so called, and the Empire of Constantinople may be traced in a very few words. Leo the Isaurian, it will be remembered, encountered the whole strength of the Caliphate, and came out successful from the struggle. He secured for a tottering and decaying empire more than seven centuries of existence, more than three centuries of glory. No Saracen army ever again appeared before the walls of the New Rome; no Saracen prince could ever permanently establish himself westward of Mount Taurus. The Caliphate and the Empire were constantly at war, but it was a border warfare, a war of captivity and devastation, not a war of real conquest. An able Emperor ravaged the dominions of a weak Caliph; an able Caliph ravaged the dominions of a weak Emperor; but till the middle of the tenth century neither side made any permanent impression on the

other. In the beginning of that century the Saracens indeed struck a terrible blow in the sack of Thessalonica; but it was merely a passing blow; Thessalonica was sacked, but it was not retained as a Saracen possession. But in the middle of the tenth century the tide began decidedly to turn to the Roman side. One of the most remarkable peculiarities of Byzantine history is the constant revival of vigour in the Empire after periods of decline, and the opportune times when these revivals happen. An enemy conquers a province, but the vital energy of Rome survives, and takes vengeance when his hour of decay is come. Thus Justinian recovered Italy and Africa, thus the last Palæologi recovered Peloponnesus. In the tenth century the Saracens were failing, and the Romans were prepared to revenge upon them the injuries of the seventh. During the latter half of the tenth century and the first half of its successor the despised Greek of the Lower Empire appears as a triumphant conqueror in every direction. By land and by sea, in Europe and in Asia, the Roman eagle is victorious as of old. The stout swordsmen of the Roman legions, the steel-clad lancers of the Roman cavalry, measured themselves with the hardiest warriors of the eastern and the northern world. The Saracen, the Bulgarian, the Russian, all sink before the power which some would fain have us believe was incapable of striking a blow in its own defence. The triumphs of John Kurkuas, of Nikephoros Phokas, of his murderer John Tzimiskes, pave the way for the crowning glories of the second Basil. From Hæmus and Taurus the Roman frontier is again advanced to the Danube and the Euphrates; Tarsus, Edessa, and Antioch again become Christian

cities; Cilicia and Syria are again added to the list of Roman provinces. Lombard Dukes, Bulgarian Kings, and Russian Czars bow to the majesty of Cæsar; the Commander of the Faithful himself trembles lest his sacred city should become a tributary province of the Infidel.

This wonderful revival of the Byzantine power came, as usual, just at the right moment. The Saracenic power was waning; the Turkish power had not yet appeared so far westward. The Iconoclast Emperors bore up against the united Caliphate; the Macedonians could triumph over the divided powers which succeeded it. The laurels of Cæsar were commonly won from the Hamdanite Emirs of northern Syria. A poor triumph, it may be said, of an Empire over a province; but it should be remembered that the rulers of the province themselves provoked a contest with the Empire by invasions of its territory. They were moreover often assisted in the holy war by other Mussulman powers; and the Byzantine frontier was so immense, and exposed to so many enemies, that the whole force of the Empire could never be brought to bear upon any single point. John Tzimiskes had to hurry backwards and forwards between the Danube and the Euphrates; in his brief reign he vanquished alike Arabs and Russians, and extended the imperial frontier in opposite directions. Basil the Porphyrogennetos was not a whit behind the bold soldier of fortune who had reigned as his colleague. Better known in history as the Slayer of the Bulgarians, he found leisure in the intervals of that tremendous conflict to be a considerable slayer of Saracens also.

It was not the Saracen, but the Turk, who was

destined first really to establish himself within the frontiers of the true Greek or Roman territory. The Saracen subdued Syria and Egypt; it was for the Seljuk to occupy Anatolia, for the Ottoman to win Romania. And we must confess that the lust of conquest, alike of the great Basil and of his weaker successors, paved the way for the conquests of the barbarians. By annexing the Christian kingdoms of Armenia, they removed the surest bulwark against Mussulman inroads. The great Seljuk Sultans, who in the Mahometan world appear as beneficent rulers and hardly less beneficent victors, appear in Christian lands as the most cruel of destroyers. The oriental civilization they revered, appreciated, and fostered; that of the west was something wholly alien to their ideas; they therefore did not scruple utterly to devastate the interior of Asia Minor, in order to convert it into a pasture ground for their nomad followers. For a long time they confined themselves to inroads of this nature, and evidently shrank from a conflict with the disciplined Roman armies. At last, on the field of Manzikert in 1071, the East obtained one of its greatest triumphs over the West. The Seljuk Sultan and the Roman Emperor met face to face; the rashness of the latter lost the day, and for the first time since the third century the successor of Augustus was led in bonds, and was made the footstool of a barbarian victor. But the insults which Sapor continued as a lasting triumph, Alp Arslan only inflicted for a moment as the established ceremony of his nation. No captive was ever more nobly treated than Romanus Diogenes; but no captivity ever wrought more lasting woe to the defeated. Three years later the Seljuk was the recognized lord of Asia Minor, and as such

he ventured to designate himself as the lord of Rome.

We must now, in conclusion, turn our eyes to the other extremity of the world. Beyond the lands of the Saracens and of the Turks, lay the unknown regions of the Moguls. In the thirteenth century came their day of greatness, celebrated by the momentary existence of an empire far exceeding those of Macedonian, Roman, or Arab, and by the infliction of miseries on the human race compared to which the cruelties of all preceding conquerors might be deemed the height of mercy. Under Jenghiz Khan and his immediate successors, the Moguls ruled over nearly all Asia, save India and Arabia, and over no small portion of Europe. The same armies waged war in China, in Syria, and on the frontiers of Germany. And though this enormous dominion was transitory, they founded permanent dynasties in Persia and Russia, not to mention realms beyond our scope on the present occasion. The Persian dynasty we shall recur to again. As for their domination in Russia, I will only say that it has given rise to what is now commonly thought a very good joke, that of calling the Russians Tartars. One might as well call the inhabitants of the Greek Kingdom Ottomans or the negroes of Hayti Spaniards. The Mogul wars in Western Asia belong to the history of the Crusades. I hasten to recount the fall of the Chorasmian Sultany, of the Order of the Assassins, and of the Caliphate of Bagdad.

The character of the Moguls at this time is a strange compound. Among themselves they had made considerable approaches to order and civilization. They had an established government and

recognized laws; they had also, what no Christian or Mahometan nation then had, perfect religious toleration. The creed of Jenghiz himself was a sort of philosophic Deism; but Jews, Christians, and Mahometans were received with honour, and were allowed to make converts even in the imperial family. Ungh Khan, who was overthrown by Jenghiz, was, if not altogether, yet certainly almost persuaded to be a Christian, and he is thought to have been the famous Prester John, of whom such wonders were recorded in the middle ages. Yet notwithstanding all this, in war they were simple savages; barbarians is far to gentle a word. A captured city, attacked without provocation, was commonly levelled with the ground, and its inhabitants massacred. Surrender, capitulation, safe-conduct, availed nothing. To be overcome by Saracens or Turks was a blessing compared with falling into the jaws of the implacable Moguls.

It is with a sort of shame that we find that this fearful scourge was aided in its progress by the crimes and treacheries of men who might have known better. In the course of their progress, it was not uncommon for rival Mahometan sects to request the destruction of one another at the hands of the Infidel. And in fact Jenghiz himself first entered the regions with which we are concerned to avenge an enormous wrong. Mahomet, Sultan of Chorasmia, not a heathen or a savage, but the Moslem ruler of a comparatively civilized kingdom, caused some peaceful Mogul traders and even a Mogul ambassador to be put to death. Their blood was avenged by the overthrow of the Chorasmian kingdom and by the devastation of many of the noblest cities of Asia.

This was in 1222. The Commander of the Faithful

and the Old Man of the Mountain yet lingered on a while; but Al Mostassem of Bagdad and Rokneddin of Alamout were among the most contemptible of princes. They could not even fall nobly when to fall was unavoidable. A cowardly surrender did not save themselves from death, nor their subjects from massacre and pillage. And it is sad to read that the fall not only of the nest of fanatic murderers, but of the peaceful throne of the Caliph, was brought about by the disappointed vanity of a philosopher. Nasireddin, the great astronomer of the east, dedicated a book to the Caliph; his language was not deemed sufficiently respectful, and his book, like the Prophet's letter to Chosroes, was thrown into the waters of the Tigris. He fled to Alamout; the dagger of Rokneddin was too slow in avenging the insult; and Nasireddin betrayed Alamout and Bagdad alike to the destroyer.

Mangu Khan then occupied the throne of Jenghiz. His brother Hulaku was sent to exterminate the Assassins and to require the submission of the Caliph. A contemptuous message while the invader was at a distance was succeeded by craven fear at his approach. Al Mostassem dared not draw a sword against Hulaku; but his tardy submission procured him only a lingering and an ignominious instead of a speedy and glorious death. Bagdad was sacked; its inhabitants were massacred; and the successor of the Prophet ceased to rank among the princes of the earth. A certain Ahmed, a real or pretended Abbasside, fled to Egypt, where he was proclaimed Caliph by the title of Al Mostanser Billah, under the protection of the then Sultan Bibars. He and his successors were deemed, in spiritual things, Com-

manders of the Faithful, and they were found to be a convenient instrument both by the Mameluke Sultans and by other Mahometan Princes. From one of them Bajazet the Thunderbolt received the title of Sultan; from another Selim the Inflexible procured the cession of his claims, and obtained a right to deem himself the shadow of God upon earth. Since then the Ottoman Padishah has been held to inherit the rights of Omar and of Haroun, rights which, if strictly pressed, might be terrible alike to enemies, neutrals, and allies. If the Ottoman Sultan be, of a truth, Caliph and Successor of the Prophet, he has an undoubted claim to the allegiance not only of Persia or the Crimea, but of Spain, Algeria, and Hindostan.

The Caliphate was extinguished in 1258, the very year which is said to have witnessed the birth of that Othman who has transmitted his name to the most terrible of Moslem dynasties. In contemplating the fall of a power which for so many centuries was venerable in the eyes of so large a portion of the human race, we are irresistibly led to compare its close with that of the Empire which it had in vain attempted to supplant, and which received the glorious mission of defending the religion and civilization of Europe for eight hundred years. Six centuries before the youthful Caliphate had seemed destined to overwhelm the already aged Empire, but the Iconoclasts warded off the blow and the Macedonians avenged it. When the Caliphate fell, the Emperor of the Romans was indeed an exile from the New Rome; but he dwelt at Nicæa, a city wrested from the true believers, and three years did not elapse ere he recovered his ancient seat from the hands of the schismatics of the West. The city which for six hundred years had mocked the

assaults of the Saracen, could yet endure for two hundred more the more fearful inroads of the Ottoman. And when the closing scene at last drew near, widely different was the fate of those two centres of universal sway. In both indeed we may observe the fatal effects of sectarian bigotry. The Seyuds of the house of Ali did not scruple to excite the vengeance of Hulaku against the usurping successor of Abbas, and the fanatics of the Orthodox Church seemed inclined to prefer the Moslem Sultan to an Emperor in communion with Old Rome. But between the last sovereigns of Bagdad and of Byzantium there is indeed a contrast. At Bagdad a close of unexampled humiliation dishonoured a preceding century of recovered dignity; at Byzantium an end of unsurpassed dignity redeemed a preceding century of humiliation. Never did the successor of Mahomet appear so degraded as in the last prostration of his empire; never did the successor of Augustus shine forth so glorious as in the last agony of his. The weakest moments of Al Radhi and Al Kader appear glorious beside the humiliation of Al Mostassem; the proudest triumphs of Tzimiskes and of Basil appear ignominious beside the martyrdom of Constantine. The last and weakest of the Caliphs, without an effort of arms or policy to stay his fall, sinks from senseless pride to craven terror, and expires amidst the tortures of a faithless victor. The last and noblest of the Cæsars, after doing all that mortal man could do for the deliverance of his city, himself dies in the breach, the foremost among its defenders. Not Darius in the hands of the traitor, not Augustulus resigning his useless purple, not the Ætheling Edgar spared by the contempt of the Norman Conqueror, ever showed fallen greatness

so dishonoured and unpitied, as did Al Mostassem Billah al Wahid, the last Commander of the Faithful; not Leonidas in the pass of Thermopylæ, not Decius in the battle below Vesuvius, not our own Harold upon the hill of Senlac, died a more glorious death than Constantine Palæologus, the last Emperor of the Romans.

LECTURE V.

THE SARACENS IN THE WEST.

OUR last Lecture was devoted to the history of the Saracens in the East, the central point of which was found in the Abbasside Caliphate of Bagdad. We have now to consider the same people in the other extremity of their empire, where an oriental faith and government so strangely existed for nearly eight centuries in the most western country of continental Europe. Our present subject, however, lacks even the approach to unity which the last derived from the nominal sovereignty of the Bagdad Caliphs. It might indeed be treated as a subject properly African rather than European. All the Moslem settlements in Western Europe had Africa for their mother-country. But in European eyes the colony cannot fail to excite greater interest than the metropolis. It is impossible to avoid making Spain and Sicily primary objects of attention, and introducing the affairs of Tunis and Morocco only so far as they bear upon those of European regions. And the Mahometan power in Spain, where it proved so much more extensive and durable than in any other part of western Europe,

will naturally claim the first place. The settlements and incursions of the Saracens in Gaul, Italy, Sicily, and Crete will be treated as subordinate to the great empire of Cordova. The mention of Crete in this connexion may appear out of place; but, strange to say, the great Saracen settlement in that island belongs to the western and not to the eastern division of our subject. Crete was wrested from the Byzantine Empire not by the Caliphs of Damascus or Bagdad, but by a band of adventurers from Spain.

The Arabs, as I mentioned in my third Lecture, first passed into the peninsula from the neighbouring coast of Africa. The history of those two regions has been closely connected from the earliest ages. There was most probably an ethnological connexion between their earliest inhabitants; certain it is that the masters of the one have generally been in some degree masters of the other. The Carthaginians passed from Africa into Spain; the Vandals passed from Spain into Africa; in intermediate times part of Africa was included in the Roman province of the Spains. When Belisarius conquered Africa, his victory led to the reunion of southern Spain to the Empire; when southern Spain was regained by the Gothic Kings, they established themselves on the coast of Africa also. The Arabs passed from Africa into Spain, and maintained themselves there only by repeated immigrations from the southern continent. Finally, when the Christian arms became triumphant in the peninsula, Spain and Portugal obtained possession of several points on the opposite coast, some of which remain attached to the Spanish crown in our own day.

In the destinies of Sicily again we find one of the most remarkable cycles which history presents. The

earliest inhabitants[1] of that island appear to have been akin to those of the Spanish peninsula; it was by annexation to a Spanish kingdom that Sicily disappeared from among the list of independent powers. In the meanwhile she twice supplied a battle-field for East and West, Greek and Barbarian, to fight out their world-old struggle. In each case the prize was wrested from both contending parties by the power dominant at the time in southern Italy. In ancient days Sicily witnessed that great conflict between the Greek and the Phœnician which was terminated only by the reception of both into the universal empire of Rome. How in later times Sicily was disputed between Arab Emirs and Byzantine Cæsars, how it was won from both by the Normans of Apulia, forms one of the subjects of the present Lecture.

Spain then and Sicily formed two great and lasting colonies of African Arabs within the limits of western Christendom. But their domination in Spain lasted nearly four times as long as their domination in Sicily. From nearly the earliest years of the eighth century to nearly the latest years of the fifteenth a Mahometan government existed in Spain, and for half that period it formed the dominant power in the peninsula. I have already mentioned the extraordinary speed with which the conquest of Spain was effected by the Arabs. Its reconquest by its own children is a wonderful tale of slow and steady perseverance and development. When the first Arabs entered Spain, their eastern brethren had still hopes of speedily entering Constantinople; the last Arab prince of Spain did not

[1] The Sikanians; not the Sikelians, who were doubtless akin to the people of Greece and southern Italy.

lose his throne till the Ottomans had had forty years' possession of the city of the Cæsars.

The history of the Arabian empire in Spain naturally divides itself into three great periods: First, the dynasty of the Ommiad Caliphs, lasting from the middle of the eighth century till the beginning of the eleventh; Secondly, the next two centuries, when Mahometan Spain was divided into numerous petty kingdoms and devastated by the civil wars of rival dynasties; Thirdly, the last two centuries and a half of the Moslem rule in the peninsula, when the other states had been consumed piecemeal by the Christian monarchs, and when the great Caliphate of the West had shrunk up into the narrow limits of the Kingdom of Granada. The last period is the most celebrated and familiar, but the first two afford more matters of importance for our present inquiry.

I call the Mahometan masters of Spain Arabs or Saracens, rather than Moors, without affecting any genealogical or ethnological precision. Doubtless multitudes of Spanish Mahometans were of old African rather than of Arabian origin; but these Africans had completely adopted the religion, language, and manners of their Arabian conquerors. They did not, like the Turks or the Persians, retain their own nationality after their conversion. The whole civilization of Mahometan Spain was essentially Arabian; and its inhabitants have the same right to be regarded as Arabs which the subjects of the Western Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries have to be regarded as Romans.

When the Ommiad Abdalrahman escaped into Spain from the overthrow of his family, the peninsula was in a very disordered state. The authority of the

Caliphs of the East was nearly nominal, and governors rose and fell with very little reference to their distant sovereign. The more sagacious among them probably fully understood the absurdity of Spain being a dependency of Syria; and the elevation of Abdalrahman may have been the result, not so much of any blind preference of Ommiads to Abbassides, as of a conviction that nature designed the Iberian peninsula to form an independent state. But at that early period of Mahometan history an independent Mahometan state could hardly be founded, except under the guise of a rival Caliphate. That Abdalrahman did establish himself as a direct rival to the Abbassides, and utterly disclaimed all authority on their part, seems fully established. The Abbassides made several attempts to recover their lost province, while Abdalrahman not only refused them all recognition in Spain, but threatened them with invasion in their own territories. Yet we read on the other hand that the early Ommiads only called themselves Emir, and that Abdalrahman the Third was the first[1] who took the title of Commander of the Faithful, giving as a reason that in his day the Bagdad Caliph had become a mere puppet in the hands of the Turks.[2] I find this in D'Herbelot and all my other authorities. Yet I find also that D'Herbelot applies without scruple the title of Caliph to their predecessors. And undoubtedly nothing is more certain than that the Ommiads of Cordova were in every sense a rival dynasty to the Abbassides of Bagdad.

The race of Moawiyah seem to have decidedly improved by their migration westward. The Caliphs

[1] See D'Herbelot. Art. Abdalrahman.

[2] Murphy's Mahometan Empire in Spain, p. 96. Cf. Condé, i. 365, 368, Eng. Trans.

of Spain must be allowed one of the highest places among Mahometan dynasties. In the duration of their house and in the abundance of able princes which it produced, they yield only to the Ottoman Sultans, while they rise incomparably above them in every estimable quality. A *fai-neant* on the one hand, a brutal tyrant on the other are characters which are found but rarely among them. Of course no oriental dynasty ever existed so long without the commission of some great crimes ; but they are neither so great nor so numerous as in most other despotic lines. Family feuds often occur, but they are less sanguinary than usual ; and the very existence of family feuds shows that a dynasty has not attained to the climax of wickedness. The accession of a Spanish Caliph was not marked, like that of an Ottoman Sultan, by the massacre of his brethren ; they had not even reached that milder form of Persian cruelty which condemned superfluous princes to loss of sight. Nor do the Ommiad princes appear to have spent their early days immured in a harem, only to make their first acquaintance with the world when invested with absolute power. On the whole, the Caliphs of Cordova may, when judged by an eastern standard, be fairly set down as a worthy line of princes. If the first Alhakem was a gloomy and cruel tyrant, his crimes were atoned for by the virtues of the second, a wise and humane prince, whose efforts to preserve peace in an age of bloodshed drew upon him no small obloquy from his subjects, who thirsted for the slaughter of the Infidel.

The condition of the Christians under the sway of these Caliphs does not seem to have been specially intolerable. The condition of a subject race and creed is necessarily a galling one, and occasional persecu-

tions are spoken of. The most famous of these was that which produced the "martyrs of Cordova," in the reign of Abdalrahman II. We must sympathize with any victim of religious persecution, especially with Christian victims of infidel persecution; but undoubtedly the martyrs in this case incurred their fate by indiscreet violation of the standing law of all Mahometan countries, which forbids any public speaking against the Mahometan religion. Cruel as such a law is, its regular and legal application must not be confounded with irregular and unprovoked violence. As a general rule, the Christian subjects of the Spanish as well as the Abbasside Caliphate were far better off than the victims of Seljukian or Ottoman tyranny. Mariana, a safe witness on this point, allows that the condition of the Christians was much aggravated by the immigration of the African Almohades, just as it was in the east by that of the Seljuk Turks. The Christians subject to tribute were allowed to be judged after their own laws by magistrates of their own.

But there were other Christians who disdained subjection even to the comparatively light yoke of the Saracen, just as in later times men have been found permanently to defy the tremendous powers of the house of Othman. What the mountains of Czernagora are to the Servian, what those of Souli were to the Greek, such were the fastnesses of Asturias to the Christian Spaniard. Only in those days diplomacy was unknown, and nations were allowed to grow up undisturbed by foreign interference. The freebooters of Montenegro are scouted as brigands and rebels, while those of Spain grew up into the famous kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal. In a rude age the difference between the robber and the patriot

is not always very clearly drawn; Hereward, the hero of England, and Wallace, the hero of Scotland, appear in hostile chronicles under the less honourable designation. The Vladika is a chief of brigands in the eyes of polished diplomatists; he is a patriotic prince in the eyes of his own people. Men of the like stamp were they who retired into the fastnesses of northern Spain, and who, in the course of eight centuries, won back the whole peninsula from the grasp of the misbelievers. A small mountainous region in the Asturias never submitted at all, and, during the civil wars which preceded the coming of Abdalrahman, the small province thus preserved by Pelayo grew into the germs of a kingdom called at different times that of Gallicia, Oviedo, and Leon. A constant border warfare fluctuated both ways, but on the whole to the advantage of the Christians. Meanwhile to the east other small states were growing up which developed into the kingdom of Navarre and the more important realm of Aragon. Castile and Portugal, the most famous among the Spanish kingdoms, are the most recent in date. Portugal as yet was unheard of, and Castile was known only as a line of castles on the march between the Saracens and the kingdom of Leon.

The most splendid period of the Saracen empire in Spain was during the tenth century. The great Caliph Abdalrahman Annasir Ledinallah raised the magnificence of the Cordovan monarchy to its highest pitch. But even during his reign, while he was overcoming rebels in Spain, and spreading his influence over Africa, the valiant mountaineers still held their ground and advanced. Even against this mighty potentate Ramiro of Leon could appear on equal terms in what was at least a drawn battle at Alchandik or

the Fosse of Zamora. This was in 936, a few years previously to the great revival of the Christian power against the Saracens of the East.

Abdalrahman was succeeded in 961 by his son Alhakem. This good prince was satisfied with one campaign in the north, and religiously observed the truce by which it was followed. The rest of his reign was devoted, as far as might be, to the promotion of the arts of peace. His son Hashem came to the throne as a child, and remained a child all his days. But his famous Hagib or Vizier, Mahomet Almansor, was one of the greatest of Moslem rulers, and was the most terrible foe the Spanish Christians had seen since the days of Tarik. He penetrated to the farthest corners of the peninsula, and sacked the famous shrine of Compostella, the Christian Mecca of Spain. He was mortally wounded in battle at Calat Anosor, and with him died the greatness of the Spanish Caliphate. The last thirty years of the Ommiad dynasty are a mere wearisome series of usurpations and civil wars. In 1031 the line became extinct, and the Ommiad empire was cut up into numerous petty states. From this moment the Christians advance, no more to retreat, and the cause of Islam is only sustained by repeated African immigrations.

This brings us to our second period. The extinction of the house of Moawiyah was accompanied by cruel wars between the different pretenders to the crown, during which the power of the central authority was utterly destroyed. When the hereditary position of the Ommiads and the sanctity of the Caliphate were lost, the new Kings of Cordova found it impossible to retain any power beyond their own province. Gehwar, who succeeded to the throne of

Cordova on the final deposition of Caliph Hashem, appears to have deserved his elevation; but there was no reason why the rulers of Seville or Toledo should obey him rather than why he should obey them. There arose therefore as many kingdoms in Mussulman Spain as there were principal cities; Toledo, Zaragoza, Seville, Valencia, with others of similar note, all became seats of royalty. Hence arose interminable wars between the several Moslem powers; for instance, Cordova itself, so long the royal and sacred city, was in 1061 treacherously taken by Mahomet Aben Abed, King of Seville, and the seat of the Caliphate was reduced to the level of a provincial town. In 1076 Ishmael Almamoun of Toledo obtained both Seville and Cordova, but he died in the moment of triumph, and they were immediately recovered by Aben Abed. The western Saracens were in fact in as bad or a worse case than the eastern had been a century before; the moment was come for the Christians to gain a decided preponderance; Alfonso of Castile was ready to play the part of Nikephoros and Tzimiskes; the African Moors, like the Turks, were destined to step in to arrest the course of Christian victory; but they were only to stop it for a while, and not, like the Turks, themselves to abide as permanent conquerors.

Neither in the east nor in the west was the triumph of the Christian over the declining Moslem so complete as might at first sight have been expected. Antioch and Toledo were regained; but the Infidel still reigned at Bagdad and at Granada. The causes in both cases were similar; neither the Eastern Empire nor the Christian powers in Spain could ever, at this time, put forth their full strength against their

Moslem enemies. The single autocrat of the East was distracted, sometimes by rebel Emperors, sometimes by other foreign wars along his immense frontier. The numerous kinglets of the West were, in like manner, distracted by constant wars among themselves. Disputed successions, kingdoms united or divided, border warfare between Aragon and Castile, afforded the same relief to the Saracens of Andalusia which Bulgarian and Russian inroads afforded to their brethren of Mesopotamia. Africa, like Turkestan, sent forth its allies to sustain the waning cause of Islam; and the field of Zalacca seemed for a while as fatal a blow as the field of Manzikert. But the heroes of Byzantium were all either born to, or usurpers of, the purple; Castile could produce in the Cid Ruy Diaz, loyal as brave, one to whom the East had supplied no parallel since the days of Belisarius. Moreover Spain was aided in her struggle by volunteers from all western Christendom; while it was deemed a no less pious work for the same volunteers to overthrow the eastern bulwark of the Cross, and to divide among them the Empire which had broken the first waves of the torrent and had left only its spray to be scattered upon Gaul and Italy.

Spain was thus divided into a number of petty kingdoms, Mahometan and Christian. In their constant wars, the distinctions of religion were not always observed; both Christians and Moslems often fought under the banners of the opposite faith. Yet on the whole the Christian cause advanced. In 1084 Alfonso VI., King of Leon and Castile, conquered Toledo, and the seat of a Christian monarchy was again fixed in the ancient capital of the Gothic Kings. In his reign too flourished Roderick of Bivar.

the faultless Cid Campeador of the Christians, the tyrant Cambitur of the Arabs. By their victories, above all by the conquest of Toledo, the Castilian kingdom attained beyond dispute the first place in the peninsula. Aben Abed, the King of Seville, was specially obnoxious to the conqueror, on account of a hideous violation of the rights of nations. A Jew who came to Seville as ambassador from Alfonso, was murdered at the court of Aben Abed. Some say he was crucified by the King's own order; others that he was stabbed by some of his courtiers. In any case no reparation of any kind was offered for a crime as execrable in Moslem as in Christian eyes. The vengeance of Alfonso appeared likely to overwhelm all Mussulman Andalusia. The terrified potentates called the famous Joseph ebn Tashfin, the Almoravide lord of Africa, to their help.

Various dynasties had, before this, been rising and falling in Africa. In the ninth century, the Edrisites, descendants of Ali, founded the first independent Fatimite state in the extreme west, and about the some time a rebel lieutenant of the Caliphs of Bagdad established the kingdom of the Aglabites somewhat more to the east. In 908 both these states sank before the power of the Ishmaelite Caliphs,[1] afterwards so famous in Egypt. The Cordovan Caliph Abdalrahman profited by these dissensions to unite all western Africa to his own dominions. But during the confusions of the eleventh century a new and very remarkable power had sprung up in that country. The tribe of the Lamtunas, though boasting of a pure Arabian origin, were among the most ignorant and barbarous of the African clans. They had scarcely

[1] See above, p. 111.

any knowledge of Mahometanism or of any other faith, and seem to have hardly made the first advances towards civilized life. Under the guidance of a certain Sheikh Abdallah, a missionary from Cairouan, they somewhat mended their ways in both respects, and became zealous followers of the Prophet. The religious movement naturally led to a political one; wars were carried on with their neighbours who would not listen to their holy teacher, who, from a peaceful missionary, found himself converted into a powerful ruler. The tribe now called themselves Almoravides, or more properly Morabethah, which appears to mean followers of the Marabout or religious teacher. Abdallah does not appear to have himself claimed more than a religious authority, but their princes Zachariah and Abu-Bekr were completely guided by his counsels. After his death Abu-Bekr founded in 1070 the city of Morocco. There he left as his lieutenant his cousin Joseph, who grew so powerful that Abu-Bekr, by a wonderful exercise of moderation, abdicated in his favour, to avoid a probable civil war. This Joseph when he had become lord of most part of western Africa, was requested, or caused himself to be requested, to assume the title of Emir Al Momenin, Commander of the Faithful. As a loyal subject of the Caliph of Bagdad, he shrank from such sacrilegious usurpation, but he did not scruple to style himself Emir Al Muslemin, Commander of the Moslems. This is a distinction which I do not exactly appreciate, and I find also that the Arabian writers, followed by Condé, do not scruple to call him Caliph.

The new Commander of the Moslems found, according to some chroniclers, an Emperor to contend with him in Spain. Mariana states, though somewhat

doubtfully, that Alfonso VI. was said to have assumed that dignity after his conquest of Toledo. He relates the same with more confidence of his son-in-law Alfonso VII. of Castile and Aragon; while there is no question as to the imperial character of Alfonso VIII. By that time an undoubted Emperor had to contend with an undoubted Caliph in the Almohade Abdelmumen.

But to return to our doubtful Emperor and our doubtful Caliph. The Almoravide Joseph passed over into Spain, like another Tarik; he vanquished Alfonso at Zalacca, and then converted the greater portion of Mahometan Spain into an appendage to his own kingdom of Morocco. The chief portion which escaped was the kingdom of Zaragoza, the great outpost of the Saracens in north-eastern Spain. That city remained independent till, in 1118, it was conquered by Alfonso of Aragon. This was the first important step to aggrandizement on the part of that kingdom, of which Zaragoza became the capital. But the great cities of Andalusia were all brought under a degrading submission to the Almoravides. Their dynasty however was not of long duration, and it fell in turn before one whose origin was strikingly similar to their own.

In the reign of Ali, the successor of Joseph, there arose in Africa a religious teacher named Mahomet ben Abdallah, who took the title of Al Mehdi or the Leader, giving himself out for the person whom many Mahometans expect under that title.[1] As before, the sect grew into an army, and the army grew into an empire. The new dynasty were called Almohades from

[1] Not to be confounded with the earlier Mahomet Al Mehdi. See p. 111.

Al Mehdi, and by his appointment a certain Abdelmumen was elected Caliph and Commander of the Faithful. Under his vigorous guidance the new kingdom rapidly grew, till the Almohades obtained quite the upper hand in Africa, and in 1146 they too passed into Spain. Under Abdelmumen and his successors Joseph and Jacob Almansor, the Almohades entirely supplanted the Almoravides, and became more formidable foes than they had been to the rising Christian powers. Jacob Almansor won in 1195 the terrible battle of Alarcos against Alfonso of Castile, and carried his conquests deep into that kingdom. His fame spread through the whole Moslem world. The great Saladin requested his aid in his wars with the Christians in the east. But in his letter he did not address the western potentate as Commander of the Faithful, and his application was consequently refused. Certainly it was a courtesy which could hardly be expected from the orthodox Mussulman who had restored Egypt to the obedience of Bagdad.

With Jacob Almansor perished the glory of the Almohades. His successor Mahomet lost in 1211 the great battle of Alacab or Tolosa against Alfonso, and that day may be said to have decided the fate of Mahometanism in Spain. The Almohade dynasty gradually declined; they had no hold on the affections of the Spanish Moslems, by whom they were regarded as at once foreigners and heretics. A temporary success of the Almoravides in Africa, during the reign of Jacob, restored the name of the Caliph of Bagdad to the Chotba or public prayer; the dynasty of the Beni Hud in Murcia also received their investiture from that distant potentate; and as the Almohades gradually lost their Spanish possessions, their political

downfall was marked by spiritual denunciations against the pernicious heresies of Al Mehdi.

The Almohades, like the Ommiads and the Almoravides, vanish from history amidst a scene of confusion the details of which it were hopeless to attempt to remember. Kings and kingdoms again rise and fall with preternatural rapidity. But the Christians were now better prepared than on either of the previous occasions to take advantage of the contentions of their enemies. The middle of the thirteenth century was one great scene of Mahometan misfortunes. In the East the ferocious Moguls were overthrowing the seat of one Caliphate; in the West the Christians of Spain were entering in triumph into the metropolis of the other. Ferdinand III. of Castile, known as St. Ferdinand, annexed to his dominions the most famous cities of Islam. Christian altars were reared amid the pillared forest of the mosque of Cordova, and the proud Giralda of Seville learned to summon men to another worship from that designed when the last Almansor decreed its foundation in the hour of triumph. To the west, Portugal was pushing on her conquests into Alentijo and Algarb; to the east, Valencia and the Balearic Isles became appendages to the crown of Aragon. The Saracen dominion in the west seemed to be at its last gasp. No one could have imagined that two centuries and a half of existence were still in store for it.

Out of the confusions of the early part of the thirteenth century arose the kingdom of Granada, the last possession of the Moslems in Western Europe. The condition of Spain was now completely reversed from what it had been under the early Caliphs; the Saracens were now, as the Christians had been centuries

before, confined to a single corner of the peninsula. But the nature of the last refuge was widely different in the two cases. Granada indeed formed a far smaller kingdom than any of the Christian realms, but it was the wealthiest and most fertile portion of Spain. It contained several splendid cities, countless strong fortresses, and a population constantly increased by immigration from those Moslem kingdoms which had been gradually incorporated with Castile and Aragon. By dexterous subserviency to the dominant powers, by actually aiding St. Ferdinand in his wars against the other Mahometan princes, Mahomet-ebn-Alahmar was enabled to found and to retain the kingdom of Granada as a vassal of Castile. Such vassalage, it is clear, could only exist between a powerful prince on the throne of Castile and a prudent, not to say a cowardly, one on that of Granada. From this time to the final conquest, the external history of the kingdom consists in alternations of war and vassalage with its powerful neighbour. Two circumstances conspired to put the two states on a greater equality than might have been expected. By the conquest of Seville and of Murcia, Castile became the only neighbour of Granada; the Moslem had no longer any conterminous frontier with Aragon or Portugal. Castile therefore was the only enemy of Granada; Almeria was indeed once attacked by the Aragonese by sea; but, as a general rule, both Portugal and Aragon were cut off from further aggrandizement within the peninsula. And small as was Granada, great as was Castile, the internal dissensions of Castile and the natural advantages of Granada long postponed the final conquest. It was not till the union of the crowns of Castile and

Aragon under the firm and settled government of Ferdinand and Isabella, that the force of both kingdoms could be turned against the last remnant of the old invaders.

The internal history of Granada is one of the most wearisome that can be conceived. It is one long record of revolution and civil war. It has not even the sort of interest which common oriental history affords in tracing the rise and fall of successive dynasties. In Granada we find nothing but disputes between members of the same family; the same king is often deposed and restored several times. At the very last moment of the existence of the kingdom, three kings of the same house were contending for the throne. One is really driven to ask whether, in a despotic sovereignty, where polygamy prevents any definite law of succession, the ferocious policy of Mahomet the Conqueror[1] does not become a necessary evil. It is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the system; a form of government which can only be supported by a massacre on each accession is at once proved to be an abomination.

Among all these horrors, we find the Christians interfering whenever they had the power, and, in like manner, we find the Kings of Granada interfering, whenever they could, in the internal affairs of Castile. The malcontents of each state regularly took refuge in the other. Warfare was constantly carried on, but warfare of the most chivalrous character. I do not use the word in commendation. What chivalry implies is an absurd excess of courtesy between men of the same rank, combined with barbarous contempt

[1] Under him systematic fratricide, frequent before, became the standing law of the Ottoman Empire.

for all beneath it. The Black Prince is the model of chivalry, and never did he perform a more chivalrous action than at the capture of Limoges. The French knights who fought against him were spared and honoured; the unresisting citizens were murdered without distinction of sex or age. In the like sort the Castilian and Moorish cavaliers carried on their warfare with extreme civility to brother cavaliers, with extreme respect for the ladies, in short, with all the tinsel frippery and romantic folly of the chivalrous spirit. But the peasant on each side was consigned to ruin by the systematic and merciless destruction of the fruits of the earth. When the first Saracens first marched forth on their mission, they were indeed bidden to combat with the infidel, but Abu-Bekr the Righteous added the precept—"Cut down no fruit-trees; destroy no fields of corn." Such were the barbarian Moslems of the desert; uncivilized indeed and unlearned, but not wholly ignorant of justice, mercy, and good faith. The civilized and scientific Moslems of Granada still continued to fight against the infidel; but they fought only for love of paltry plunder, or from an abstract love of useless slaughter and devastation.

It is easy to weep over the extinction of so remarkable and so splendid a race as the Spanish Arabs; but it is equally easy to see that their subjugation, or rather expulsion, was absolutely necessary, if Spain was to become a great Christian power. To say nothing of the national feelings which prompted the Spaniard to recover every province of the old Gothic monarchy, of the religious feelings which excited the Christian to recover every site which the Cross had ever hallowed in former days, natural ambition and

reasonable policy alike led the Catholic Kings to the conquest. It was impossible to allow a natural portion of their dominions to remain possessed by a people alien in language, manners, and religion, and with whom religion afforded a constant pretext for devastations of the Castilian territory. The final war was provoked by the denial of a customary tribute, and by forays upon Castilian ground in time of truce. The surrender of the capital was the mere fulfilment of a prior stipulation ; the terms of its surrender were mild in the extreme, and for some years they were faithfully observed. Ferdinand, as his conduct towards Naples shows, was capable of any unprovoked and treacherous aggression ; but the conquest of Granada was a worthy source of honour for the humane, the pious, the wise, the righteous Isabella.

The fact was that the terms on which Granada was surrendered were, as Prescott says, so mild that they could not be observed. It was nugatory, for instance, to grant the Moors of Granada commercial privileges above other Castilian subjects, and to make Granada an asylum for runaway bondmen from the rest of Spain. Abolish slavery, by all means, but abolish it fairly throughout the whole country. The complete equality, or rather superiority, which was retained by the Moors under the capitulation, it was not in human nature to respect. Nor is it in human nature for Mahometans to remain other than unwilling subjects of any but a Mahometan government. Our own tolerant government would be driven to persecution, if Kent or Caithness were wholly inhabited by a Mussulman population. As it was, impossible terms did not continue. Good Archbishop Talavera began by preaching to the Infidels in their

own tongue, and actually made some way towards their peaceful conversion. Ximenes forced Christianity upon them; rebellions arose; pretended conversions followed upon subjugation; alleged apostasy called in the agency of the Inquisition; at last, in the year 1610, the last remnant of the Moriscos were expelled with nothing but the clothes on their backs. It would have been alike more merciful and more politic, though doubtless difficult to effect, if the whole Moorish nation in Granada could have been removed to some African settlement immediately upon the conquest, with full and honourable indemnity for the property which they would have been constrained to forsake. As it was, the taking of Granada was the last act of the crusading spirit, which Spain was now beginning to exchange for the persecuting spirit. The crusading spirit has undoubtedly led to many unnecessary horrors, but, after all, the Crusader is a very superior being to the Inquisitor. The Inquisition had now commenced busy operations both in Castile and Aragon. Under the old Castilian Kings the Hebrew race appears to have flourished; at Zalacca Alfonso numbered in his army Jews and Mahometans as well as Christians; we have seen that one of the greatest crimes recorded in Spanish history is the murder by a Moslem King of a Jewish ambassador commissioned by a Christian sovereign. But now Jews, instead of filling posts of honour, were consigned to the fires of the Holy Office, which were soon extended to their circumcised brethren of the law of Mahomet. In this point the Moslem has the advantage: he fights for his religion; he cruelly punishes any insult to it; he often inflicts unprovoked wrongs upon those who dissent from it; but he does not elaborately enquire

into men's private thoughts. One cause for this may be the absence of any organized priesthood in the Mahometan system. The doctors of the Mahometan law have often opposed themselves to cruelties beyond the letter of the Koran. In the Greek war of Independence the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople was deposed by the Sultan,[1] another legal dignitary was murdered by the Turkish populace at Smyrna,[2] because they steadily refused their sacred sanction to wholesale massacres of unoffending Christians.

Fully to realize the feelings of Spain and of Europe at the final extinction of the Saracen power in the west, we must endeavour to place ourselves in the position of men of those times. To the Spaniard it was the last blow of a prolonged battle of well nigh eight hundred years; it was a day which kings and righteous men had desired to see and had not seen. It was the triumph alike of nationality and of religion; his race had advanced, slowly but surely, from the Pyrenees to the Alpuxarras; his faith was dominant through the whole compass of his native land; the Cross had displaced the Crescent upon the Giralda of Seville and the mighty fanes of Cordova and Granada. And through the whole struggle he had been invading no man's right; every victory did but win back his own; every step that the hostile banners receded only enabled him to take possession of another portion of the inheritance of his fathers. All was now over,—

> 'Tis come, the dream of ages,
> Seen dimly from afar,
> The longing of thy heart of hearts,
> Ruy Diaz de Bivar.[3]

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[1] See Trikoupes, Ἱστορία τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπαναστάσεως, i. 192.
[2] Ib. i. 289.
[3] G. W. Cox.

Rodrigo of Cadiz had wiped out the stain of his royal namesake of old, and rivalled the fame of the Campeador himself. Another Ferdinand had surpassed the glory of the victor of Seville; Spain was once more a Christian land; not a foot of her territory now owned any master but those who gloried in the title of the Catholic Kings.

By Europe at large the triumphs of Ferdinand and Isabella were supposed to wipe out the disgrace of the general lethargy forty years earlier. The capture of Granada was supposed to make up for the capture of Constantinople; the consecrated mosque atoned for the desecrated St. Sophia; the Catholic Kings in the Alhambra counterbalanced the infidel Sultan in the palace of the Cæsars. A fallacious comparison indeed, whether for the past or for the future. A certain analogy indeed there is between the fall of the last outpost of Islam in the West and the fall of the last outpost of Christendom in the East. In each case we can mark the gradually receding boundary of the isolated realm, surrounded by advancing enemies, till "the Roman world is contracted to a corner of Thrace[1]," and the vast empire of the third Abdalrahman is represented by the single province of Granada. But, as the disciple of the Prophet might blush to compare the wretched Boabdil to the heroic Constantine, so the Christian historian must confess that in mere military prowess the last Spanish Moors had not degenerated like the last Byzantine Romans. They were weakened by luxury and division; but in mere fighting they do not seem to have at all gone back since the days of Tarik or Mahomet Almansor. And the parallel fails in the fact that the Castilian

[1] Gibbon, cap. lxiv. (xi. 443.)

was only winning back his own, the Ottoman was advancing on another man's possessions. That Spain should be other than a Christian and European country was an anomaly on the face of things. It was a pleasing delusion to suppose that the removal of this anomaly at all atoned for the appearance of the Infidel on the Bosporus and the Danube. The conquest of Granada was a mere honorary triumph for Christendom; the conquest of Constantinople was the most practical of all the victories of Islam. The presence of the Arab at Granada was an anomaly on the map of Europe and a practical evil to the inhabitants of the Castilian frontier. But he was in no way formidable to Europe, or even to Spain. He was as little likely to threaten Toledo or Lisbon as to appear again upon the field of Tours. The Ottoman had yet to conquer Hungary, to bombard Vienna, to subdue Crete and Cyprus, to spread his dominion over Syria and Egypt, and to extend his supremacy almost within sight of the new conquests of Ferdinand and Isabella.

I have reserved for this point of our subject, that of the final extinction of the most civilized and magnificent of Mahometan powers, such consideration as I am able to give to the subject of Arabian literature, art, and science. It is but a very feeble consideration that I can give to them. The excellence of the Arabs lay mainly in the cultivation of a native literature, and in the prosecution of physical and metaphysical science. On these points I am a very poor judge; I am ignorant of the Arabic language, and I am quite unfit to appreciate physical or metaphysical works in any language. The architecture of the Alhambra and the mosque of Cordova I may be better qualified

to criticize; but I do not group nations in order of merit according to their proficiency even in the first of arts. But as far as I can judge at all, I think I discern a prevalent disposition, not exactly to overrate the positive excellence of the Saracens in these points, but to assert for them an untrue monopoly of excellence. Of the excellence of a native popular literature no man can judge who is not acquainted, and fully acquainted, with the language. To me the Koran itself, in Sale's version, appears insufferably dull, but I know that the real Koran must be otherwise, because so many ages and nations have agreed to admire it. I can estimate my own condition in this matter by the condition of those who know Herodotus only through Beloe and Homer only through Pope, worst of all, if any such there be, who know David only through the medium of Tate and Brady. I am therefore willing to believe that the poetry and tales of Arabia may be equal to those of any nation, ancient or modern; and I know that among no people has literary excellence, after their own standard, ever been held in higher honour. It is no less clear that, for several ages, the Saracens, above all, the Spanish Saracens, were considerably in advance of the western nations of Christendom, in astronomy, medicine, logic, and most of the useful and ornamental arts. Their science was of course child's play compared with what we should now call by that name, but it was far superior to any thing in contemporary England, Gaul, or Germany. But when I am told, as we sometimes are, not only that they had made great comparative advances in learning and science, but that they had all the learning and science then in the world to themselves, I simply

attribute it to our strange habit of entirely forgetting the existence of an eastern as well as a western Christendom. Whence did the Saracens obtain their knowledge? They confessedly did not bring it with them from Mecca and Medina, and it hardly sprang spontaneously from the ground either at Cordova or at Bagdad. We must again look to our poor friend, the "Greek of the Lower Empire." The Arabs studied Aristotle and taught him to the men of western Europe; but it was surely from the men of eastern Europe that they obtained him in the first instance. He was read in translations at Samarcand and at Lisbon, when no one knew his name at Oxford or Edinburgh; but all the while he continued to be read in his own tongue at Constantinople and Thessalonica. I think I can perceive that nearly all Saracenic knowledge came from what was to them the west, except what came from the remoter east, namely the Arabic numerals, which I believe competent judges consider to be of Indian origin. The Arabs seem to have positively invented nothing, though what they learned from their Byzantine masters they often, with the zeal of new scholars, developed and improved. And I can also perceive that they only acquired a very little of what those Byzantine masters could have taught them. I looked through those parts of Abulpharagius which are devoted to the enumeration of learned men, till I grew tired of the process. This did not happen till I had observed three things: First, that whatever the Arabs learned, they learned from translations of Greek books; secondly, that they confined themselves to an infinitesimal portion of Greek literature; thirdly, that many of the most famous literary men

at the court of the Caliphs were not Mahometans at all, but Jews or Christians. They seem never to have cultivated any language but their own; they never studied the Greek authors in their own tongue, and they hardly selected the masterpieces for translation. As Gibbon says, there is no record of an Arabic translation of any Greek poet, orator, or historian. Abulpharagius once mentions two books of Homer being translated into an oriental tongue, but this was not by a Moslem into Arabic, but by a Syrian Christian into his own language. A victorious Caliph sometimes imposed a tribute of books upon a defeated Emperor; he carried off Ptolemy and Hippocrates, the physical, logical, and ethical writings of Aristotle. But he never inquired for the lays of Homer, of Pindar, or of Æschylus, for the orations of Lysias or Demosthenes, for the histories of Thucydides and Polybius, for the treatise in which Aristotle himself has taught of man in his highest capacity, as the citizen of a free republic. Caliphs and Sultans were never disturbed by the doctrine of the earliest historian, that "freedom is a brave thing." They often trembled on their thrones, but not because of the immortal strains which promised a place in the happy Island to the slayer of a tyrant. Under the despotism of the Cæsars the old republican literature was not forgotten, though it might be studied in vain; under the despotism of the Caliphs it remained utterly unknown. Compare for a moment the intellectual resources of a man like Photius with those of the most varied scholar he could meet with at the Court of Bagdad. The one knew by heart volumes upon volumes of precious lore, which the barbarism, not of Goth and Vandal, but of Frank and Venetian,

has lost to us. The other, with the whole feast spread before him, selected only a few scraps of what has descended to ourselves. Neither a nation nor an individual is blameable for ignorance of the old Greek literature, if it has not come within his reach; but I cannot rate highly the intellectual proficiency of those who, while making their election among the writers of Hellas, omit to cast a single glance upon her poets, her orators, or her historians.

The conquests of Africa and Spain were made by land, as it required no great maritime exertion to cross the narrow strait of Gibraltar. The other exploits of the Arabs in the west were, for the most part, effected by sea. It was by the latter element that they necessarily reached Sicily, Sardinia and Crete; Gaul they attacked at different periods in both manners.

The first rush of Saracenic conquest in western Europe carried the victors beyond the Pyrenees into Septimania. Here they fixed themselves in Narbonne and its province, while they neglected those refugees of the Asturian mountains, who, in the course of ages, were to grow up into their own conquerors. So early in the history of Islam, one can hardly imagine that they entered Gaul, or any other country, without a view to its permanent conversion or subjugation; but certain it is that the Saracens appear in totally different lights in Gaul and in Spain. The comparatively civilized and tolerant conquerors of the peninsula appear in nearly every other western country as mere barbarian destroyers. Narbonne was their only really settled colony, and even that served them for little more than a *point d'appui* for plundering incursions. Instead of winning converts

or tributaries to the Faith, they simply burned villages and churches, wasted fields, and, above all, carried off slaves. Slaves have always been in great request in all Mahometan countries, and it is only justice to add that among no people is the lot of the slave so easy or his prospects so hopeful. The converted and manumitted slave becomes at once the equal of his master, and may rise to the highest dignities. The slave of a powerful man has in fact a far greater chance of doing so than an obscure freeman. Both in Egypt and in India slaves have been enrolled in armies, and have produced whole dynasties of Sultans. In Spain too slaves, captured or purchased, formed the body-guard of the Caliphs; they rose to the highest places in their court, and, in the wreck of the Ommiad empire, they frequently seated themselves on provincial thrones. The slave of either sex was the choicest booty of the Saracen soldier, the choicest commodity of the Saracen merchant. Christians were not ashamed to sell to the Infidel not only their own captives, but sometimes their own flesh and blood. The wars of the Frank Kings and Emperors filled Saracenic Spain with Slavonic captives[1] to such an extent that in its language, as well as in those of Europe, a national designation, meaning in its own tongue *glorious*, became the common title of servitude. The Slavonians of the Spanish Caliphate are equivalent to the Mamelukes of Egypt or the Turks of Bagdad.

Frankish captives however might be won with steel, while distance made the Slavonic slave attainable only with gold. In pursuit of the former the Arab made

[1] See Reinaud, Invasions des Sarrazins, p. 237, a work from which I have derived much information for the present chapter.

many a wasting foray into the heart of Gaul. The most famous of these plundering expeditions, under the great Emir Abdalrahman,[1] was vanquished, as all the world knows, by Charles Martel upon the field of Tours. Let me not for a moment depreciate the fame of so glorious an exploit. The first total defeat of the Saracen by the Christian in a great pitched battle was indeed an illustrious event; and it may be that Charles Martel saved Gaul from the fate of Spain. But let honour be given where honour is due; and honour is not fairly assigned when Charles is magnified as the one saviour of Christendom, while Leo the Isaurian is forgotten. In that day even the conquest of Gaul would have been a light matter compared with the conquest of Constantinople. The Isaurian Emperor rescued the head of Christendom; the Mayor of the Palace rescued only one of its extremities. One bore the onslaught of the whole force of the Caliphate; the other only overthrew the power of its most distant and recent province.

The fight of Tours took place in 732; the Saracens however retained possession of their Gallic province for twenty-three years longer. In 755, when Spain was torn to pieces by the dissensions consequent on the fall of the Ommiad dynasty in the east, Pepin, the son of Charles Martel and the first of the Carolingian Kings, expelled the Arabs from Narbonne and drove them beyond the peninsula.

The remaining Saracenic conquests in the west were made by sea. Nothing could be more alien than a maritime life to the habits of the primitive Arabs; but the same revolution which converted

[1] Not to be confounded with any of the Ommiad princes of the same name.

them into natural philosophers converted them also into sailors. So early as the days of Othman and Moawiyah they had entered upon their career of naval victory. They conquered Rhodes and made descents upon Crete; they besieged Constantinople by sea as well as by land, and in later days they sacked Thessalonica by a naval attack. But in the east the Byzantine navy generally maintained its superiority; the maritime conquests of the Arabs, with one remarkable exception, were confined to the western portion of the Mediterranean. Thus commenced that system of robbery by sea which, under the form of the Barbary corsairs, has lasted down almost to our own times. In the ninth and tenth centuries it was at its height. As long as the Abbasside Caliphs retained any power in the west, the Western Empire, as a friendly territory, was spared by the African Saracens, but, as the Abbasside dominion broke to pieces, the revolted Emirs were restrained by no such considerations. Every port of Spain and Africa sent forth ships, for what, on a small scale, is called piracy, and on a greater, conquest. These sea-rovers were probably the scum of the Saracenic people, and they certainly exhibited the Saracenic character in its most odious colours. They were mere plunderers and destroyers. The islands of Sardinia and Corsica were constantly plundered, and were sometimes more permanently occupied. They ravaged all the western shores of Italy, they attacked Rome itself, and were driven back by the energy of the illustrious Pontiff Leo IV. They occupied Bari on the other side of the peninsula, and required the combined energies of the Eastern and Western Empires to expel them. The army of the Carolingian Lewis and the navy of

the Macedonian Basil triumphed over the intruders, and the result was a great extension of the Byzantine province in southern Italy. Another band landed at Fraxinetum, near Nice. Here they again took to a terrestrial life; they established themselves as free-booters in Alpine fortresses, and for eighty years they devastated all the adjoining portions of the kingdoms of Italy and Burgundy. But all these Saracen posts were mere nests of robbers; possibly the needs of warfare may have required the aid of medical science, but we may be sure that the astronomers and logicians of Cordova and Bagdad did not often turn out of their way to seek disciples at Bari or Fraxinetum.

Crete and Sicily were more important and permanent possessions, but even of these Crete was merely a pirates' nest on a greater scale. I alluded in an earlier part of this lecture to the character of the first Alhakem of Cordova as an exception to the generally mild and beneficent rule of the Spanish Ommiads. In 823 some of his subjects, dissatisfied with his tyranny, determined to better their condition by becoming themselves tyrants elsewhere. They first sailed to Alexandria. That city was then a dependency, in name at least, of the eastern Caliphate; they were therefore enabled to burn and plunder at discretion among Moslems who recognized not the authority of the master from whom they fled. From Alexandria they sailed to Crete; they occupied the island, and founded a city called Chandax or Chandak, signifying in Arabic a trench. This name, under the corrupt form of Candia, has become, in western languages, the designation of the whole island; but no man therein, whether Ottoman or

Hellenic, knows his country by any name but that which it has retained since the days of Homer. For nearly a hundred and forty years these Cretan Saracens were the terror of the Ægæan. At last, in 960, Nikephoros Phokas, the future Emperor, performed one of his greatest and most beneficial exploits in their overthrow. The Roman leader, a saint as well as a hero, remembered the words of Epimenides and St. Paul, and promised the Christian host a speedy triumph over "liars, evil beasts, and slow bellies.[1]" The promise was amply redeemed by the annexation of Crete to the Eastern Empire for nearly two centuries and a half; but Nikephoros might have remembered that both the diviner and the Apostle spoke of Cretan Greeks, and not of Cretan Saracens. Possibly however his enemies numbered many who by blood belonged to the nobler race. Certainly the Greek population had to a great extent become Mahometan during the Arab occupation. They have not belied their character in more recent times; since the Turkish conquest large numbers of them have again apostatized, forming a strange contrast to the ordinary constancy of the Hellenic race to its nationality and religion. But those who did remain constant went through the sternest martyrdom of all; never were Arabs or Ottomans so truly "evil beasts" as the Hellenic Moslem of Crete has always been to his Christian brother.

In Sicily alone, of their maritime conquests, did the Saracens display any of their better qualities. There, as I have already observed, the old warfare of East

[1] *Οὐκ ἠνέσχετο πάντως ἡ πρόνοια μέχρι καὶ τοῦ παντὸς, τοὺς ψείστας, τὰ θήρια τὰ κάκιστα, τὰς ἀργὰς γαστέρας, καταθοινεῖσθαι λαὸν τὸν Χριστώνυμον.*—Leo Diac. i. 6.

and West was fought again between the Greek and the Arab, as of old between the Greek and the Carthaginian. In 827 the African Saracens were invited into that noble island to gratify the revenge of a certain Euphemios. The stern justice of Michael the Stammerer had sentenced him to lose either his tongue or his nose for the abduction of a nun, a proceeding which the Emperor, whose own queen had once taken the veil, thought an unbecoming liberty in a subject. Other Arabs from Spain joined the original invaders, but it was nearly fifty years before the conquest of the whole island was completed by the capture of Syracuse. That city made a long and gallant defence, and it might have been easily saved, had Basil the First been as eager to retain Syracuse as to obtain possession of Bari. A hundred and fifty years after, his descendant and namesake, the Slayer of the Bulgarians and the Saracens, undertook its recovery at the age of sixty-eight, but death prevented his winning fresh laurels in the western seas. Ten years later, the Byzantine general Maniakes commenced the reconquest of Sicily in a manner worthy of Basil himself, but the women and eunuchs who ruled at Constantinople procured his recall; affairs fell into confusion, and the prize was eventually snatched from both parties by the Normans of Apulia. They founded a countship which grew into a kingdom, and they avenged the wrongs of their predecessors by conquests on the African coast. The Norman Kings ruled over a people partly Greek, partly Arabian, both of whom retained their manners, laws, and religion. By some strange and unexplained process, both Greek and Arabic have given way, not to the French tongue of the conquerors, but to the

Italian of the neighbouring peninsula, though its southern provinces were, at least up to the eleventh century, as thoroughly Greek as Sicily itself. The Sicilian Saracens were in great power in the twelfth century at the court of William the Bad, who was accused of conducting himself rather like a Moslem Sultan than a Christian King. Frederick II. of Hohenstaufen planted a colony of them at Nocera, and found them his most trustworthy soldiers, for upon them he was sure that Popes and monks would have no influence. Yet Pope John VIII. had himself headed Saracenic armies, and disciples of the Prophet were numbered in the host wherewith Robert Guiscard hastened to the deliverance of Hildebrand himself. The Saracens of Nocera fought by the side of Manfred at Beneventum when his Christian warriors had deserted him; and with this, the most honourable juxtaposition in which the Arab of western Europe is found, I will conclude my sketch of the history of the Saracens themselves. My next and final lecture will embrace a view of those powers which in the remoter east arose after the strictly Saracenic empire had passed away.

LECTURE VI.

THE LATER DYNASTIES OF PERSIA AND INDIA.

My last Lecture in strictness concluded our subject as a history of the Saracens. We have witnessed the extinction of every independent Saracenic dynasty, and we have beheld the eastern empire of the Caliphs

torn to pieces by Turkish and Mongolian conquerors. But to complete the cycle of Mahometan history, with the exceptions made at starting, it will be necessary somewhat to extend our view, and to conclude our whole subject with some notice of those later Persian and Indian dynasties which grew out of the dismemberment of the Bagdad Caliphate. And, with the exception of the first conquests under Abu-Bekr and Omar, I know of no portion of our scheme more full of interest and instruction, or which sets the character of Mahometan and oriental history in more varied and more important aspects.

Persia, at first sight, would appear to have been at once the easiest and most complete of the Saracenic conquests. It was subdued by the Arabs as speedily as it had been by the Macedonians. In each case three battles sufficed to effect the utter overthrow of the ancient monarchy. And no conversion ever seemed more complete. The Grand Turk, the Great Mogul, the Caliphs of Cordova and Bagdad, ruled over nations of other creeds who often outnumbered the true Believers. But the Persians are, and have been for many centuries, really a Mahometan nation. The followers of the Prophet do not there, as in India or Romania, form a mere ruling order; they really constitute the people of the land. A remnant of the Fire-Worshippers still lingers on, but they form a most insignificant minority; Jews of course are found there as everywhere else: Christianity is not unknown, but it exists only as the faith of Armenian tributaries and colonists. Nowhere, would it seem, have conquest and conversion been more successful. Undoubtedly large bodies of Persians migrated into the Roman territory. In the wars of the ninth century the

Emperor Theophilus numbered in his army thirty thousand Persian refugees, who, with their leader Theophobos, were among the most formidable enemies of the Saracenic power. But this very fact would make it the more appear as if all the discontented spirits had expatriated themselves, and as if all who remained at home were faithful followers of the Prophet and loyal subjects of his earthly Vicegerent.

But the old Persian spirit was one alike vigorous and stubborn. We have already seen how Persia, after five centuries of Macedonian and Parthian bondage, rose again under the dynasty of the Sassanidæ, and again recovered her place among the nations. Eight hundred years after the Arabian conquest she once more did the same. Ishmael in the fifteenth century played over again the part of Artaxerxes in the third; the Shiah religion proved as successful an instrument in the hands of the Sophis as Magianism had been in those of the Sassanidæ. But even in earlier times we may discern abundant traces of the same national spirit. With this view we will again cast our eye over some of those dynasties which we hurriedly enumerated in our fourth Lecture. We there regarded them as connected with the overthrow of the Saracenic Caliphate; we will here regard them as connected with the regeneration of the Persian people.

First of all we should notice that no province was ever so unsteady in its allegiance to the throne of Bagdad as that of Chorassan. None provided so many upstart dynasties to weaken the empire, or so many heterodox sects to disturb the faith. Surely the explanation of this is not merely that it was a distant and powerful province, but that it was one of

the oldest and most sacred seats of the religion of Zoroaster. The Bactrians revenged themselves for their speedy conquest by no less speedy rebellions, and for their speedy conversion by adopting the Law of the Prophet only in such forms as were acceptable to the national mind. Sometimes they rose for the house of Abbas, sometimes for the house of Ali, sometimes for sects which both parties agreed in condemning; but in no case was Chorassan found at all disposed blindly to submit either to the government or the doctrine of a distant master.

The first dynasty, that of the Taherites, we may pass by very briefly. When Haroun divided his Empire between Al Amin and Al Mamoun,[1] the natural consequence would have been for the latter to have become the source of an independent dynasty. As it was, Al Mamoun was translated to the Caliphate of Bagdad, and Chorassan became the appanage of his valiant general Zulyemnin. But he and his descendants, though exemplifying the easy separation of Chorassan, were in no way Persian, and probably did nothing for Persian renovation. Their successors, the Soffarides, from the low origin of their founder, may probably have belonged to the conquered race, but their sway was too transient to effect much change.

With the Samanides, the Dilemites, the Ghaznevids, the case is widely different. All these dynasties more or less identified themselves with the ancient glories of Persia; all cultivated and patronized the national literature; all boasted of genealogies connecting them with the national sovereigns of former times. The Dilemites, there can be no doubt, were native Per-

[1] See page 101.

sians; their royal descent is more problematical; but it is of as little consequence whether they were really descendants of the Sassanidæ as whether the Sassanidæ were really descendants of the Achæmenidæ. The Samanides were probably Turks, but they professed a descent from Bahram, a Persian general who had disputed the crown with Chosroes, the rival of Heraclius. Sabektekin, the founder of the house of Ghazni, was, beyond all doubt, in his immediate antecedents, a purchased Turkish slave. But slavery in a foreign land is not inconsistent with nobility in one's own. When Sabektekin rose to greatness, his genealogy was discovered or invented; it was remembered that Yezdijird, in his flight, had penetrated into Turkestan, and had there left posterity behind him. The descendants of Artaxerxes had been for some centuries merged in the vulgar herd of Turkish Giaours and savages; but in Sabektekin the imperial race again made their way into their own land to recover the throne of their forefathers.

Absurd fictions as these genealogies doubtless were, they are just as valuable for our purpose as if they had been the most undoubted verities. People do not invent ancestors except those whom they regard as honourable. When Turkish princes devised for themselves Persian genealogies, it shows that a Persian nationality still existed to which such a descent would render their sway more acceptable. Under the patronage of these princes a revived Persian literature arose. Arabic indeed remained the language of religion and science, but the tongue of the people again became the tongue of poetry, history, and polite intercourse. To the Arab all before Mahomet was the Time of Ignorance, but the Persian never forgot

his old history and legends. Ferdousi, under the auspices of Mahmoud of Ghazni, recorded them in immortal verse; and Mirkhond, in later times, thought it not beneath him to compose the history of the Infidels of the line of Sassan as well as of the faithful Ghaznevid himself. Consequently when, in the next stage, Turkish and Mongolian hordes permanently settled upon Persian ground, they found there a civilization Persian rather than Arabian. This civilization they adopted, and even transferred to other lands. The old Persian names revive, and we again find a Kai Kobad, a Khosru, and a Nushirvan among the potentates of the earth. Hindostan received from its Mahometan conquerors an Arabian religion, but it received also a Persian literature; and the Persian language still retains its rank as the most polished and refined among the dialects of the East.

The Ghaznevid Sultans ruled over a large part of Persia, but their fame is rather connected with India than with that country. During the centuries which we have now to consider, the histories of Persia and of India sometimes converge and sometimes remain distinct. Thus the invasion of the Moguls under Jenghiz barely grazed the frontiers of Hindostan, while it led to the establishment of a remarkable dynasty in Persia. That of Timour, on the other hand, had important results upon the destinies of both countries. I propose therefore to sketch the history, first of Persia, then of India, down to the time of Timour; then to consider the career of that conqueror; and finally to sketch the distinct histories of the two countries from Timour to Nadir Shah. At that point they again converge, and this will be

as far as there will be any necessity for me to prolong the subject.

I briefly recounted in my fourth Lecture the succession of the great Turkish dynasties in Persia, the Ghaznevids, Seljuks, and Chorasmians; together with the overthrow of the last by Jenghiz Khan, and that of the Assassins and of the Bagdad Caliphate by his grandson Hulaku. This last conqueror founded a permanent dynasty in Persia. His character, and that of the nation over which he ruled, is one of the greatest anomalies in history. For unprovoked aggressions, for fiendish barbarities in warfare, no people, unless possibly the American Indians, can be compared to the Moguls. I do not remember any other barbarian of the old world who ever commanded a captive prince to be refused all nourishment except pieces of flesh cut from his own body. This was one of the exploits of Hulaku, a ferocious warrior, who in war scrupled neither at perfidy nor massacre, but who is withal described as a lover of learning, as tolerant in religion, and just in his internal administration. It appears that these Mogul Khans really believed themselves to have a divine commission to subdue the whole world, and deemed no barbarity misplaced against those who were impious enough to withstand them. Otherwise we cannot understand the phænomenon of mere savages being suddenly transformed into rulers certainly above rather than below the average of oriental despots. The descendants of Hulaku reigned in Persia for a century and a half; they ran the common race of an eastern dynasty: a few generations of able princes were succeeded by weakness, internal divisions, and external defeats.

Into the details of the Syrian, Egyptian, and Anatolian wars of these Mogul lords of Persia I shall not enter. But they are closely connected with the most important aspect of their character. It will be remembered that the Moguls were not Mahometans. Under them, for the first time in those regions, the creed of Islam was displaced from its predominance. The Mogul Khans professed complete toleration; but they naturally looked with a certain disfavour upon the creed with which they had come into most direct collision. Mahometanism was not persecuted, but it was depressed from its sovereignty; it was slighted and discouraged, while Judaism and Christianity enjoyed a far larger portion of royal favour. Christendom was always expecting or imagining an actual proselyte in these Mogul Khans; but it does not appear certain that any of them actually embraced Christianity. But they showed favour to its professors at home and abroad; they exalted Christians to high offices, and cultivated the alliance of foreign Christian powers against their common Mahometan enemies.

But Christians, Jews, and Mongolian Theists formed far too small a minority to effect a permanent conversion of Persia, or even to prevent the re-establishment of Islam as the dominant faith. As the conquerors began to identify themselves with the country they had conquered, they began gradually to adopt its religion. Abaka, the immediate successor of Hulaku, was a wise, just, and tolerant ruler; but, so early as 1281, his successor, Nikoudar Khan, who is said to have been baptized in his childhood, professed himself a convert to Mahometanism. He assumed the Mahometan name and title of Sultan

Achmet, and commenced a severe persecution of the Christians. But the times were not yet ripe for the change. In three years the Mongolian chiefs revolted, deposed Sultan Achmet, and established his nephew, Arghoun Khan, on the throne. He had a Jew to his prime-minister, corresponded on friendly terms with the Pope, favoured Christians in his own kingdom, and is even said to have forbidden all Mahometans to appear at court. His successor Kai Khatou is only worthy of notice on account of an attempt to abolish the use of gold and silver in his dominions, and to reduce all things to an uniform paper currency.

It was under Sultan Ghazan, who reigned from 1294 to 1303, that Mahometanism again became the established religion of Persia. In the second year of his reign, Ghazan Khan publicly declared his conversion to the faith of the Koran. The disposition of the Moguls must have greatly changed since the days of Achmet; instead of this conversion being followed by a revolt, the imperial example was followed by a hundred thousand Mogul warriors. This change of religion did not, however, involve any corresponding change of policy in foreign affairs. Ghazan still continued the hereditary friendship of his house with the Christians of Europe, and its hereditary enmity with the great champions of Islam, the Mameluke Sultans of Egypt. Some have inferred from this that his conversion was only pretended, and that he was at heart a Christian, or at least a favourer of Christians. To this it is easy to answer that a man must have been a zealous Moslem indeed in whom religion so far outweighed policy as not to perceive that the Egyptian Sultan was a more

dangerous rival to Persia than any European power could ever be, even if established in all the conquests of the first Crusaders. And more than this, if it be true that Ghazan embraced Mahometanism in its Shiah form,[1] as was certainly the case with his brother and successor, his conduct is at once intelligible. To a believer in the twelve Imams, who could be so odious as that Egyptian monarch who kept at his court an Abbasside Commander of the Faithful? Against such an one he would readily employ infidel arms, just as the Spanish Caliphs did not scruple to ally themselves with the Byzantine Cæsars against the common foe at Bagdad; just as Haroun, the terror of Byzantium, was on terms of friendship with the Cæsar of Old Rome.

One political consequence however did follow on the conversion of Ghazan. Hitherto some nominal unity was held to exist among the different countries ruled by the descendants of Jenghiz. The Khan of Persia was deemed the vassal of the Grand Khan of Tartary. But now that Persia was recovered to the true faith, this humiliating dependence of Iran upon Turan could be endured no longer. The believing Sultan could no longer profess himself the vassal of an Infidel. An Infidel army indeed appeared in Chorassan to assert the rights of the Grand Khan; but the arms of Ghazan were triumphant; the land of light was liberated, and the new Afrasiab was compelled to confine his sovereignty to his native realm of darkness.

After Sultan Ghazan the power of the Mongolian dynasty in Persia rapidly declined. The empire soon began to break in pieces; rival monarchs established

[1] Price's Mahommedan Empire, ii. 632.

themselves in different provinces. The royal house became extinct, while another branch of the descendants of Hulaku established themselves at Bagdad. At last Persia became a mere scene of anarchy and confusion, utterly incapable of offering any serious resistance to the greatest of Mussulman conquerors, the invincible and merciless Timour.

We will now turn to India. After the temporary Saracenic occupation of Sind in the eighth century, that country remained untouched by the Mussulman arms till the close of the tenth. Then Hindostan was first invaded by the Ghaznevid Sabektekin. Strange to say, the Turk was not the original aggressor. The Rajah of Lahore, jealous of a Moslem kingdom so near to him as at Ghazni, took the initiative, and attacked the new state. A defeat from the hands of Sabektekin, twelve invasions from his son Mahmoud, and the ultimate subjection of nearly all India to Mahometan sway, was the result of Jeipal making war upon people who had not attacked him. Whether a Turkish dynasty at Ghazni might not have brought about all this of its own accord, I cannot pretend to say; but undoubtedly this instance shows that too long-sighted calculations may sometimes bring about the evils which they are intended to avert.

The name of Mahmoud every one knows, if only from the tale of the two owls who wished a long life to so diligent a creator of ruined villages. Among the Turkish princes of those days he must claim a high place, but this of itself shows how inferior even these earlier and better Turks were to the warriors of the first Caliphate. Warrior of Islam as he was, plunder seems to have been fully as much in his thoughts as

conquest or conversion. He broke in pieces the idol of Somnath; he carried off the gates which our own age has seen restored; but to place an unconverted Hindoo devotee upon a tributary throne was hardly in the spirit of Khaled or even of Abu-Obeidah. It does not appear that he ever converted a single idolater or ever slaughtered one off the field of battle. Yet he was guilty of several massacres of his fellow-believers during his conquest of Persia. Some even represent him as a sceptic; he was, it is said, doubtful of a future state till reclaimed by a special visit from the Prophet himself. He is the type of the oriental conqueror, a being far less odious than the oriental *faineant*. The conqueror is necessarily a man of vigour, a quality which is commonly combined with justice of the oriental kind. His wars inflict less misery than the oppression inflicted or permitted by his weaker successors. Mahmoud was at least ready to deal summary punishment on all inferior disturbers of the peace of the world. The story is well known, how a Turk of his army expelled a peasant from his house and bed, how the injured man invoked the aid of the Sultan, how Mahmoud in person smote off the head of the adulterer, performing his vengeance in the dark, lest the culprit should prove to be his own son. No stronger testimony can be needed alike to the inflexible righteousness of the sovereign, and to the miserable state of society which could afford no other remedy for the wrong.

Mahmoud conquered only the Punjab, and did not extend his ravages beyond Guzerat. He consequently only sowed the seed of Mahometan dominion in India. The greatness of his dynasty died with him. A new race of conquerors, the Ghourians, arose.

These first expelled the descendants of Mahmoud from Ghazni, so that the empire of the Ghaznevids was now confined to their Indian kingdom of Lahore. Even there they did not long resist the torrent. Under the Ghourian Sultan Gheiasaddin, his brother Shababaddin extinguished the Ghaznevids of Lahore in 1184, and commenced a career of conquest in the independent parts of India. During his brother's reign and his own, which lasted till 1206, he may be said to have subdued the whole of Hindostan[1]. This vast territory however did not form a compact kingdom, but was held in various degrees of subjection. He may however be fairly considered as the great founder of the Mahometan power in India.

Between Shababaddin and Timour a number of Mahometan dynasties arose and fell in India, which we may dismiss with a very cursory notice. Those who desire further particulars I must refer to the admirable history of Mr. Elphinstone. With the reigns of Abbas and Akbar before me, I cannot afford to devote much of my last Lecture to the houses of Khilji and Toghlak. Aladdin, of the former dynasty, subdued nearly all the Deccan, about 1312; under Mahomet, of the latter house, about 1340, both Bengal and the Deccan revolted against the Kings of Delhi. A number of Moslem thrones were now set up, and a number of Hindoo thrones were re-established, some of which never returned to their allegiance till the days of Akbar and Aurengzebe.

We must however remark that in India, from the very beginning, Mahometanism lost something of its intolerance. The Moslems have always been a small

[1] That is, of Northern India, as distinguished from the peninsula of the Deccan.

minority in the country ; far smaller indeed even than the Ottomans in Europe. But the Hindoo was subjected to a far lighter yoke than the Greek or the Servian. The jezia or capitation-tax had indeed to be paid ; but, further than this, the idolaters were commonly not disturbed. It is only in one or two reigns that we hear of anything like persecution, while in others we find Hindoos filling high offices, and a Hindoo influence actually paramout in the state. One explanation doubtless is to be found in the passiveness of the Hindoo character and the extreme tolerance of the Hindoo creed. It was not, like Christianity, antagonistic ; if the Hindoo was allowed to live and to worship after his own fashion, he had no special horror of alien rule ; still less did he entertain any desire to convert his alien rulers. The Christian subjects of the Ottoman were beings of another sort, with whom their masters could not afford to deal so gently.

The Mahometan Kings of this period sprung from various sources. Some were Turkish slaves, others Hindoo converts. The Kings of Delhi were orthodox Moslems, and some at least of their number deemed it necessary to obtain investiture of their dominions from the Caliph of Bagdad or even from his nominal successor in Egypt[1]. But in the Deccan the Shiah sect made great progress, and the creed of the twelve Imams became the established religion at several of the southern courts. Mogul invasions were several times attempted, but they were always successfully repelled. We also hear much of Mogul mercenaries, who seem to have been about as tractable as the Turkish mercenaries at Bagdad in earlier times. Within the

[1] Like Mahomet of the house of Toghlak. See Elphinstone, ii. 66.

country, wars and rebellions abounded; and, just as with the Christians and Mahometans in Spain, it does not appear that either Mahometans or Hindoos ever scrupled to make war upon men of their own religion or to ally themselves with the professors of the opponent creed.

In the latter portion of the fourteenth century the ferocious Timour appeared as the general scourge of Mahometan Asia. Born of the same family as Jenghiz, though not one of his direct descendants, he bore throughout life the humble title of Emir, and led about with him a nominal Grand Khan, of whom he professed himself a dutiful subject. His pedigree may in strictness entitle him to be called a Mogul; but, for all practical purposes, himself and his hordes must be regarded as Turks. Like all the eastern Turks, such civilization as they had was of Persian origin; and it was of the Persian form of Islam that Timour was so zealous an asserter. The character of Timour exhibits the savage ferocity of Jenghiz, combined with a considerable amount of low cunning, and with Mussulman fanaticism of the vilest kind. One is really tempted to say hypocrisy, instead of fanaticism, though this is an accusation which one should be very slow to bring against any man. But I cannot help thinking that Mahomet would have rejected a devotee who massacred believers by thousands, while he set a guard to protect the premises of a canonist who had died a year before.[1] I cannot help thinking that Khaled the Sword of God would have revolted at the operation of flaying alive even the most obstinate of infidels.[2] These were the exploits of Timour,

[1] Shereffeddin, b. ii. c. 60 (Engl. Tr. i. 292); Malcolm, i. 491.
[2] Shereffeddin, b. iv. c. 22 (Engl. Tr. ii. 21).

who devastated Persia and India, overthrew the power of the Ottoman, and threatened alike China and Constantinople. Of the two, China was in the greater danger, even when Timour was engaged in the sack of Smyrna, for the Ægæan still rolled between him and the trembling Palæologus, and, as Gibbon says, the lord of so many myriads of horse had not a single galley. 'In fact, by his temporary overthrow of the Ottomans, he prolonged the existence of the feeble power which still assumed the titles and travestied the greatness of the Iconoclasts and the Macedonians. After carrying destruction through Persia and Syria, the Emir Timour thought good to wage war against the Cæsar of Rome. The person so designated was neither the Bohemian of the West nor the Greek of the East, but the Ottoman Bajazet Yilderim.[1] He had indeed exchanged by authority of the orthodox Egyptian Caliph, his title of Emir for that of Sultan, but, as far as I know, he resigned European titles to his Byzantine tributary. But Emir, Sultan, or Cæsar, the Ottoman Thunderbolt fell harmless at the feet of the lame old man of Transoxiana, and the victor of Nikopolis either was, or was not, exhibited to wondering nations in an iron cage.[2] That the Ottoman power ever recovered from the utter destruction of the field of Ankyra is a phænomenon without a parallel in eastern history.

Timour committed massacres alike at Delhi and at Isfahan, but he founded no dynasty at all in India, and no lasting one in Persia. He appears on the stage simply as a destroyer. I will not tarry over the sway

[1] The Thunderbolt: so called from the rapidity of his conquests.

[2] I do not feel myself at all bound to enter into this famous controversy. All, I believe, that can be said about it may be found in Gibbon and his commentator Dean Milman.

of his descendants in Persia, nor yet over the Turkman dynasties of the Black and the White Sheep; I hasten to the more attractive subject of the Suffavean dynasty, the famous Sophis.

I remarked in the commencement of this Lecture that Ishmael in the fifteenth century exactly reproduced Artaxerxes in the third. A combined religious and national enthusiasm again made Persia an independent power. A strictly national dynasty she has never seen since the fall of Yezdijird, but Turks and Persians, citizens and nomads, were knit together into one brotherhood by the common bond of the Shiah faith. The sect of Ali had always numbered many votaries in Persia; it had even been occasionally the faith of Kings; but now it became the acknowledged creed of the nation, and the race of Kings who approached most nearly to the character of national rulers were raised to the throne as its defenders. The Persians, in so universally embracing Islam, avenged themselves by embracing it in a shape of their own. The doctrine of the Imams, and of their indefeasible right to the allegiance of the faithful, was easily blended with eastern notions of metempsychosis and incarnations of the Deity. The successive Imams began to be looked upon as mysterious and superhuman beings; Ali takes nearly the place of Ormuzd, and Omar pretty completely that of Ahriman. The wildest developements of Shiism we have already seen in the Ishmaelites of Egypt and in the fearful confraternity of Alamout. But even among its soberer devotees, the regard for Ali and his house certainly surpasses what Mahomet would have allowed to any human being. If not deified, they are at least canonized. Something is practised not readily

to be distinguished from Invocation of Saints, and which it requires no small subtlety to reconcile with the precepts of the Koran. Even orthodox Sonnites are not free from similar superstitions, but certainly Persia is the chosen land of them.

At various times up to the fifteenth century holy devotees of the Shiah persuasion had attracted the reverence of their sect. The earth was deprived of all legitimate sway by the disappearance of the twelfth Imam; he alone was the true Pontiff and the true King; but wise and holy men might, till his re-appearance, bear sway in his name, as his lieutenants. Vicegerents of this sort styled themselves "Slaves of the Lord of the Age," a title not disdained by the proudest of the Sophis. One of these saints, a descendant of Ali, either Sheikh Sefi or his son Seddereddin—for the tale is told of both—flourished in the days of Timour. The great Emir professed extreme reverence for sanctity and learning, and, as he returned in triumph from Ankyra, he asked the Sheikh if he could bestow any favour upon him. The devotee was not content to ask the conqueror to step out of his sunshine;—"Release your Roman captives," was the far nobler reply. These Roman captives, I need hardly say, were Mahometan Turks, subjects of the conquered Sultan. As such, the Sheikh ought to have been a grievous heretic in their eyes; but possibly they were Moslems unattached, possibly gratitude overcame orthodoxy; certain it is that when the conqueror complied with the benevolent behest of the saint, they immediately enrolled themselves as his most fervent disciples. In a Mahometan country the progress is easy from spiritual to temporal dominion; the only remarkable thing is that the progress of the

new sect or dynasty was so slow. Throughout the fifteenth century, a period in Persia of extreme disorder, the descendants of Sefi waxed stronger and stronger, gradually growing from hermits into Padishahs. At last, in 1502, Ishmael, the then representative of this holy race, found himself, after a succession of victories, undisputed monarch of all Persia.

Shah Ishmael must undoubtedly be placed in the first rank of oriental conquerors. He not only founded a dynasty; he refounded a nation. As the Orthodox Church made the existing Greek nation, so the Shiah sect made the existing Persian nation. For more than two centuries the descendants of Sheikh Sefi filled the throne of Iran, and, as slaves of the invisible Imam, they exercised a sway more utterly uncontrolled than that of any princes upon earth. Their government stands out vividly before us in the curious volume of Kämpfer[1] and in the four quartos of that prince of travellers, Sir John Chardin. Both testify that no other, even among oriental princes, at all equalled the perfect despotism of the later Sophis. Their neighbours on each side, the Great Mogul and the Grand Turk, were by comparison limited monarchs. The Padishah of Stamboul was subject alike to military and to ecclesiastical checks; the turbulent Janissaries served as a rude expression of public opinion; the dignitaries of the law were often able to interpose between the sovereign and his contemplated atrocities. But the Padishah of Isfahan depended on no Prætorian guard, on no ecclesiastical tribunal. The Grand Turk might call himself successor of the Abbasside Caliphs; but everyone knew that he was

[1] Amœnitatum Exoticarum Politico-Physico-Medicarum Fasciculi V. Lemgoviæ, 1712.

primarily a King and only secondarily a Pontiff. But the Sophi was King wholly and solely by virtue of his spiritual character; it was only as lieutenant of the Imam that he was entitled to bear either sword. It naturally followed that the chiefs of the Law in Persia could not maintain that comparative independence of the sovereign which they have always done in Turkey. The Sultan requires a sacred *fetva*[1] for many things; he may indeed depose the Pontiff who refuses it, but the form must be gone through, and the delay may hinder many an act of barbarity. But the Shah of Iran, the direct vicegerent of the Imam, needed no such sanction; his slightest word must be obeyed at the moment. The Great Mogul too, according to Kämpfer[2], was kept in some check by the rivalry of his sons and brothers; but the sons and brothers of the Grand Sophi were at best shut up in the haram, and very frequently were deprived of eyesight in the most effectual manner. The Shah, and the Shah alone, had absolute power of life and death; he and his officers could, at any moment, override all the precepts of the regular courts, by their customary, or rather martial, law. So unmixed a despotism probably never existed in any other country, Christian or Mahometan, with the slightest pretensions to civilization.

How did such a system work? It is hard to say, because the condition of Persia was so totally different from that of the countries with which we must compare it. Persia was a really Mahometan nation, and it enjoyed profound peace for nearly a century. The mass of the people in Persia were better off than the

[1] A legal or theological opinion whether a proposed course of action is in conformity with the Koran. [2] Page 4.

mass of the people in Turkey or India; but that was because the mass of the people in Persia were Mahometans, while in Turkey and India they were Giaours. On the few disciples of Zoroaster who still remained the hand of Moslem oppression pressed far more heavily than on the votaries of Brahma and the Panagia. And the Persian Mahometan was hardly so well off in some respects as his Mahometan neighbour, because justice was still worse administered in Persia than in Turkey. But on the whole the Persian peasantry were not very badly off. Their lives were safe; the Shah cut off heads and put out eyes *ad libitum* at court, but this mattered little to provincials out of his reach. For instance, Abbas II., like several of his race, was fonder of wine than became a descendant of the Prophet. In his drunkenness he committed the most horrid atrocities; when sober, he was an excellent sovereign. But the horrors of his drunkenness affected only his immediate courtiers, while the benefits of his sober moments extended to his whole kingdom. In financial matters Chardin describes a perpetual warfare as going on between the peasantry on the one hand, the landlords and government officials on the other; the one endeavouring to extort more than their due, the other endeavouring to evade even the most lawful demands. Strange to say, the weaker party commonly triumphed; and our author describes the Persian peasantry of his time as tolerably prosperous, and especially as enjoying that full liberty of personal action which in some countries it is deemed the main object of government to annihilate.

Three languages were in use in Persia under the Sophis, and a man in any prominent position was

necessarily conversant with all. Arabic was the language of religion and science; Turkish of court ceremonial; Persian of popular literature and ordinary intercourse. In religion Shiism was universal, and Sonnite Moslems paid a higher capitation-tax than Infidels.

With their Ottoman neighbours the early Sophis had frequent wars. Shah Ishmael, victorious over all with whom he contended on equal terms, could not withstand the terrors of Sultan Selim's park of artillery. But towards the close of the sixteenth century the relative position of Turkey and Persia was reversed. Solomon the Magnificent was no more, and the wonderful series of the great Sultans had closed with him. But from 1585 to 1627 the throne of Persia was filled by Shah Abbas the Great, the most illustrious of her rulers since the days of Nushirvan. Abbas conquered at home and abroad; he encouraged Europeans at his court; he learned from them in peace and war; he drove back the threatening Ottoman, and broke the power of dangerous grandees within his own kingdom. He is perhaps the most perfect specimen of a great oriental despot; a man of vast powers devoting them on the whole to noble and beneficent ends, yet guilty of occasional crimes at which humanity shudders. He did not, like the nobler Akbar, rise above his class, and possibly, for that very reason, he effected more permanent good. A valiant and successful warrior, he carried on war no farther than was needful to secure peace; and no oriental ruler ever did more to promote commerce, cultivation, and pure administration of justice. Yet this man was, in his own household, a sanguinary and suspicious tyrant, who

put his eldest son to death because the eyes of the courtiers were turned to him with admiration. In his dealings with the Georgian princes too he appears in a light no less detestable. But Persia had every reason to bless a prince who raised her to a pitch, unknown for a thousand years, alike of external glory and of internal prosperity.

So great a prince as Abbas, though he affected extreme devotion, was not likely to be a religious persecutor. With regard to foreigners, he carried his toleration so far as to stand godfather to the child of an English resident[1], a transaction in which one hardly knows which most to marvel at, the Mahometan or the Christian. And with regard to his own subjects he was as liberal in religious matters as a Mussulman ruler can be. Part of his policy was to leave his frontiers uninhabited, in pursuance of which end he did not scruple, like the old Persian Kings, to make wholesale removals of the population. The people thus removed were chiefly Armenian Christians. Of these he founded two great colonies, one in Mazenderan on the Caspian Sea, and another at Julfà, a suburb of Isfahan. Both were endowed with ample privileges, and were carefully protected from the bigotry of his Mahometan subjects. The colony in Mazenderan failed; Abbas said it would be a paradise for Christians, as the land abounded in vines and hogs; but the climate proved too unhealthy to realize the royal expectations. But the Armenians at Julfà greatly flourished all the days of Shah Abbas the Great; under later and less liberal monarchs they declined, and at last, under Sultan Hossein, the last Sophi, their condition amounted to actual persecution.

[1] Malcolm, i. 559.

After Abbas the Great the race of the Sophis degenerated; such degeneracy was indeed no marvel, when the future sovereign remained shut up in the haram till his elevation to the throne. Abbas II., who reigned from 1641 to 1666, was, as I have said, an excellent prince when he was not drunk. He was, like his great ancestor, tolerant in religion, and especially favourable to Christians. Indeed to him is attributed a golden dictum, worthy of Akbar himself:—"It is for God, not for me, to judge of men's consciences; and I never will interfere with what belongs to the tribunal of the great Creator and Lord of the Universe[1]."

The Suffavean dynasty lasted till 1722, when it was terminated by an Affghan revolt. That nation, so well known to ourselves in recent times, was then tributary to Persia, but they professed Islam in its orthodox form. Oppression on the part of Persian satraps, and sectarian hatred of Shiah masters, led to the capture of Isfahan and the brief establishment of an Affghan dynasty on the throne of Iran. Another Mahmoud descended from nearly the same regions as his more famous namesake, and he and his kinsman Ashraff both appear in the list of Persian monarchs. But Tahmasp, the son of Shah Hossein, still asserted his rights; nor were foreign enemies wanting to add to the miseries of the kingdom. We have now reached the beginning of a period of which we have perhaps not yet seen the ending, that of wars between the Grand Turk and the Czar. One of these had just been concluded by a peace, which enabled the disputants to unite in a nefarious coalition for the dismemberment of Persia. When the Ottoman army

[1] Malcolm, i. 583.

advanced, Ashraff naturally inquired why the Sultan made war upon orthodox Moslems who had just subverted an heretical dynasty. The answer was that the master of Stamboul was Caliph as well as Padishah, and that the King of Persia must own the spiritual supremacy of the Commander of the Faithful.

From all these enemies Persia was liberated by the genius of one man. Tahmasp Kouli Khan, afterwards Nadir Shah, a Persian Turk of low birth, changed from a robber to a soldier, and as a soldier grew into King of Persia and conqueror of the surrounding realms. He delivered his country alike from Russians, Ottomans, and Affghans; he dethroned Tahmasp, the nominal Suffavean king; his infant successor soon disappeared; and in 1736 Nadir himself procured his own election to the crown. In his liberation of his country he trod in the steps of Artaxerxes and Ishmael; not so in the condition which he annexed to his acceptance of the throne, the surrender of the distinctive faith of Persia. Shiism, as a separate creed, was to be abolished, and "the sect of Jaffer" was to be recognized as a fifth orthodox sect. Shiism was perhaps too closely connected with the rule of the Sophis to be regarded with favour by their destroyer; and Nadir looked forward to foreign conquests in which sectarian divisions might turn to his prejudice.

Nadir reigned till 1747; he subdued, or concluded favourable treaties with, all the surrounding nations. He invaded India to avenge the reception which the Great Mogul had given to the Affghan fugitives, and, like Jenghiz or Timour, he celebrated his coming by a massacre of the inhabitants of Delhi. In his early

days the liberator, he became in his later years the savage tyrant of his country; he died by the hand of an assassin; he founded no permanent dynasty; nor did his religious innovations survive him.

I shall not pursue the more recent history of Persia any further, but will rather continue that of India from the invasion of Timour to that of Nadir. The greater portion of that period is included in the dynasty of the descendants of Timour, once so celebrated as the Great Moguls. Timour himself founded no dynasty in India; he simply overthrew an existing dynasty, and caused the breaking up of an existing empire. It was not till more than a century later that his descendant Baber founded that particular Mahometan dynasty in India which, we may fairly say, surpassed every other Mahometan dynasty alike in the splendour and in the equity of its rule. The Great Mogul, at almost any period of his real power, afforded an honourable contrast both to the Grand Turk and the Grand Sophi. At some periods his government might be fairly compared, not indeed to that of constitutional states like Britain, Norway, or Switzerland, but at any rate to that of the most flourishing days of the Roman Empire. In its founder this dynasty exhibited the most attractive of eastern conquerors; in his descendant Shah Jehan it produced the ablest of oriental administrators; while in an intermediate generation comes a name which soars far above all eastern and most western rulers; a name which I can never speak without admiration and reverence; need I add the immortal name of Akbar? We shall fitly close our subject with a sketch of this splendid line of monarchs; rulers under whom Mahometan despotism at once appeared in its fairest colours, and at the

same time exhibited the surest signs of its incapacity, even under the most favourable circumstances, to discharge the proper functions of government.

This dynasty is commonly known as Mogul, both in and out of India; but Baber was for all practical purposes a Turk. His memoirs were written in Turkish; his army was chiefly Turkish; and he always speaks of the real Moguls with extreme dislike. The cause of the misnomer is that the name Mogul is in India loosely applied to all strangers from the North, much in the same way as that of Frank is, throughout the eastern world, to all strangers from the West. It is even applied to the Persians, with hardly more reason than the Persians themselves have for calling the Ottoman Turks Romans. Baber was at least as much a Turk as the later Plantagenet Kings were Englishmen. He was hardly so much of a Mogul as Robert Bruce was of a Frenchman. It is remarkable that, while in Persia Turkish was the court language, in India Persian was the tongue both of ceremony and literature. Baber's Turkish Memoirs were translated into that language; Akbar's Institutes and Ferishta's History were published in it. Hindostani was however the ordinary speech; but Turkish, at least under the early Emperors, was not entirely forgotten.

Baber is one of the most attractive characters in eastern history. We forgive him his wars and aggressions, partly on account of his charming memoirs, partly because his conquests procured for Akbar a realm wherein to govern. His eventful life chiefly consisted in being tossed backwards and forwards from one kingdom to another, ruling alternately over Ferghana, Cabul, and Hindostan. How many times

he gained and lost Samarcand, I will not venture to say; certain it is, that, like Demetrius Poliorketes, when driven from one throne, he generally found another ready for him; only, while Demetrius after all died a captive, Baber contrived to die Emperor of Hindostan.

Baber, though fond of wine, was an orthodox Mussulman. He speaks with glee of warfare against the Infidel; he rejoices in the surname of Ghazi obtained by such warfare. Still he does not seem to have been a special bigot. His own style of writing on such matters contrasts favourably with the declamation of his secretaries,[1] and he seems to hate heretics worse than infidels. His son Humayun had considerable experience of the heretics and their ways. Expelled from his kingdom, he took refuge in Persia, then ruled by Shah Tahmasp, the second Sophi. The descendant of Saints and Imams received his Sonnite guest with extraordinary magnificence, but threatened to burn him alive if he would not conform to the practices of the Shiahs.[2] Humayun did not feel any vocation for martyrdom, and he at least coquetted with a heresy whose *ultima ratio* was of so cogent a kind. Even when restored to his kingdom, he was reproached for a tendency to the sect of Ali, and for the favour which he showed to many of its votaries. But let us pass from him to his illustrious son.

Akbar, the third Mogul Emperor, reigned from 1556 to 1605, being, during the greater part of that

[1] See the firman in p. 359 of Baker's Memoirs, and Mr. Erskine's note.

[2] On the reception of Humayun in Persia, see the narrative—a fine piece of critical history—in Erskine's India under Baber and Humayun, ii. 280, &c.

time, a contemporary of Shah Abbas the Great. But as an average Great Mogul was far better than an average Sophi, so the most illustrious of the Moguls rises immeasureably above the most illustrious of the Sophis. If any man can be pardoned for running headlong into every sort of iniquity, it is one who finds himself possessed of uncontrolled power from his childhood. Yet Akbar went unscathed through this fearful ordeal. He ascended an eastern throne at the age of thirteen, and reigned nearly half a century without a recorded crime. His first recorded action is worthy of his subsequent course. His tutor, Behram Khan, a bigotted Shiah Moslem, caused an Affghan chief, captive and wounded, to be brought before the young Emperor, whom he bade strike him again, in order, by shedding infidel blood, to win the rank of Ghazi. The noble boy refused the odious task, and Behram smote off the captive's head with his own hand.

Akbar was engaged in wars during his whole reign; but in an eastern prince we cannot harshly condemn even what we might deem unrighteous aggression. Akbar's wars, however, were chiefly waged to recover provinces to which he could pretend some shadow of right; they were far less unjust than those cruel attacks upon France which have won immortality for Edward III. and Henry V. His wars moreover were carried on with a moderation most unusual in eastern lands; nations were subdued only to subject them to a far better sway than they had previously known, and the conquered constantly became the most loyal subjects of the conqueror. His legislation was in every way beneficent and humane; his flatterers undoubtedly attribute to him much that was really

the work of earlier kings ; but it was needless to rob others of their praise to exalt an eastern king who, at eighteen, forbade the sale of prisoners of war as slaves, and who instructed all his governors to be sparing of the punishment of death, and never to inflict it in a lingering form. As far as my acquaintance with his actions extends, I cannot find that he was ever guilty of a massacre or an unjust execution. Of how many eastern despots can we say the like ?

The faults of Akbar's character appear to have been a very considerable amount of personal vanity, and a certain disposition to over-meddling with the private affairs of his subjects. His government was truly paternal; but he descended too much into trifling and puerile regulations. His Institutes contain too many vague moral precepts which it is hardly the business of a sovereign to instil into his subjects. A legislator may either allow or forbid polygamy; but he need hardly inform his people that their Emperor "does not approve of a man marrying more than one wife, nor of a young man marrying an old woman."[1] I do not know how far Akbar's own practice was conformable to his precepts on the latter head; certainly, on the former, he claimed, like Mahomet, exemptions for himself. The imperial seraglio was far from empty.[2] It was weak also

[1] Ayeen Akbery, i. 288. One might imagine that Akbar here designed a twofold sarcasm on Mahomet, glancing alike at the monogamy of his youth and the polygamy of his later years.

[2] "There is in general great inconvenience arising from a number of women; but his Majesty, out of the abundance of his wisdom and prudence, has made it subservient to the public advantage: for by contracting marriages with the daughters of the princes of Hindostan and other countries, he secures himself against insurrection at home, and forms powerful alliances abroad.

"The Haram is an enclosure of such immense extent as to contain a

and hardly tolerant, to insist upon men shaving their chins, with whom it was a matter of conscience to do otherwise; nor should he have insisted on prostrations to himself, which orthodox Mussulmans thought idolatrous.

But what are defects like these when set against such an oasis in the desert of oriental history as a forty-nine years' reign of justice, humanity, and toleration? From the beginning, we have seen, Indian Mahometanism lost something of its native intolerance. I remember a newspaper, full of zeal for the Grand Turk, pointing to the tolerance of the Great Mogul, as an unanswerable argument in favour of the former. Call Mahometanism intolerant! Look at Akbar! Very good. Akbar was the most tolerant of rulers; but was he a Mahometan? He was brought up in that faith; he professed it on his death-bed; but the mature judgment of his vigorous intellect rejected it during the long years of his glory. From the very first, he admitted men of all creeds to the highest offices; Hindoo Rajahs alternate with Moslem Khans among the great dignitaries of the empire. He abolished the pilgrim-tax; he abolished the jezia or capitation-tax, the permanent badge of degradation upon the Giaour. He listened attentively to the religious teachers of all sects; and ended by putting forth a system of his own, to which however he constrained no man.

By the creed of Akbar exclusive reverence for Mahomet or any human prophet was rejected. He taught that there was but one God, and added that Akbar Padishah was His Caliph. He did not how-

separate room for every one of the women, *whose number exceeds five thousand.*" Ayeen Akbery, i. 15.

ever claim any miraculous or prophetic character; his Caliphate apparently consisted in the union of imperial power with the vocation of a religious teacher. In his creed God was one and spiritual; a purely spiritual worship was the best; but those who could not attain to it were recommended to take the sun as the visible symbol of divinity. He ordained no ritual, he established no priesthood; a few prayers and obeisances were recommended in consideration for human infirmity; abstinence was not enforced, but it was recommended as tending to exalt the mind; the real way for man to serve his Creator was by doing his duty to His creatures. In all this, Akbar quite cast away Mahomet and his Creed, and rather lighted upon the original idea of the Hindoo faith in its purer form. Christianity he treated with great respect; he showed reverence to images of Christ and the Virgin; he even caused one of his sons to receive lessons in the Gospel, in which the ordinary "Bismillah" was changed into the formula, "In the name of Jesus Christ.[1]"

This eclectic creed however made but few converts. Akbar fully tolerated all creeds. He persecuted neither Moslem nor Hindoo; but he withdrew all legal sanction from any portion of their systems. The Moslem might, if he pleased, drink wine, eat pork, play at dice, and cease to frequent the mosque; he might not, by premature circumcision, commit an infant to a faith which he could not examine. The Hindoo widow might marry again, and she might not be burned against her will. He is said however, which seems at variance with his general system, to have forbidden the slaughter of animals for sacrifice. To

[1] Elphinstone, ii. 322, 3

continue the date of the Hejira would have been absurd when Islam was no longer the dominant religion; he therefore established an æra dating from his own accession, and he had the good sense to make his year solar instead of lunar. The result of all this was strongly to endear his government to the mass of the Hindoo people, who now at last found themselves raised to a perfect equality with their conquerors. The valiant Rajpoots became the most loyal soldiers in the imperial army. The corresponding result was great dissatisfaction among the Mussulman population. Their creed, as under the elder Moguls of Persia, was discouraged; it was brought down from its eminence, and was obliged to meet other creeds on equal terms. Many zealots strongly opposed the imperial projects, and they met with a corresponding proportion of imperial disfavour. But no man was harmed in life, limb, or estate. Akbar's persecution went no further than ordering one bigot out of the presence-chamber, and telling another that he *deserved* a blow. He never deviated from the noble principles of toleration set forth by his minister Abul Fazl in the Preface to his Institutes—principles totally unknown in any other contemporary state, European or Asiatic, Mahometan or Christian, Catholic or Protestant:—"Persecution, after all, defeats its own ends; it obliges men to conceal their opinions, but produces no change in them.[1]"

Under Akbar's successors Jehangir and Shah Jehan a retrograde movement took place. Jehangir was a cruel tyrant; but Shah Jehan, as a civil administrator, rivalled, if he did not surpass, Akbar. During their reigns Islam again became the dominant faith, but

[1] Ayeen Akbery, p. xi.; cf. p. ix.

full toleration was still allowed. Hindoos were not excluded from office nor subjected to the capitation-tax. Christian missionaries were not hindered from making converts even in the imperial family. Two nephews of Jehangir embraced their faith. Under Shah Jehan, three sons of that Emperor professed three different persuasions. Dara adhered to the eclectic creed of Akbar; Shuja was a Shiah; Aurangzebe a bigotted Sonnite.[1] Aurangzebe ultimately deposed his father; he put his brother Dara to death as an apostate; he restored the capitation-tax and the lunar year; he excluded Hindoos from office; he acted in short as a perfect Moslem bigot. He had his reward in the revolt of the noble Rajpoots and in the growth of the indomitable Mahrattas. He reigned from 1658 to 1707; his forty-nine years may be set against the forty-nine of Akbar.

The history of these Mogul Emperors shows to my mind most plainly the essential intolerance of the Mahometan religion. Only one Mahometan prince ever gave full and perfect religious equality to all his people By a logical consequence, he deserted the religion against whose precepts his noblest acts were so many sins. Here and there a King like Abbas had laboured to secure his infidel subjects from actual personal oppression; but Akbar stands alone in thoroughly relieving them from every mark of degradation or inferiority. Among all the benefactors of their species few can claim a more honourable place than this most illustrious Emperor. In his own age he stood alone,[2] not only in Islam, but in the whole world; Catholic and Protestant Christendom

[1] Elphinstone, ii. 416.

[2] William the Silent of Nassau may be classed as a solitary exception.

might both have gone and sat at his feet. A mightier genius and a nobler heart can hardly be conceived than that of the Mahometan despot who ordained universal toleration. But the more glory we yield to Akbar, the more shame we cast upon the Mahometan religion. His tolerance proves its intolerance. There are those in our own day who assuredly need the lesson, that a Mahometan government, to become really tolerant, must cease to be Mahometan. Sultan Abdul Medjid personally I believe to be actuated by the most beneficent motives towards his subjects of all religions. But he would fain effect impossibilities. He may, as a Mahometan ruler, perchance be glorious after the fashion of his ancestors. He may, if he will, be glorious after the far nobler fashion of Akbar. But to win the glory of Akbar, he must tread in his steps. He must not only grant a nominal equality to his Christian subjects; he must himself, if he would really change from a foreign invader into a national sovereign, cast away a creed, against which, the more beneficent is his legislation, the greater is his sin. And after all, the example of Akbar shows how little an individual man can do, when his reforms rest on no national basis. Whatever good a single despot could do Akbar did; but even Akbar could not secure permanency for a reform which he had granted of his own free will, but which no national voice had demanded. Strange to say, some look for special permanence in the modern Turkish reforms, because they originate in the Government, and are "in a manner forced upon the people in spite of themselves.[1]" The history of Rome, of Switzerland, of England, tells us a good deal in favour of the permanence of reforms

[1] Larpent's Turkey, ii. 9.

which the people win for themselves. The history of India tells us but little as to the permanence of reforms which even the noblest of rulers force upon them. It is hardly to be expected that Abdul-Medjid can succeed where Akbar failed. A weak, though well-meaning prince, the nominal sovereign of a decaying realm supported by foreign powers for their own convenience, a prince surrounded by corrupt officials and a barbarian populace, can hardly effect what surpassed the power of the undisputed lord of a vigorous and flourishing empire, and personally one of the best and greatest of the sons of men. Even Akbar could only secure the full establishment of his reform for the duration of his own life. His son restored many of the old abuses; his great grandson swept away every trace of reform. The reforms of a Kleisthenes, a Licinius, and a De Montfort can perish only with the nation which demands them. The reforms of an Akbar can be abolished by an Aurangzebe. What shall we predict for the reforms of an Abdul-Medjid?

Aurangzebe however was an able prince, and kept up the splendour of his dynasty. Since his day, the history of the Mogul Empire has closely resembled that of the Caliphate or the Western Roman Empire. Governors grew into Kings who retained only a nominal allegiance; Nadir Shah swept over Delhi like a whirlwind; the English power in India arose and grew. The dominions of the successor of Akbar are now confined to the walls of his own palace, where he still sits, the pensioner of a British Company, fallen lower than any Palæologus of Constantinople, than any Abbasside of Cairo.

We have thus traced Mahometanism from the Arabian desert to the thrones of Cordova and Bagdad, of Stamboul and of Delhi. We have seen its good and its evil side; its momentary reform; its permanent obstruction to better things. We have seen the splendour of the rival Caliphates, their pomp and luxury, their art and learning. We have seen in Persia a really Mahometan people; in Turkey and Spain we have seen the Moslem lord it over the Christian, in India we have seen him lord it over the idolator. Full justice I trust I have done to the Prophet himself and the nobler among his disciples. But what has been the result of our inquiry? That Mahometanism is essentially an obstructive, intolerant system, supplying just sufficient good to stand in the way of greater good. It has consecrated despotism; it has consecrated polygamy; it has consecrated slavery. It has declared war against every other creed; it has claimed to be at least dominant in every land. And in one sense it has rightly so claimed So long as a Mahometan nation is dominant and conquering, so long is it great and glorious after its own standard. When it ceases to have an enemy to contend against, it sinks into sluggish stupidity and into a barbarism far viler than that of the conquerors who raised it to greatness. It must have an enemy; if cut off, like Persia, from conflict with the infidel, it finds its substitute in sectarian hatred of brother Moslems. Islam has founded mighty empires, it has reared splendid palaces, it has accumulated libraries of countless volumes. But it has done nothing for man in his highest earthly capacity, as the citizen of a free state; it has done nothing for the higher even of his purely speculative faculties. By slightly re-

forming, it has perpetuated and sanctified all the evils of the eastern world. It has, by its aggressive tenets, brought them into more direct antagonism with the creed and civilization of the west. A system, originally the greatest of reforms in its own age and country, has proved the curse and scourge of the world for twelve hundred years. There are lands in which we may still wish God speed to the peaceful preachers—for such there are—of a creed which teaches that "there is no God but God," even though it adds that "Mahomet is the Apostle of God." But within the limits of what once was Christendom; on the site of vanished Carthage, in Alexandria, in Byzantium, in the Holy City itself, what sadder sight can a Christian behold than the ensign of him who in deed, though not in will, has been the Antichrist? Let us hope yet to see the Cross gleaming upon the dome of St. Sophia; let us hope to see peace preserved around the Holy Sepulchre by other means than the scimetar of the Infidel. And once more, to those who expect to see a Mahometan state become tolerant and civilized without ceasing to be Mahometan, I would again hold up the solitary example of the illustrious Mogul. If European Turkey is to be reformed from within, without the coercion of either enemies or friends, the career of Akbar must be the guiding star. Let the individual Mahometan have the fullest equality with the individual Christian, but let not the individual Christian have to recognize a Mahometan master as his sovereign. So long as a government remains Mahometan, so long must it be intolerant at home; so long will it only be restrained by weakness from offering to other lands the old election of "Koran, Tribute, or Sword."

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